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Abstract
In function inversion, we are given a function 𝑓 : [𝑁 ] ↦→ [𝑁 ], and want to prepare some
advice of size 𝑆, such that we can efficiently invert any image in time 𝑇 . This is a well studied
problem with profound connections to cryptography, data structures, communication complex-
ity, and circuit lower bounds. Investigation of this problem in the quantum setting was initiated
by Nayebi, Aaronson, Belovs, and Trevisan (2015), who proved a lower bound of 𝑆𝑇 2 = Ω̃(𝑁)
for random permutations against classical advice, leaving open an intriguing possibility that
Grover’s search can be sped up to time ?̃?(
√︀
𝑁/𝑆). Recent works by Hhan, Xagawa, and Ya-
makawa (2019), and Chung, Liao, and Qian (2019) extended the argument for random functions
and quantum advice, but the lower bound remains 𝑆𝑇 2 = Ω̃(𝑁).
In this work, we prove that even with quantum advice, 𝑆𝑇 + 𝑇 2 = Ω̃(𝑁) is required for an
algorithm to invert random functions. This demonstrates that Grover’s search is optimal for
𝑆 = ?̃?(
√
𝑁), ruling out any substantial speed-up for Grover’s search even with quantum advice.
Further improvements to our bounds would imply a breakthrough in circuit lower bounds, as
shown by Corrigan-Gibbs and Kogan (2019).
To prove this result, we develop a general framework for establishing quantum time-space
lower bounds. We further demonstrate the power of our framework by proving the following
results.
∙ Yao’s box problem: We prove a tight quantum time-space lower bound for classical advice.
For quantum advice, we prove a first time-space lower bound using shadow tomography.
These results resolve two open problems posted by Nayebi, Aaronson, Belovs, and Trevisan
(2015).
∙ Salted cryptography: We show that “salting generically provably defeats preprocessing,” a
result shown by Coretti, Dodis, Guo, and Steinberger (2018), also holds in the quantum
setting. In particular, we prove quantum time-space lower bounds for a wide class of
salted cryptographic primitives in the quantum random oracle model. This yields the first
quantum time-space lower bound for salted collision-finding, which in turn implies that
𝖯𝖶𝖯𝖯𝒪 ̸⊆ 𝖥𝖡𝖰𝖯𝒪/𝗊𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒 relative to a random oracle 𝒪.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Function Inversion
The task of function inversion asks that given a function 𝑓 : [𝑁 ] ↦→ [𝑁 ] and a point 𝑦, find an 𝑥 such
that 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑦. It is easy to show that a classical inversion algorithm requires Ω(𝑁) queries (which
trivially lower bounds time) to succeed with constant probability in inverting a random function 𝑓 ,
even with the help of randomness. Grover [Gro96] considered the same problem in the context of
database search, and showed that quantum computers can invert any function in time only ?̃?(
√
𝑁),
which was subsequently shown to be tight [BBBV97].
The situation becomes intriguing when preprocessing is allowed. Namely, we allow the algorithm
to take the entire truth table of 𝑓 and arbitrarily preprocess an 𝑆-bit advice string 𝛼 = 𝛼(𝑓),
and then we give the algorithm a random 𝑓(𝑥) and ask the algorithm to invert it using at most
𝑇 queries. Understanding the tradeoff between 𝑆 and 𝑇 is referred to as time-space tradeoffs for
function inversion. This tradeoff is an important problem in cryptography. Recent works [GGH+19,
KP19, CK19] showed its connections to well studied problems in data structures, communication
complexity, and circuit lower bounds.
For classical algorithms, the heuristic algorithm proposed by Hellman [Hel80], and subsequently
rigorously analyzed by Fiat and Naor [FN99], uses 𝑆 bits of advice and 𝑇 queries to invert a
random function with high probability for every 𝑆, 𝑇 satisfying 𝑆2𝑇 ≥ ?̃?(𝑁2). For the lower
bound, Yao [Yao90] and De et al. [DTT10] proved that any preprocessing algorithm that uses 𝑆
bits of advice and 𝑇 queries must satisfy 𝑆𝑇 = Ω̃(𝑁), which remains the best general lower bound
we know today. Corrigan-Gibbs and Kogan [CK19] recently investigated possible improvements on
the lower bound, and showed that any improvements on Yao’s lower bound will lead to improved
circuit lower bounds.
The study of time-space tradeoffs in the quantum setting was initiated by Nayebi, Aaronson,
Belovs and Trevisan [NABT15]. When the preprocessing algorithm is quantum, it is natural to
distinguish the cases of quantum versus classical advice, as analogous to the complexity classes of
𝖡𝖰𝖯/𝗊𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒 versus 𝖡𝖰𝖯/𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒 and 𝖰𝖬𝖠 versus 𝖰𝖢𝖬𝖠. Nayebi et al. [NABT15] showed that any
quantum preprocessing algorithm that uses 𝑆 bits of classical advice and 𝑇 queries to invert a
random permutation with a constant probability must satisfy 𝑆𝑇 2 = Ω̃(𝑁). Note that the 𝑇 2
term is necessary given Grover’s search algorithm. Recently, with motivations from post-quantum
cryptography, Hhan, Xagawa, and Yamakawa [HXY19] extended the lower bound to handle general
function inversion (and other cryptographic primitives). For the more challenging case of algorithms
with quantum advice, Hhan el al. [HXY19] and Chung et al. [CLQ19] proved lower bounds for
inverting random permutation and a restricted class of random functions1. However, these lower
bounds remain 𝑆𝑇 2 = Ω̃(𝑁). As pointed out by Nayebi et al. [NABT15], this leaves open the
following intriguing possibility:
Could a piece of preprocessed advice help speed up Grover’s search algorithm?
In this work, we prove the following quantum time-space lower bound for function inversion,
which shows that even quantum advice of size 𝑆 = 𝑂(
√
𝑁) does not help speed up Grover’s search
algorithm.
Theorem 1.1. Let 𝑓 : [𝑁 ] ↦→ [𝑁 ] be a random function. For any quantum oracle algorithms 𝒜
with 𝑆-qubit oracle-dependent advice 𝛼 = 𝛼(𝑓) and 𝑇 queries to 𝑓 ,
1Specifically, the lower bound only holds for functions with roughly the same domain and image size.
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(Classical) Hellman’s algorithm 𝑆2𝑇 ≤ 𝑁2
Classical lower bound 𝑆𝑇 ≥ 𝑁
(Quantum) Grover’s search algorithm 𝑇 ≤ √𝑁
Previous quantum lower bound 𝑆𝑇 2 ≥ 𝑁
Our quantum lower bound 𝑆𝑇 + 𝑇 2 ≥ 𝑁
Figure 1: Time-space tradeoffs for inverting a random function 𝑓 : [𝑁 ] ↦→ [𝑁 ] with a constant
successful probability. For the classical setting, the best upper bound is given by Hellman’s algo-
rithm [Hel80, FN99], and the best lower bound is given by [Yao90, DGK17, CDGS18]. For the
quantum setting, the best upper bound is given either by Grover’s search algorithm [Gro96] or
(classical) Hellman’s algorithm, and the previous best lower bound is given by [HXY19, CLQ19].
For simplicity, logarithmic terms and constant factors are omitted.
∙ if 𝛼 is classical, then
Pr
[︁
𝒜𝑓 (𝛼, 𝑓(𝑥)) ∈ 𝑓−1(𝑓(𝑥))
]︁
= ?̃?
(︂
𝑆𝑇 + 𝑇 2
𝑁
)︂
;
∙ if 𝛼 is quantum, then
Pr
[︁
𝒜𝑓 (𝛼, 𝑓(𝑥)) ∈ 𝑓−1(𝑓(𝑥))
]︁
= ?̃?
(︃
3
√︂
𝑆𝑇 + 𝑇 2
𝑁
)︃
,
where both probabilities are over 𝑓 , a uniformly random 𝑥 from [𝑁 ], and randomness of 𝒜.
Our lower bound implies that for a quantum preprocessing algorithm to invert a random function
with a constant probability, it must satisfy 𝑆𝑇 + 𝑇 2 = Ω̃(𝑁) even for the case of quantum advice.
This further shows that Grover’s search is optimal for 𝑆 = ?̃?(
√
𝑁), ruling out any substantial
speed-up for Grover’s search even with quantum advice. For 𝑆 = ?̃?(
√
𝑁), our lower bound matches
Yao’s lower bound for classical algorithms and is the best provable lower bound in light of the
above-mentioned barrier results of [CK19].
Furthermore, in the context of cryptography, a typical complexity measure to define the security
is 𝑆 + 𝑇 (corresponding to the program length and the running-time), with respect to which our
lower bound implies a lower bound 𝑆 + 𝑇 ≥ Ω̃(√𝑁). This matches Grover’s search algorithm and
gives a tight characterization for function inversion.
A comparison of our bounds with known upper and lower bounds is included in Figure 1. We
remark that our lower bounds can be extended to general functions 𝑓 : [𝑁 ] ↦→ [𝑀 ] (see Theorem 5.3
and Theorem 5.4).
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1.2 Yao’s Box Problem
Yao’s box problem [Yao90] is another basic problem investigated in the literature of time-space
tradeoffs that is closely related to the function inversion problem and non-uniform security of pseu-
dorandom generators. In this problem, a preprocessing algorithm 𝒜 can compute an 𝑆-bit advice for
a function 𝑓 : [𝑁 ] ↦→ {0, 1} in the preprocessing phase, and then in the online phase, it is required to
compute the bit 𝑓(𝑥) ∈ {0, 1} for a random point 𝑥 ∈ [𝑁 ] by making at most 𝑇 query but without
querying 𝑓 on 𝑥. Similar formulations of such problem in the classical setting are recently studied
in the context of circuit complexity [ST18, MW19], which led to a new result on depth 3 circuits.
In the classical setting, Yao [Yao90] proved that for 𝒜 to succeed with probability 2/3, it
must satisfy 𝑆𝑇 = Ω(𝑁), which is known to be optimal. In the quantum setting, Nayebi et
al. [NABT15] showed an 𝑆𝑇 2 = Ω(𝑁) lower bound for solving Yao’s box problem with classical
advice, which does not rule out the possibility that a preprocessing algorithm with 𝑆 bits of advice
and 𝑇 = 𝑂(
√︀
𝑁/𝑆) queries. Subsequently, Hhan et al. [HXY19, Lemma 6] refined the analysis
and showed that for any 𝑆, 𝑇,𝑁 , any quantum algorithm with classical advice can only succeed
with probability 1/2+ ?̃?(𝑆𝑇 2/𝑁)1/6. However, the following two problems posted by Nayebi et al.
remain open.
Open Problem 1.2 ([NABT14, Section 3.4, Section 5]). Is there a quantum algorithm that solves
Yao’s box in time 𝑇 = 𝑂(
√︀
𝑁/𝑆)? Or equivalently, prove or disprove the optimality of the lower
bound 𝑆𝑇 2 = Ω̃(𝑁) for Yao’s box.
Open Problem 1.3 ([NABT14, Section 5]). Extend the lower bound for Yao’s box to the setting
where the advice can be an arbitrary quantum state.
We prove the following theorem for Yao’s box problem, answering both open problems above.
Theorem 1.4. Let 𝑓 : [𝑁 ] ↦→ {0, 1} be a random function. For any quantum oracle algorithms 𝒜
with 𝑆-qubit oracle-dependent advice 𝛼 = 𝛼(𝑓) and 𝑇 queries to 𝑓 except on the given challenge
point 𝑥,
∙ if 𝛼 is classical, then
Pr[𝒜𝑓 (𝛼, 𝑥) = 𝑓(𝑥)] = 1
2
+ ?̃?
(︃
3
√︂
𝑆𝑇
𝑁
)︃
;
∙ if 𝛼 is quantum, then
Pr[𝒜𝑓 (𝛼, 𝑥) = 𝑓(𝑥)] = 1
2
+ ?̃?
(︃
19
√︂
𝑆5𝑇
𝑁
)︃
,
where both probabilities are over 𝑓 , a uniformly random 𝑥 from [𝑁 ], and randomness of 𝒜.
In particular, this theorem implies that any algorithm achieving success probability 2/3 has to
satisfy 𝑆𝑇 = Ω̃(𝑁) for classical advice, which shows that the power of quantum query does not help
solving Yao’s box problem, and 𝑆5𝑇 = Ω̃(𝑁) for quantum advice.
We note that while in the classical setting, time-space lower bounds for Yao’s box problem
and the function inversion problem can be proved using the same techniques, such as compres-
sion [DTT10, DGK17] or presampling [Unr07, CDGS18], proving quantum time-space lower bounds
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for Yao’s box problem seems to be more challenging for quantum advice. This is also the case for our
framework since in Yao’s box problem, the algorithm cannot verify the answer on its own. For the
case of quantum advice, we employ a novel use of online shadow tomography [AR19], which enables
us to prove the first time-space lower bound for algorithms with quantum advice. We discuss the
issue more carefully in Section 1.4.3.
Finally, we note that while we did not explicitly prove this, we believe that our techniques are
sufficient for proving a lower bound 𝑆𝑇 = Ω̃(𝑁) for quantum advice, if we restrict the algorithm
such that it has to recover 𝑓(𝑥) for any 𝑥 ∈ [𝑁 ] with probability 2/3.
1.3 Post-Quantum Non-Uniform Security
It turns out that our techniques for proving the two results above are fairly general, and we can
use it to prove a variety of quantum non-uniform lower bounds. We now turn our focus to proving
non-uniform lower bounds in cryptographic ideal models, which is a topic that has gained a lot of
momentum recently.
Random oracle methodology and concrete security. While theoretically we can instantiate
a lot of private-key cryptography assuming only the existence of any one-way function [Lev87],
the constructions are almost always way too inefficient to be any useful for practical purposes.
Practical cryptographic schemes, instead are usually designed under an ideal model and are proven
secure under that model. A popular model of choice is random oracle model (ROM) [BR93], which
“heuristically” models a function in question 𝑓 : [𝑁 ] ↦→ [𝑀 ], say a SHA3 hash function, as a truly
random function that everyone has only oracle access to. To determine the security parameter to
use in the construction, usually concrete security bounds are derived in the ideal model, and we
work out the calculations to make sure any adversary in the ideal model, using at most a reasonable
amount of resources, can only succeed with small enough probability, usually 2−32 [LR10, Arc20].
While the random oracle model “heuristically” captures all attacks that do not employ the
structure of any particular instantiation of the random oracle, the model itself captures neither
preprocessing attackers nor quantum attackers. Moreover, security bounds obtained in the random
oracle model are inaccurate or do not apply at all once preprocessing or quantum computation are
allowed.
Quantum random oracle model. Quantum algorithms are known to achieve various nontrivial
speedups compared to classical algorithms, sometimes even an exponential speedup. For example,
Grover’s search algorithm achieves
√
𝑁 speedup over classical algorithms, and Shor’s algorithm
solves factoring in quantum polynomial time.
Motivated by assessing the post-quantum security of constructions in ROM, Boneh et al. [BDF+11]
introduced the quantum random oracle model (QROM) where the attacker can make superposition
queries to the oracle, as given a classical description of any function, a quantum algorithm can
trivially perform such superposition queries. Extending security proofs in classical ROM into the
stronger QROM has been an active area of investigation [BDF+11, Zha12, BZ13, Unr15, TU16,
Unr17, KLS18, Zha19, AHU19, LZ19b, DFMS19].
Auxiliary-input random oracle model. Consider the example where we use random oracle to
instantiate an one-way function (OWF). As shown by Hellman’s algorithm [Hel80], a preprocessing
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attacker can achieve a non-trivial saving of resources from 𝑁 to 𝑁2/3 even in the random oracle
model. Because the instantiated function is usually public, there is no way of preventing the
adversary from performing a heavy precomputation to speed up the online attack.
To address this mismatch, Unruh [Unr07] introduced the auxiliary-input random oracle model
(AI-ROM) where the adversary is allowed to obtain a bounded length advice about the random or-
acle before attacking the system. Several works [Unr07, DGK17, CDGS18, CDG18] have developed
various techniques for analyzing the security in this model.
Hhan et al. [HXY19] first considered the auxiliary-input quantum random oracle model (AI-
QROM) and quantum auxiliary-input quantum random oracle model (QAI-QROM), which is the
natural generalization of the model above for quantum adversaries. Despite the progress in QROM
and AI-ROM respectively, proving post-quantum non-uniform security remains quite challenging.
Only a few security bounds have been proven against classical advice, i.e. under AI-QROM [HXY19],
and no security bounds are known against quantum advice, i.e. QAI-QROM, except for OWFs [HXY19,
CLQ19]. The only known technique under these models is the (quantum) compression technique, in-
troduced by Nayebi et al. [NABT15], and its variants. We note that this technique is only somewhat
generic, and its effectiveness seems limited under QAI-QROM.
New generic framework for security bounds in (Q)AI-QROM. We generalize our tech-
niques for function inversion and Yao’s box into a general framework for proving concrete post-
quantum non-uniform security in AI-QROM and QAI-QROM. In particular, we show the following
theorem.
Theorem (Informal). For any security game 𝐺, adversary time bound 𝑇 , and any 𝑔 > 0, con-
sider its multi-instance game 𝐺⊗𝑔, which requires the adversary to break 𝑔 independent challenges
sequentially, and each instance is given time 𝑇 .
If the best winning probability for 𝐺⊗𝑔 is 𝛿𝑔 in the QROM, meaning that the best adversary can
only win the game with probability at most 𝛿𝑔, then for adversaries with 𝑆 = 𝑔 (qu)bits of advice:
1. 𝐺 is roughly ?̃?(𝛿)-secure in AI-QROM;
2. If 𝐺 is publicly verifiable, 𝐺 is 𝗇𝖾𝗀𝗅(𝑁)-secure in QAI-QROM if 𝛿 = 𝗇𝖾𝗀𝗅(𝑁);
3. If 𝐺 is a decision game, 𝐺 is 1/2 + 𝗇𝖾𝗀𝗅(𝑁)-secure in QAI-QROM if 𝛿 = 1/2 + 𝗇𝖾𝗀𝗅(𝑁).
The formal definition of security games and multi-instance games are given in Section 3, and the
formal reduction is presented in Section 4.
We note that our bound for function inversion we show in Section 1.1 directly translates to the
concrete security bound for OWFs, and our techniques for OWFs can be additionally used to show
security for pseudorandom generators (PRGs) with little efforts. The concrete bounds, proven in
Theorem 5.3, Theorem 5.4, and Theorem 5.14, are summarized into the table below.
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OWFs PRGs
AI-ROM [DGK17, CDGS18] 𝑆𝑇𝛼
(︀
𝑆𝑇
𝑁
)︀1/2
+ 𝑇𝑁
AI-QROM [HXY19]
(︁
𝑆𝑇 2
𝛼
)︁1/2 (︁
𝑆𝑇 4
𝑁 +
𝑇 4
𝑁
)︁1/6
AI-QROM (ours) 𝑆𝑇𝛼 +
𝑇 2
𝛼
(︁
𝑆𝑇
𝑁 +
𝑇 2
𝑁
)︁1/3
QAI-QROM (ours)
(︁
𝑆𝑇
𝛼 +
𝑇 2
𝛼
)︁1/3 (︁
𝑆5𝑇
𝑁 +
𝑆4𝑇 2
𝑁
)︁1/19
Table 1: Asymptotic security bounds on the security of OWFs and PRGs constructed from a random
function 𝑓 : [𝑁 ] ↦→ [𝑀 ] against (𝑆, 𝑇 )-algorithms, where 𝛼 := min{𝑁,𝑀}.
Salting defeats preprocessing in the quantum setting. Instead of proving more concrete
security bounds using the framework, we show that salting, a common mechanism used in practice
for defeating auxiliary input, generically extends the security of applications proven in the QROM
to the (Q)AI-QROM. A similar statement was first shown to hold in the classical world by Coretti
et al. [CDGS18], where they showed that the security in the ROM can be generically extended into
salted security in the AI-ROM.
In this work, we prove the hardness of salted multi-instance game under QROM.
Lemma (Informal statement of Lemma 7.2). For any security game 𝐺 with security 𝛿 in the QROM
against adversary running in time 𝑇 , let 𝐺𝑆 denote its salted version with salt space [𝐾]. Then the
best winning probability for multi-instance salted game 𝐺⊗𝑔𝑆 is at most (𝛿 + 𝑔𝑇/𝐾)
𝑔, which is tight
(Section 7.3).
Combining this lemma with our reduction theorem above, we conclude that salting generically
defeats preprocessing in the AI-QROM, and defeats preprocessing against publicly-verifiable and
decision games in the QAI-QROM. We believe our techniques are sufficient and both the reduction
theorem and salted multi-instance bound can be generalized for proving quantum non-uniform salted
security bounds under other idealized cryptographic models, e.g. the ideal-cipher model (which is
by definition a salted permutation family), and the salted generic group model. However, in order
to simplify presentation, in this work we only focus on the ROM.
Using this generic bootstrapping theorem, we can also easily obtain security bounds for a wide
class of salted cryptographic primitives in the AI-QROM and QAI-QROM. In particular, we use
it to give the first bound for salted collision-resistant hash (CRH) in AI-QROM and QAI-QROM,
resolving an open problem raised by Hhan et al. [HXY19]. This in turn implies that 𝖯𝖶𝖯𝖯𝒪 ̸⊆
𝖥𝖡𝖰𝖯𝒪/𝗊𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒 relative to a random oracle 𝒪 (Theorem 7.12).
Finally, we note that our proof can also be naturally downgraded to a classical reduction, which
gives a new proof of the classical result first proven by Coretti et al. [CDGS18]
1.4 Technical Overview
1.4.1 From Non-uniform Algorithms to Multi-Instance Games
We start by considering applying a general approach in the literature for proving lower bounds
for non-uniform algorithms in the context of classical function inversion, and then generalize it to
quantum non-uniformity. In particular, the following argument is based off the work of Aaron-
son [Aar05].
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Let 𝑓 : [𝑁 ] ↦→ [𝑁 ] be a function. Consider a classical (randomized) algorithm 𝒜 with 𝑆-bit of
advice 𝛼 = 𝛼(𝑓), 𝑇 queries to 𝑓 (which is a lower bound on its running time), that can invert a
random image for any function2 𝑓 with probability at least 𝛿, i.e.
𝛿 := Pr
𝒜,𝑥
[𝒜𝑓 (𝛼, 𝑓(𝑥)) ∈ 𝑓−1(𝑓(𝑥))],
where the probability is taken over the measurement randomness of the algorithm 𝒜 and the random
choice of 𝑥, and we want to give an upper bound on 𝛿. At a high level, the approach is to reduce it
to proving lower bound for the multi-instance version of the problem for algorithms without advice.
Specifically, we reduce it to bound the success probability of an algorithm ℬ with 𝑔𝑇 queries to
invert random 𝑔 inputs 𝑓(𝑥1), . . . , 𝑓(𝑥𝑔) simultaneously, for some parameter 𝑔 ∈ [𝑁 ] on the number
of instances. For function inversion, it is easy to show that for any 𝑔 > 0, the best success probability
drops exponentially fast in 𝑔. Specifically, for any (randomized) algorithm ℬ and random functions
𝑓 ,
Pr
ℬ,𝑓,𝑥1,...,𝑥𝑔
[ℬ𝑓 (𝑓(𝑥1), . . . , 𝑓(𝑥𝑔)) inverts 𝑓(𝑥1), . . . , 𝑓(𝑥𝑔)] ≤ 𝑂(𝑔𝑇/𝑁)𝑔. (1)
The reduction proceeds in two simple steps. We first use 𝒜 to construct an algorithm ℬ′
using only one copy of the original advice for the multi-instance problem (with decent success
probability), and then get rid of the advice by simply guessing a uniformly random bitstring.
The algorithm ℬ′𝑓 (𝛼, 𝑓(𝑥1), . . . , 𝑓(𝑥𝑔)) simply invokes 𝒜 to invert each 𝑓(𝑥𝑖), and succeeds when
𝒜𝑓 (𝑓(𝑥𝑖)) succeeds on all 𝑔 instances. By independence, it is easy to see that
Pr
ℬ′,𝑥1,...,𝑥𝑔
[ℬ′𝑓 (𝛼, 𝑓(𝑥1), . . . , 𝑓(𝑥𝑔)) inverts 𝑓(𝑥1), . . . , 𝑓(𝑥𝑔)] ≥ 𝛿𝑔.
Next we remove the advice by guessing. Consider an algorithm ℬ first guesses a random advice
𝛼 ∈ {0, 1}𝑆 and then runs ℬ′. Clearly, ℬ guesses the advice correctly with probability 2−𝑆 , in which
case ℬ simulates ℬ′ perfectly. Hence,
Pr
ℬ,𝑥1,...,𝑥𝑔
[ℬ𝑓 (𝑓(𝑥1), . . . , 𝑓(𝑥𝑔)) inverts 𝑓(𝑥1), . . . , 𝑓(𝑥𝑔)] ≥ 2−𝑆𝛿𝑔.
As this statement is for any function, the same conclusion holds for random functions. Combining
this with the above upper bound (1) on the success probability of ℬ with 𝑔 = 𝑆 shows that
𝛿 ≤ 𝑂(𝑆𝑇/𝑁), which matches the best known classical bound [Yao90, DGK17, CDGS18].
It should be clear from the above example that this approach is fairly general and reduces the
non-uniform lower bound problems to analyze the success probability of the corresponding multi-
instance games. Indeed, this approach and its variants have implicitly appeared in various contexts
under the name of direct product theorems. We discuss this in more details in Section 1.5.
First attempt using multi-instance problems. Seeing this as a promising start, we now
consider the setting of quantum algorithms with classical advice. Indeed, the argument works out
similarly, except that now we need to consider the success probability of the best quantum algorithm
that queries 𝑔𝑇 locations and succeed inverting 𝑔 independently random images. We could hope that
2Since we are requiring the algorithm to invert any function, the lower bound we present here is slightly weaker.
We intentionally make this omission for the overview to highlight the more important ideas in our proofs. Interested
readers should refer to the formal proofs.
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analyzing the best success probability for quantum algorithms solving the multi-instance problem
would lead us to the desired bound.
Unfortunately, it turns out that this approach is destined to fail to achieve any 𝛿 ≪ 𝑆𝑇 2/𝑁 .
With 𝑞 quantum queries, the famous Grover’s search can find one element in 𝜂 fraction of all elements
with probability ≈ 𝜂𝑞2. Consider the following algorithm ℬ̃, where it tries to find one pre-image
among all the 𝑔 images using the first 𝑇 queries, which succeeds with probability 𝑔𝑇 2/𝑁 . If it
succeeds in finding the first pre-image, it then use the next 𝑇 queries to find one pre-image among
all remaining (𝑔 − 1) images, which succeeds with probability (𝑔 − 1)𝑇 2/𝑁 and so on. Using this
algorithm, for any function, we can find all 𝑔 pre-images with probability at least roughly
(𝑔𝑇 2/𝑁) · ((𝑔 − 1)𝑇 2/𝑁) · ... · (𝑇 2/𝑁) ≈ (𝑇 2/𝑁)𝑔 · 𝑔! ≈ (𝑔𝑇 2/𝑁)𝑔.
This implies that the best bound we can hope to achieve for the multi-instance problem would be
𝑂(𝑔𝑇 2/𝑁)𝑔, which would in turn imply the bound 𝑂(𝑆𝑇 2/𝑁).
Bypassing the barrier via multi-instance games. A natural question arises that whether we
can go beyond 𝑆𝑇 2/𝑁 . We claim that this is actually the case.
To see this point, we first recall the high level ideas of the argument above – we first bootstrap the
best algorithm 𝒜 with advice 𝛼 for computing 𝑓−1 with success probability 𝛿, into a multi-instance
algorithm ℬ with advice 𝛼 with success probability 𝛿𝑔, and then remove the advice and incur a loss
of 2−𝑆 , which we amortize into 𝛿𝑔. The problem essentially reduces to proving a lower bound for
the success probability of the resulting algorithm ℬ that solves the multi-instance problem.
While it may seem like that the (𝑔𝑇 2/𝑁)𝑔 algorithm above seems could be an upper bound for
the new problem, we observe that this iterated Grover’s search algorithm ℬ̃ actually never arises
from our reduction from 𝒜 to ℬ. In particular, ℬ always solves each instance one by one, while ℬ̃ in
some sense solves all 𝑔 instances at once. To view this issue in terms of quantum queries, the first
𝑇 queries by ℬ are only searching pre-image of 𝑓(𝑥1), but the first 𝑇 queries by ℬ̃ are searching for
all 𝑔 pre-images.
We formalize this intuition by strengthening the multi-instance problem into what we call a
“multi-instance game,” where the algorithm (or adversary) is instead interacting with a verifier (or
challenger). For each round 𝑖 ∈ [𝑔], the challenger samples a new image 𝑓(𝑥𝑖), and the adver-
sary is given 𝑇 queries to 𝑓 , before producing an output 𝑥′𝑖, which the challenger checks whether
𝑓(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑓(𝑥
′
𝑖). The main change we make to the multi-instance games, compared with multi-instance
problems, is that the adversary gets challenges one-by-one or sequentially, rather than getting all
challenges at once or in parallel.
Observe that this multi-instance game seems to rule out the algorithm ℬ̃ above, as the adversary
does not have any information about 𝑓(𝑥𝑖) until he has issued (𝑖− 1)𝑇 queries.
If we assume that the probability that any quantum adversary wins such multi-instance game for
function inversion is 𝑂
(︁
𝑔𝑇+𝑇 2
𝑁
)︁𝑔
, using the same reduction as before, we would reach the conclusion
that the best success probability for function inversion with 𝑆 bits of classical advice and 𝑇 quantum
queries is 𝑂(𝑆𝑇 + 𝑇 2)/𝑁 . It turns out that we can indeed prove this assumption, but we will defer
the discussion and consider quantum advice first.
Beyond classical preprocessing. The reduction above requires the algorithm to solve multiple
instances using only a single copy of the advice, which is problematic in the quantum setting due to
8
no-cloning theorem. We resolve this problem by constructing ℬ similarly as before, and add gentle
measurement to solve multiple instances. To fill in the details, ℬ does the following.
1. Prepare 𝑘 = Θ(log 𝑔) copies of the quantum advice 𝛽 := 𝛼⊗𝑘.
2. Boost 𝒜’s success probability from constant to 1 − 𝑜(1), by running 𝒜 on each copy of the
advice 𝛼 𝑘 times, and identify the correct answer using one additional query.
3. To solve 𝑔 instances simultaneously, ℬ simply runs boosted 𝒜 for each instance, and applies
measurement. As we have boosted the success probability high enough, the measurement
will be “gentle” and we can recover an almost-as-good-as-new quantum advice for the next
instance.
4. Finally, to remove the quantum advice, we replace 𝛽 with a maximally mixed state, which
gives us a multiplicative loss of 2−𝑆𝑘 in success probability.
However, for function inversion, this idea seems to fail as function inversion problem can have
non-unique correct answers. In particular, if 𝑓−1(𝑓(𝑥)) = {𝑥1, 𝑥2, ..., 𝑥ℓ}, and the algorithm some-
how prepares the answer |𝑥′𝑖⟩ that is a uniform superposition over all the answers 𝑥1, ..., 𝑥ℓ, while it
succeeds with probability 1, performing a gentle measurement on this answer seems very difficult.
This difficulty of performing gentle measurements for function inversion was also acknowledged by
the work of Hhan et al. [HXY19], although under a different context.
We claim that using multi-instance games (as opposed to multi-instance problems), there is
actually a very elegant solution to this. Instead of having the adversary submitting a classical
answer 𝑥′𝑖, we will allow the adversary to submit a quantum state |𝑥′𝑖⟩, and the challenger can
compute in superposition whether 𝑓(|𝑥′𝑖⟩) = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖), and measure her decision (which will be gentle,
as we boosted its success probability), and send back |𝑥′𝑖⟩. On a high level, the idea is basically
having the adversary and the challenger “jointly” perform this gentle measurement. As the adversary
cannot control challenger’s behavior, this change should not impact the best winning probability of
the multi-instance game.
We formally define multi-instance games in Section 3.2 and highlight the difference from multi-
instance problems in more details there at Remark 3.13.
1.4.2 Analyzing Multi-Instance Game via “Compressed Oracles”
To complete our time-space tradeoff for function inversion, the only remaining step is to bound
the best winning probability of the multi-instance game for function inversion. We extends the
techniques of Zhandry’s compressed oracles [Zha19] and combine with a new indistinguishability
lemma to give a tight bound for this problem.
Compressed oracles. In the classical setting, there is a commonly used technique for arguing
random functions called the lazy sampling of a random oracle. The idea is that a simulator will
maintain a partial truth table about the random function. Upon an oracle query 𝑥, the simulator
looks up 𝑥 in the table 𝐷 and returns it as the answer. If not found, the simulator freshly samples
a new 𝑦 as the output of 𝑥 and inserts the pair (𝑥, 𝑦) into the table 𝐷.
Zhandry observes that, if care is taken to implement the oracle correctly, a quantum analogy
of the classical on-the-fly simulation is possible. Unlike the classical simulation, they simulate a
random oracle as a superposition of tables, each of which partially instantiates a random function.
9
Below is the high level idea of their simulation. The table is initialized as an empty table. Upon a
quantum query is made by an algorithm, the simulator updates the database in superposition: for
a query |𝑥⟩ and a table |𝐷⟩, the simulator look up 𝑥 in the table 𝐷; if not found, it initializes a
superposition of all possible output
∑︀
𝑦 |𝑦⟩ (up to a normalization) as the value of 𝐷(𝑥) and updates
𝐷 in superposition to get |𝐷 ∪ (𝑥, 𝑦)⟩; it then returns 𝐷(𝑥) as the output.
A major difference between quantum setting and classical setting is an algorithm may forget
some query it made before. As an example, an algorithm can query the same input twice to un-
compute everything and thus completely lose the information about the output. Therefore, to
perfectly simulate a quantum random oracle, the simulator also checks after every query that if the
algorithm loses all information about the query. With all these operations above, Zhandry shows a
quantum random oracle can be efficiently simulated on-the-fly.
Analyzing multi-instance game. To prove the success probability of multi-instance function
inversion, we consider a stronger statement regarding the success probability of inverting for any
round: assume an algorithm already makes (𝑖− 1)𝑇 queries for the first (𝑖− 1) rounds, and condi-
tioned on it having passed the first (𝑖− 1) rounds, what is the probability of succeeding in the 𝑖-th
round by making 𝑇 queries?
Lemma 1.5. For any quantum algorithm making 𝑞0+𝑞 queries to a random function 𝑓 : [𝑁 ]→ [𝑁 ],
if 𝑓(𝑥) is sampled and given after the 𝑞0-th query, conditioned on arbitrary outcomes (with non-zero
probability) of the algorithm’s measurement during the first 𝑞0 queries, the probability of inverting
𝑓(𝑥) is at most 𝑂((𝑞0 + 𝑞2)/𝑁).
We consider the lemma above as remarkable and perhaps even surprising, as intuitively, it is
saying that quantum power can achieve a quadratic speed up for search only if you know what you
are looking for, and there is no classical analogue of this.
With the above lemma, the probability of succeeding in the 𝑖-th round is at most 𝑂((𝑖𝑇+𝑇 2)/𝑁).
Therefore, the probability of succeeding in inverting all random images is at most 𝑂((𝑔𝑇 +𝑇 2)/𝑁)𝑔.
To prove this lemma, let us start by assuming that a uniformly random image 𝑦 is instead given as
a challenge and without conditioning on the intermediate measurements. By Zhandry’s techniques,
after making 𝑞0 queries to a random oracle, the knowledge of an algorithm about the random oracle
can be viewed as a superposition of some tables with at most 𝑞0 entries which specifies partial
random functions over at most 𝑞0 inputs. Since 𝑦 is sampled uniformly, the amplitude (square root
of probability) of database containing 𝑦 is about
√︀
𝑞0/𝑁 . After given the image 𝑦, each query can
increase the amplitude by at most
√︀
1/𝑁 . Therefore, the final amplitude of of database containing
𝑦 is about (√𝑞0 + 𝑞)/
√
𝑁 which gives us the lemma above.
There are two challenges we need to overcome for proving the full lemma.
The first challenge comes from the fact that our lemma statement requires an algorithm is
conditioned on some fixed measurement outcomes. To address this, we extend Zhandry’s techniques
to such settings in Section 2.3 and complete the proofs in Appendix A, which is a very natural but
non-trivial extension and crucial for analyzing multi-instance game.
The second challenge seems even more difficult. For function inversion, the image is sampled by
first sampling a random pre-image 𝑥 and computing 𝑓(𝑥). The natural application of compressed
oracle only gives us a probability bound when a random 𝑦 is sampled instead of 𝑓(𝑥). This is a
nontrivial issue as with high probability, the distribution of 𝑓(𝑥) is only supported on a constant
fraction of [𝑁 ], so the statistical difference of the two distributions is significant. The issue is more
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prominent when we consider the general random functions 𝑓 : [𝑁 ] ↦→ [𝑀 ] where 𝑁 ≪ 𝑀 , where a
uniform sample of 𝑦 is with high probability not an image of any 𝑥.
Towards this challenge, we prove the following indistinguishability lemma to bridge the gap.
The proof of the lemma does not require the compressed oracle technique and we believe that both
lemmas are of independent interest.
Lemma 1.6 (Indistinguishability). For any quantum algorithm making 𝑞0+ 𝑞 queries to a random
function 𝑓 : [𝑁 ]→ [𝑁 ], if 𝑓(𝑥) or a uniformly random 𝑦 is sampled and given after the 𝑞0-th query,
conditioned on arbitrary outcomes (with non-zero probability) of the algorithm’s measurement during
the first 𝑞0 queries, the advantage of distinguishing is at most 𝑂((𝑞0 + 𝑞2)/𝑁).
We can then assume a random 𝑦 is sampled instead of a random 𝑓(𝑥) with only an additive loss
of 𝑂((𝑔𝑇 + 𝑇 2)/𝑁) in each round, giving us the bound that we desire.
Proving the indistinguishability lemma. We first convert the problem from distinguishing
samples (random 𝑓(𝑥) or random 𝑦) into distinguishing oracles. Assume the oracle is sampled as
follows: first, a uniformly random input 𝑥 is sampled; then a random function 𝑓−𝑥 defined on all
inputs except 𝑥 is sampled, together with two independently sampled 𝑦0, 𝑦1; define 𝑓−𝑥||𝑦 as a
function that outputs 𝑓−𝑥(𝑥′) on all inputs that are not 𝑥 and 𝑦 on input 𝑥; the distinguisher is ask
to given either oracle access to 𝑓−𝑥||𝑦0 or 𝑓−𝑥||𝑦1 and the same challenge 𝑦0 after the 𝑞0-th query,
distinguish which oracle is given (without knowing 𝑥). When the function 𝑓−𝑥||𝑦0 and challenge
𝑦0 is given, it corresponds to the case a random 𝑓(𝑥) is given; while giving the second function
corresponds to the second case that a random 𝑦 is given. It can be shown that the two problems
have the exact same difficulty.
Intuitively, every quantum query to a function entangles a quantum algorithm with one of the
output of that function in superposition. By making 𝑞0 queries, the algorithm is entangled with
at most 𝑞0 outputs of the function in superposition. When 𝑦0 is given, the only way to tell which
oracle is given is by already making a query on 𝑥 and entangling the algorithm with either 𝑦0 or
𝑦1 respectively. Since 𝑦0 has not been given during the first 𝑞0 queries, 𝑥 is perfectly hidden and
completely uniformly random from the algorithm’s view. Thus, such entanglement only happens
with probability 𝑞0/𝑁 . For the remaining 𝑞 queries, knowing the information 𝑦0 does help build
the entanglement faster. One strategy is to use Grover’s search to check if 𝑦0 is an image of the
function since with constant probability, 𝑦0 is not an image of 𝑓−𝑥||𝑦1. By using Grover’s search,
the advantage of distinguish is about 𝑞2/𝑁 and we show such advantage is the best one can get for
these 𝑞 queries. Combining with these two separate analysis, we conclude the indistinguishability
lemma.
1.4.3 Yao’s Box Problem
We now focus our attention on Yao’s box problem. Assume that an algorithm 𝒜, given any function
𝑓 : [𝑁 ] ↦→ {0, 1}, prepares an 𝑆-qubit advice 𝛼 = 𝛼(𝑓) such that 𝒜 can recover 𝑓(𝑥) for a random
𝑥 using 𝛼 without ever querying 𝑓(𝑥) in time 𝑇 with probability 1/2 + 𝜀.
We claim that for classical advice, our reduction from function inversion with advice to multi-
instance game can also be generalized to Yao’s box, with a more careful amortizing analysis; and
the multi-instance game for Yao’s box is fairly straightforward to argue using similar techniques as
for function inversion. Intuitively, for Yao’s box, the only non-trivial strategy is that the adversary’s
first (𝑖 − 1)𝑇 quantum queries predicted the challenge 𝑥𝑖, so the best advantage of any algorithm,
11
i.e. the best winning probability minus 1/2, can only be 𝑂(
√︀
𝑔𝑇/𝑁) instead of 𝑂(
√︀
𝑔𝑇 2/𝑁). This
leads us to the final bound 1/2 + ?̃?(𝑆𝑇/𝑁)1/3, where the additional exponent loss comes from the
new amortizing argument.
For quantum advice, things are a lot trickier. While Aaronson [Aar05] proved a similar lower
bound for a different problem against quantum advice, the techniques there only allow us to prove
lower bounds against algorithms that find the correct answer with probability at least 2/3 for all
𝑓 and 𝑥 (and indeed under this setting, our techniques combined with [Aar05] are sufficient to
give query lower bound 𝑆𝑇 ≥ Ω̃(𝑁) even for quantum advice). However, this is insufficient in our
settings where we need to consider the stronger lower bound where 𝑥 is sampled randomly, and the
algorithm can only predict some 𝑓(𝑥) and output a random guess for others.
We first revisit the idea of Aaronson [Aar05], which is to prepare 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒(log 𝑔) copies of the advice,
and use majority vote3 to boost the success probability from 2/3 to 1−𝑜(1) to make the measurement
gentle. We show that majority vote cannot possibly boost success probability under the average-
case (over 𝑥) setting, by considering the following example: the algorithm 𝒜 outputs the correct
answer with probability 1 on 40% of the inputs, and with probability 0.45 on the other 60% of the
inputs. Overall, the success probability is 67%, but with majority vote, the success probability goes
down, and can go down arbitrarily close to 40%, which is much worse than random guessing!
One way to resolve this is to instead “gently” measure the success probability of 𝒜 for each
instance 𝑓(𝑥), and throw a biased random coin according to this distribution as our answer. We
observe that the problem of “gently” measuring this probability can be reduced to shadow tomogra-
phy, which is a problem introduced by Aaronson [Aar18]. As our multi-instance game requires that
each challenge is given sequentially, we also require the shadow tomography to be able to handle
online queries. Aaronson and Rothblum [AR19] showed that online shadow tomography indeed can
be done using 𝑆2 log2 𝑔 copies of the advice, which leads us to the final bound 𝑆5𝑇 = Ω̃(𝑁) for
constant 𝜀 > 0.
1.5 Related Works
In this section, we compare our techniques with other related works.
The approach of reducing time-space tradeoff lower bounds to multi-instance problems, which is
outlined in Section 1.4.1, has appeared implicitly in various works [Bea91, Kla03, KŠW07], where
they usually refer to the (exponential) hardness of multi-instance problems as “(strong) direct prod-
uct theorems.” While the different approaches presented in different works share some similar
high-level ideas, the context and details in each work are slightly different. In this work, to avoid
confusion, we use the term “multi-instance problem” instead of direct products. Recently Hamoudi
and Magniez [HM20] independently applied the similar technique along with Zhandry’s compressed
oracles to prove quantum time-space tradeoffs for finding multiple collisions.
Classically, this approach has also been considered in various works [GKL93, Imp11] for proving
non-uniform lower bounds. Aaronson [Aar05] first showed how to employ such ideas when the non-
uniform lower bounds need to hold even against quantum advice. While the problem they consider
is quite simple and somewhat arbitrary, the starting point we outline in Section 1.4.1 is based off
this work.
As far as we are concerned, our work is the first one to consider the stronger variant “multi-
3This idea was implicitly given, where they called it “boosting” under the context of randomized algorithms in
complexity theory.
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instance games” and show a separation of the two variants for function inversion in Section 1.4.1.
Additionally, we present our reduction under a general framework for the stronger variant of multi-
instance games.
The idea of using gentle measurements is almost ubiquitous for proving lower bounds against
quantum advice. To the best of our knowledge, Aaronson [Aar05] first showed how to combine
boosting and gentle measurements for quantum advice lower bounds, which we briefly discuss in
Section 1.4.3. In particular, this technique was also employed by Hhan et al. [HXY19] to prove an
asymptotic lower bound of 𝑆𝑇 2 ≥ 𝑁 for inverting random permutations, although under a different
context.
1.6 Open Problems
Quantum time-space tradeoff lower bounds for permutation inversion. While our work
provides substantial evidence that the quantum time-space tradeoff bound for inverting permu-
tations is 𝑆𝑇 + 𝑇 2 = Θ̃(𝑁), which would have resolved the open problem posted by Nayebi et
al. [NABT15, Section 4.3], we are not able to formally prove this due to a lack of “compressed
permutation oracles”. This is especially interesting, considering that it is easier to argue about per-
mutations than functions using the compression argument, which is used in prior works [NABT15,
HXY19, CLQ19].
Nontrivial quantum speed ups for function inversion. While our lower bound is best pos-
sible, it still leaves open the possibility that some nontrivial quantum speed ups exist under the
following asymptotic regime: ⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
𝑆𝑇 ≫ 𝑁,
𝑇 2 ≪ 𝑁,
𝑆2𝑇 ≪ 𝑁2.
An especially interesting case is that there might be a quantum algorithm with advice under this
regime, but it might seem extremely hard to be “dequantized”.
Our paper also gives many lower bounds, improving any of the bounds that are not tight (for
example, the query bound for average-case Yao’s box against quantum advice), or showing new
non-trivial attacks, are all interesting possibilities.
Suboptimal exponent on success probability for quantum advice, or is it? All the bounds
we have achieved for quantum advice are not tight in terms of the exponent on the success probability
for quantum advice. In particular, we note that for function inversion, our classical advice lower
bound has exponent 1, which is tight – while the quantum advice bound has exponent 1/3. Can this
loss be avoided, or is there any speed up in terms of 𝑆 and 𝑇 for sub-constant success probability?
We make the observation that the loss in exponent ultimately comes from the use of gentle mea-
surements. Looking back at the literature, all the quantum advice lower bound techniques [Aar05,
HXY19, CLQ19] we have seen so far always require “reusing” of the advice, which in turns require
gentle measurements. Is there a way to avoid reusing the quantum advice to escape this cost? We
suspect that this is the case, as in the work of Chung et al. [CLQ19], they presented a reduction to
quantum random access code, which by definition seems to avoid this issue, albeit in the end, the
advice reusing issue somehow kicks back in.
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2 Preliminaries
For any 𝑛 ∈ ℕ, we denote [𝑛] to be the set {1, 2, ..., 𝑛}. We denote ℤ/𝑛ℤ = {0, 1, ..., 𝑛 − 1} as the
ring of integer modulo 𝑛, and 𝔽2 = {0, 1} as the binary finite field. For a complex vector 𝐱 ∈ ℂ𝑛,
we denote the 𝐿2-norm |𝐱| = |𝐱|2 =
∑︀
𝑖∈[𝑛] 𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑖.
Next, we recall some basic facts about quantum computation, and review the relevant literature
on the quantum random oracle model.
2.1 Quantum Computation
A quantum system 𝑄 is defined over a finite set 𝐵 of classical states. A pure state over 𝑄 is a
unit vector in ℂ|𝐵|, which assigns a complex number to each element in 𝐵. In other words, let |𝜑⟩
be a pure state in 𝑄, we can write |𝜑⟩ as a column vector:
|𝜑⟩ =
∑︁
𝑥∈𝐵
𝛼𝑥|𝑥⟩
where
∑︀
𝑥∈𝐵 |𝛼𝑥|2 = 1 and {|𝑥⟩}𝑥∈𝐵 is called the “computational basis” of ℂ|𝐵|. The computational
basis forms an orthonormal basis of ℂ|𝐵|. We define ⟨𝜑| to be the row vector that is the conjugate
of |𝜑⟩.
Given two quantum systems 𝑄1 over 𝐵1 and 𝑄2 over 𝐵2, we can define a product quantum
system 𝑄1 ⊗ 𝑄2 over the set 𝐵1 × 𝐵2. Given |𝜑1⟩ ∈ 𝑄1 and |𝜑2⟩ ∈ 𝑄2, we can define the product
state |𝜑1⟩ ⊗ |𝜑2⟩ ∈ 𝑄1 ⊗𝑄2.
We say |𝜑⟩ ∈ 𝑄1 ⊗ 𝑄2 is entangled if there does not exist |𝜑1⟩ ∈ 𝑄1 and |𝜑2⟩ ∈ 𝑄2 such that
|𝜑⟩ = |𝜑1⟩ ⊗ |𝜑2⟩. For example, consider 𝐵1 = 𝐵2 = {0, 1} and 𝑄1 = 𝑄2 = ℂ2, |𝜑⟩ = |00⟩+|11⟩√2 is
entangled. Otherwise, we say |𝜑⟩ is unentangled.
A pure state |𝜑⟩ ∈ 𝑄 can be manipulated by a unitary operator 𝑈 ∈ ℂ|𝐵|×|𝐵|. The resulting
state |𝜑′⟩ = 𝑈 |𝜑⟩. We denote the trace distance operator ‖𝑈‖tr to be 12 Tr
√
𝑈 †𝑈 .
We extract classical information from a quantum state |𝜑⟩ by performing a measurement. A
measurement specifies an orthonormal basis, typically the computational basis, and the probability
of getting result 𝑥 is |⟨𝑥|𝜑⟩|2. After the measurement, |𝜑⟩ “collapses” to the state |𝑥⟩ if the result is
𝑥.
For example, given the pure state |𝜑⟩ = 35 |0⟩+ 45 |1⟩ measured under {|0⟩, |1⟩}, with probability
9/25 the result is 0 and |𝜑⟩ collapses to |0⟩; with probability 16/25 the result is 1 and |𝜑⟩ collapses
to |1⟩.
We assume quantum circuits can implement any unitary transformation (by using these basic
gates, Hadamard, phase, CNOT and 𝜋8 gates), in particular the following two unitary transforma-
tions:
∙ Classical Computation: Given a function 𝑓 : 𝑋 → 𝑌 , one can implement a unitary 𝑈𝑓
over ℂ|𝑋|·|𝑌 | → ℂ|𝑋|·|𝑌 | such that for any |𝜑⟩ =∑︀𝑥∈𝑋,𝑦∈𝑌 𝛼𝑥,𝑦|𝑥, 𝑦⟩,
𝑈𝑓 |𝜑⟩ =
∑︁
𝑥∈𝑋,𝑦∈𝑌
𝛼𝑥,𝑦|𝑥, 𝑦 ⊕ 𝑓(𝑥)⟩
Here, ⊕ is a commutative group operation defined over 𝑌 . In particular, if 𝑓 is given as a
classical circuit 𝐶, there exists an efficient implementation of the unitary 𝑈𝑓 using |𝐶| ancillas,
and each gate is evaluated at most twice.
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∙ Quantum Fourier Transform: For every 𝑛 ∈ ℕ, the quantum Fourier transform 𝖰𝖥𝖳𝑛
is a unitary operation, that is given a quantum state |𝜑⟩ = ∑︀𝑗∈ℤ/𝑛ℤ 𝑥𝑗 |𝑗⟩, outputs |𝜓⟩ =∑︀
𝑘∈ℤ/𝑛ℤ 𝑦𝑘|𝑘⟩ where the sequence {𝑦𝑘}𝑘 is the Fourier transform to the sequence {𝑥𝑗}𝑗 , i.e.
𝑦𝑘 =
1√
𝑛
∑︁
𝑗∈ℤ/𝑛ℤ
𝜔𝑗𝑘𝑛 𝑥𝑗
where 𝜔𝑛 = 𝑒2𝜋𝑖/𝑛, and 𝑖 =
√−1 is the imaginary unit.
2.2 Quantum Random Oracle Model
An oracle-aided quantum algorithm can perform quantum computation as well as quantum oracle
query. A quantum oracle query for an oracle 𝑓 : [𝑁 ] → [𝑀 ] is modeled as a unitary 𝑈𝑓 : |𝑥⟩ |𝑢⟩ =
|𝑥⟩ |𝑢+ 𝑓(𝑥)⟩, where + denotes addition in integer ring ℤ/𝑀ℤ (we take the natural bijection that
𝑀 ≃ 0, but any bijection [𝑀 ]↔ ℤ/𝑀ℤ suffice for our purposes).
A random oracle is a random function 𝐻 : [𝑁 ]→ [𝑀 ]. The random function 𝐻 is chosen at the
beginning. A quantum algorithm making 𝑇 oracle queries to 𝐻 can be modeled as the following: it
has three registers |𝑥⟩ , |𝑢⟩ , |𝑧⟩, where 𝑥 ∈ [𝑁 ], 𝑢 ∈ ℤ/𝑀ℤ and 𝑧 is the algorithm’s internal working
memory; it starts with some input state |0⟩ |0⟩ |𝜓⟩, then it applies a sequence of unitary to the
state: 𝑈0, 𝑈𝐻 , 𝑈1, 𝑈𝐻 , · · · , 𝑈𝑇−1, 𝑈𝐻 , 𝑈𝑇 and a final measurement over computational basis. Each
𝑈𝐻 is the quantum oracle query unitary 𝑈𝐻 : |𝑥⟩ |𝑢⟩ = |𝑥⟩ |𝑢+𝐻(𝑥)⟩ and 𝑈𝑖 is the local quantum
computation that is independent of 𝐻. We can always assume there is only one measurement which
is a measurement over computational basis and applied at the last step of the algorithm.
2.3 Compressed Oracle
In this subsection, we recall the technique introduced by Zhandry [Zha19]. We will explain how to
purify a random oracle in the quantum setting first, and then give equivalent forms of a quantum
random oracle, namely standard oracle 𝖲𝗍𝖮, phase oracle 𝖯𝗁𝖮 and compressed standard oracle
𝖢𝖲𝗍𝖮. All these oracles are equivalent in the sense that for every (even unbounded) algorithm
making queries to one of these oracles, the output distribution of the algorithm is exactly identical
regardless of which oracle is given. Then Zhandry shows dealing with compressed standard oracle is
usually easier. Roughly speaking, Zhandry shows that with compressed standard oracle, one could
quantify the amount of the information about the random oracle learned by any quantum algorithm,
analogous to the lazy sampling technique that is very commonly used for classical random oracles.
Note that in Zhandry’s work [Zha19], they originally only considered output of size 𝑀 = 2𝑚,
and implementing a quantum random oracle as 𝑈𝐻 : |𝑥⟩ |𝑢⟩ = |𝑥⟩ |𝑢⊕𝐻(𝑥)⟩ where ⊕ is bit-wise
XOR, or the addition over 𝔽𝑚2 . Therefore, their description of the compressed oracle technique is
different since the range is defined as 𝔽𝑚2 instead of ℤ/𝑀ℤ considered in this paper. Two oracles
are equivalent as we can simulate one with the other using two queries. For the completeness of the
paper, we will reprove some of the useful lemmas under the integer ring ℤ/𝑀ℤ.
Also note that Zhandry also showed that a compressed oracle can be efficiently implemented
by a quantum computer, i.e. the running time is only polynomial in the number of queries and
log𝑁, log𝑀 . In this work, since we mainly consider query complexity and for presentation, we
ignore the issue of efficiency for a simpler presentation.
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Purification: standard oracle. Let 𝐻 be a random oracle [𝑁 ] → [𝑀 ]. The function 𝐻
is sampled at the very beginning, or equivalently, initially we prepare a maximally mixed state
𝜂
∑︀
𝐻 |𝐻⟩ ⟨𝐻| up to some normalization factor 𝜂, and each query can be implemented by another
unitary 𝑈 , which reads the function 𝐻 and applies 𝑈𝐻 . However, we can “purify” the random oracle,
meaning that we can replace the mixed state of |𝐻⟩ with a uniform superposition of all possible
functions, i.e. √𝜂∑︀𝐻 |𝐻⟩. Consider the truth table of 𝐻, that is |𝐻⟩ = |𝐻(1)⟩ |𝐻(2)⟩ · · · |𝐻(𝑁)⟩.
Let 𝒜 be any quantum algorithm. We say the algorithm can query the standard oracle if we treat
the algorithm’s registers and |𝐻⟩ as a whole system, initialized as |0⟩ |𝜓⟩⊗ 1
𝑀𝑁/2
∑︀
𝐻 |𝐻⟩. An oracle
query 𝖲𝗍𝖮 in this purified state is defined as,
𝖲𝗍𝖮 |𝑥⟩ |𝑢⟩ |𝑧⟩ ⊗ |𝐻⟩ = |𝑥⟩ |𝑢+𝐻(𝑥)⟩ |𝑧⟩ ⊗ |𝐻⟩ ,
where |𝑥⟩ , |𝑢⟩ are the input and output register, |𝑧⟩ is an arbitrary working register and |𝐻⟩ is the
random oracle. Each local quantum computation is 𝑈𝑖 ⊗ 𝐼 which only operates on 𝒜’s registers
|𝑥⟩ |𝑢⟩ |𝑧⟩. Therefore the computation of any 𝒜 can be described as a sequence of: 𝑈0⊗ 𝐼, 𝖲𝗍𝖮, · · · ,
𝑈𝑇−1 ⊗ 𝐼, 𝖲𝗍𝖮, 𝑈𝑇 ⊗ 𝐼, and a final computational measurement over 𝒜’s register. The following
proposition tells that the output distribution using a standard oracle is exactly the same as using a
random oracle.
Lemma 2.1 ([Zha19, Lemma 2]). Let 𝒜 be an (unbounded) quantum algorithm making oracle
queries. The output of 𝒜 given a random function 𝐻 is exactly identical to the output of 𝒜 given
access to a standard oracle. Therefore, a random oracle with quantum query access can be perfectly
simulated as a standard oracle.
Phase kickback: phase oracle. Define a unitary 𝑉 as (𝐼𝑥 ⊗𝖰𝖥𝖳†𝑀 ⊗ 𝐼𝐻) which applies 𝖰𝖥𝖳†𝑀
on the output register |𝑢⟩. Define the phase oracle operator 𝖯𝗁𝖮 := 𝑉 † · 𝖲𝗍𝖮 · 𝑉 .
𝖯𝗁𝖮 |𝑥⟩ |𝑢⟩ ⊗ |𝐻⟩ = 𝑉 † · 𝖲𝗍𝖮 · 1√
𝑀
∑︁
𝑦
𝜔−𝑢𝑦𝑀 |𝑥⟩ |𝑦⟩ ⊗ |𝐻⟩
= 𝑉 † · 1√
𝑀
∑︁
𝑦
𝜔−𝑢𝑦𝑀 |𝑥⟩ |𝑦 +𝐻(𝑥)⟩ ⊗ |𝐻⟩
=
1
𝑀
∑︁
𝑦,𝑦′
𝜔
−𝑢𝑦+(𝑦+𝐻(𝑥))𝑦′
𝑀 |𝑥⟩ |𝑦′⟩ ⊗ |𝐻⟩
=
1
𝑀
𝜔
𝑢𝐻(𝑥)
𝑀
∑︁
𝑦,𝑦′
𝜔
(𝑦+𝐻(𝑥))(𝑦′−𝑢)
𝑀 |𝑥⟩ |𝑦′⟩ ⊗ |𝐻⟩
= |𝑥⟩ |𝑢⟩ ⊗ 𝜔𝑢𝐻(𝑥)𝑀 |𝐻⟩ .
Similarly, we override the notation 𝖯𝗁𝖮 such that for any auxiliary register |𝑧⟩, 𝖯𝗁𝖮 |𝑥⟩ |𝑢⟩ |𝑧⟩ ⊗
|𝐻⟩ = |𝑥⟩ |𝑢⟩ |𝑧⟩ ⊗ 𝜔𝑢𝐻(𝑥)𝑀 |𝐻⟩.
Observing that 𝑉 𝑉 † = 𝐼, the following lemma tells that we can efficiently convert between a
standard oracle algorithm and a phase oracle algorithm.
Lemma 2.2 ([Zha19, Lemma 3]). Let 𝒜 be an (unbounded) quantum algorithm making queries to
a standard oracle. Let ℬ be the algorithm that is identical to 𝒜, except it performs 𝑉 and 𝑉 † before
and after each query. Then the output distributions of 𝒜 (given access to a standard oracle) and ℬ
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(given access to a phase oracle) are identical. Therefore, a quantum random oracle can be perfectly
simulated as a phase oracle.
We then have the following lemma for the phase oracle, that formulates the behavior of a
quantum algorithm making at most 𝑇 queries to the phase oracle. We have seen that every 𝖯𝗁𝖮
query will add a phase to the |𝐻⟩ register, i.e., 𝖯𝗁𝖮 |𝑥⟩ |𝑢⟩ ⊗ |𝐻⟩ = |𝑥⟩ |𝑢⟩ ⊗ 𝜔𝑢𝐻(𝑥)𝑀 |𝐻⟩. Define 𝐷
as a truth table, or equivalently a vector in (ℤ/𝑀ℤ)𝑁 and 𝐷(𝑥) be the 𝑥-th entry of 𝐷. Define |𝐷|
be the number of non-zero entries in 𝐷. For any 𝐷, we define |𝜑𝐷⟩ = 1𝑀𝑁/2
∑︀
𝐻 𝜔
⟨𝐷,𝐻⟩
𝑀 |𝐻⟩ for all
𝐷 ∈ (ℤ/𝑀ℤ)𝑁 where ⟨𝐷,𝐻⟩ is defined to be the inner product ∑︀𝑥∈[𝑁 ]𝐷(𝑥)𝐻(𝑥). Note that we
will only use this inner product on the exponent of 𝜔𝑀 so it is irrelevant whether we are computing
it on the integer ring or the ring modulo 𝑀 .
Lemma 2.3. Let 𝒜 be a quantum algorithm making at most 𝑇 queries to a phase oracle. The overall
state of 𝒜 and the phase oracle can be written as ∑︀𝑧,𝐷:|𝐷|≤𝑇 𝛼𝑧,𝐷 |𝑧⟩ ⊗ 1𝑀𝑁/2 ∑︀𝐻 𝜔⟨𝐷,𝐻⟩𝑀 |𝐻⟩ =∑︀
𝑧,𝐷:|𝐷|≤𝑇 𝛼𝑧,𝐷 |𝑧⟩ ⊗ |𝜑𝐷⟩.
Moreover, it is true even if the state is conditioned on arbitrary outcomes (with non-zero proba-
bility) of 𝒜’s intermediate measurements.
For completeness, we provide the proof for this lemma in Appendix A.
Compressed standard oracle. Intuitively, compressed oracle is an analogy of classical lazy
sampling method. Instead of recording all the information of 𝐻 in the registers (like what it does
in the standard oracle or the phase oracle), Zhandry provides a better solution which is useful to
argue the amount of the information an algorithm knows about the random oracle.
The oracle register records a database/list that contains the output on each input 𝑥, the output
is an element in ℤ/𝑀ℤ∪{⊥}, where ⊥ is a special symbol denoting that the value is “uninitialized”.
The database is initialized as an empty list 𝐷0 of length 𝑁 , in other words, it is initialized as the
pure state |∅⟩ := |⊥,⊥, · · · ,⊥⟩. Let |𝐷| denote the number of entries in 𝐷 that are not ⊥. Define
𝐷(𝑥) to be the 𝑥-th entry.
For any 𝐷 and 𝑥 such that 𝐷(𝑥) = ⊥, we define 𝐷 ∪ (𝑥, 𝑢) to be the database 𝐷′, such that for
every 𝑥′ ̸= 𝑥, 𝐷′(𝑥′) = 𝐷(𝑥) and at the input 𝑥, 𝐷′(𝑥) = 𝑢.
The compressed standard oracle is the unitary 𝖢𝖲𝗍𝖮 := 𝖲𝗍𝖽𝖣𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉 ∘𝖢𝖲𝗍𝖮′ ∘ 𝖲𝗍𝖽𝖣𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉, where
∙ 𝖢𝖲𝗍𝖮′ |𝑥, 𝑢⟩|𝐷⟩ = |𝑥, 𝑢 +𝐷(𝑥)⟩|𝐷⟩ when 𝐷(𝑥) ̸= ⊥, which writes the output of 𝑥 defined in
𝐷 to the 𝑢 register.
∙ 𝖲𝗍𝖽𝖣𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝑥 |𝐷⟩, which works on the 𝑥-th register of the database 𝐷(𝑥):
– If 𝐷(𝑥) = ⊥, 𝖲𝗍𝖽𝖣𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝑥 maps |⊥⟩ to 1√𝑀
∑︀
𝑦 |𝑦⟩, or equivalently, 𝖲𝗍𝖽𝖣𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝑥|𝐷⟩ =
1√
𝑀
∑︀
𝑦 |𝐷∪ (𝑥, 𝑦)⟩. Intuitively, if the database does not contain information about 𝑥, it
samples a fresh 𝑦 as the output of 𝑥.
– If𝐷(𝑥) ̸= ⊥, 𝖲𝗍𝖽𝖣𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝑥 works on the 𝑥-th register, and it is an identity on 1√𝑀
∑︀
𝑦 𝜔
𝑢𝑦
𝑀 |𝑦⟩
for all 𝑢 ̸= 0; it maps the uniform superposition 1√
𝑀
∑︀
𝑦 |𝑦⟩ to |⊥⟩.
More formally, for a 𝐷′ such that 𝐷′(𝑥) = ⊥,
𝖲𝗍𝖽𝖣𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝑥
1√
𝑀
∑︁
𝑦
𝜔𝑢𝑦𝑀 |𝐷′ ∪ (𝑥, 𝑦)⟩ =
1√
𝑀
∑︁
𝑦
𝜔𝑢𝑦𝑀 |𝐷′ ∪ (𝑥, 𝑦)⟩ for any 𝑢 ̸= 0,
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and,
𝖲𝗍𝖽𝖣𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝑥
1√
𝑀
∑︁
𝑦
|𝐷′ ∪ (𝑥, 𝑦)⟩ = |𝐷′⟩.
Since all 1√
𝑀
∑︀
𝑦 𝜔
𝑢𝑦
𝑀 |𝑦⟩ and |⊥⟩ form a basis, these requirements define a unique unitary
operation. We define 𝖲𝗍𝖽𝖣𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉(|𝑥⟩ ⊗ |𝐷⟩) := |𝑥⟩ ⊗ 𝖲𝗍𝖽𝖣𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝑥 |𝐷⟩.
Zhandry proves that, 𝖲𝗍𝖮 and CStO are perfectly indistinguishable by any unbounded quantum
algorithm.
Lemma 2.4 ([Zha19, Lemma 4]). Let 𝒜 be an (unbounded) quantum algorithm making oracle
queries. The output of 𝒜 given access to the standard oracle is exactly identical to the output of 𝒜
given access to a compressed standard oracle.
Combining this lemma with Lemma 2.1, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2.5. A quantum random oracle can be perfectly simulated as a compressed standard
oracle.
In this work, we only consider query complexity, and thus simulation efficiency is irrelevant to
us. Looking ahead, we simulate a random oracle as a compressed standard oracle to help us analyze
security of different games with the help from the following lemmas.
The first lemma gives a general formulation of the overall state of 𝒜 and the compressed standard
oracle after 𝒜 makes 𝑇 queries, analogous to Lemma 2.3 for phase oracle. We also defer the proof
for this lemma to Appendix A.
Lemma 2.6. If 𝒜 makes at most 𝑇 queries to a compressed standard oracle, assuming the overall
state of 𝒜 and the compressed standard oracle is ∑︀𝑧,𝐷 𝛼𝑧,𝐷 |𝑧⟩𝒜|𝐷⟩𝐻 , then it has support on all 𝐷
such that |𝐷| ≤ 𝑇 . In other words, the overall state can be written as,∑︁
𝑧,𝐷:|𝐷|≤𝑇
𝛼𝑧,𝐷 |𝑧⟩𝒜 ⊗ |𝐷⟩𝐻 .
Moreover, it is true even if the state is conditioned on arbitrary outcomes (with non-zero probability)
of 𝒜’s intermediate measurements.
The second lemma provides a quantum analogue of lazy sampling in the classical ROM.
Lemma 2.7 ([Zha19, Lemma 5]). Let 𝐻 be a random oracle from [𝑁 ]→ [𝑀 ]. Consider a quantum
algorithm 𝒜 making queries to the standard oracle and outputting tuples (𝑥1, · · · , 𝑥𝑘, 𝑦1, · · · , 𝑦𝑘, 𝑧).
Supposed the random function 𝐻 is measured after 𝒜 produces its output. Let 𝑅 be an arbitrary
set of such tuples. Suppose with probability 𝑝, 𝒜 outputs a tuple such that (1) the tuple is in 𝑅 and
(2) 𝐻(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑦𝑖 for all 𝑖. Now consider running 𝒜 with the compressed standard oracle CStO, and
supposed the database 𝐷 is measured after 𝒜 produces its output. Let 𝑝′ be the probability that (1)
the tuple is in 𝑅 and (2) 𝐷(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑦𝑖 (in particular, 𝐷(𝑥𝑖) ̸= ⊥) for all 𝑖. Then √𝑝 ≤
√
𝑝′+
√︀
𝑘/𝑀 .
Moreover, it is true even if it is conditioned on arbitrary outcomes (with non-zero probability)
of 𝒜’s intermediate measurements.
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3 Security Games
3.1 Security Game with Advice
Definition 3.1 (Algorithm with Advice). An (𝑆, 𝑇 ) (query) algorithm 𝒜 = (𝒜1,𝒜2) with (oracle-
dependent) advice consists of two procedures:
∙ |𝛼⟩ ← 𝒜1(𝐻), which is an arbitrary (unbounded) function of 𝐻, and outputs an 𝑆-qubit
quantum state |𝛼⟩;
∙ |𝖺𝗇𝗌⟩ ← 𝒜?̃?2 (|𝛼⟩ , 𝖼𝗁), which is an unbounded algorithm that takes advice |𝛼⟩, a challenge 𝖼𝗁,
makes at most 𝑇 quantum queries to ?̃?, and outputs an answer, which we measure in the
computational basis to obtain the classical answer 𝖺𝗇𝗌 if needed.
Furthermore, we distinguish the following cases:
∙ If both the output of 𝒜1 and all queries of 𝒜2 are classical queries4, we call it a classical algo-
rithm with (classical) advice, or an (𝑆, 𝑇 ) algorithm in the AI-ROM (auxiliary input random
oracle model);
∙ If only the output of 𝒜1 is classical, we call it a quantum algorithm with classical advice, or
an (𝑆, 𝑇 ) algorithm in the AI-QROM (auxiliary input quantum random oracle model);
∙ Otherwise, we call it a quantum algorithm with (quantum) advice, or an (𝑆, 𝑇 ) algorithm in
the QAI-QROM (quantum auxiliary input quantum random oracle model).
∙ If 𝑆 = 0, we call it an classical/quantum algorithm without advice, or an algorithm in the
ROM (random oracle model)/QROM (quantum random oracle model) respectively.
Remark 3.2. In the above definition, we assume the advice is a pure state without loss of generality.
Mentioned in [Aar05], by Kraus’ Theorem, every 𝑆-qubit mixed state can be realized as half of a
2𝑆-qubit pure state.
Below, we will use the word “adversary" and “algorithm" interchangeably, especially when we
consider interactive security games shortly after.
Definition 3.3 (Security Game). Let 𝐻 be a random oracle [𝑁 ] → [𝑀 ]. A (non-interactive)
(classical) security game 𝐺 = (𝐶) is specified by a challenger 𝐶 = (𝖲𝖺𝗆𝗉,𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒,𝖵𝖾𝗋), where:
1. 𝖼𝗁 ← 𝖲𝖺𝗆𝗉𝐻(𝑟) is a deterministic classical algorithm that takes randomness 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 as input,
and outputs a challenge 𝖼𝗁.
2. 𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻(𝑟, ·) is a deterministic classical algorithm that hardcodes the challenge and provides
adversary’s online queries5.
3. 𝑏← 𝖵𝖾𝗋𝐻(𝑟, 𝖺𝗇𝗌) is a deterministic classical algorithm that takes the input 𝖺𝗇𝗌 and outputs a
decision 𝑏 indicating whether the game is won.
4Here, we do not distinguish whether 𝒜?̃?2 is a quantum algorithm making classical queries or a completely classical
algorithm making classical queries, since a quantum algorithm can always be simulated in classical finite time.
5For almost all applications below, 𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻(𝑟, ·) = 𝐻(·). The only exception is Yao’s box, where the adversary
cannot query the challenge point.
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For every algorithm with advice, i.e. 𝒜 = (𝒜1,𝒜2) , we define
𝒜 ⇐⇒ 𝐶(𝐻) := 𝖵𝖾𝗋𝐻
(︁
𝑟,𝒜?̃?2 (𝒜1(𝐻), 𝖲𝖺𝗆𝗉𝐻(𝑟))
)︁
to be the binary variable indicating whether 𝒜 successfully makes the challenger output 1, or equiv-
alently if 𝒜 wins the security game, where ?̃?(·) := 𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻(𝑟, ·).
Definition 3.4 (Security in the AI-ROM/AI-QROM/QAI-QROM). We define the security in the
AI-ROM, AI-QROM, QAI-QROM of a security game 𝐺 to be
𝛿 = 𝛿(𝑆, 𝑇 ) := sup
𝒜
Pr
𝐻,𝑟,𝒜
[𝒜 ⇐⇒ 𝐶(𝐻) = 1] ,
where 𝒜 in the probability denotes the randomness of the algorithm, and supremum is taken over
all 𝒜 in the AI-ROM/AI-QROM/QAI-QROM (respectively).
Additionally, we can say a security game 𝐺 is 𝛿-secure if its security is at most 𝛿.
For some games, it is helpful to consider how much advantage an algorithm can gain by getting
more queries or more advice. This is formalized as below.
Definition 3.5. We call the security game a decision game if 𝖺𝗇𝗌 ∈ {0, 1}.
Definition 3.6 (Advantage against Decision Games). We define the advantage of 𝒜 for a decision
game 𝐺 to be
𝜀 = 𝜀(𝑆, 𝑇 ) := 𝛿(𝑆, 𝑇 )− 1/2,
if it has winning probability 𝛿(𝑆, 𝑇 ).
Definition 3.7 (Best Advantage of Decision Games). We define the best advantage of a decision
game 𝐺 in model ℳ to be 𝜀(𝑆, 𝑇 ) := 𝛿(𝑆, 𝑇 ) − 1/2 if 𝐺 has security 𝛿(𝑆, 𝑇 ) in ℳ, where the ℳ
could be AI-ROM, AI-QROM, or QAI-QROM.
Another class of security games that we would like to consider is when the adversary can verify
the answer by itself, which we formalize as below.
Definition 3.8. We call a security game to be publicly-verifiable if 𝖵𝖾𝗋𝐻(𝑟, ·) = ̃︁𝖵𝖾𝗋?̃?(𝖼𝗁, ·) for
some classical algorithm ̃︁𝖵𝖾𝗋?̃? where ?̃?(·) = 𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻(𝑟, ·).
Since by our definition of security games, an algorithm has only access to ?̃?(·) which may not
be the same as 𝐻(·). Therefore, publicly-verifiable means an algorithm can verify an answer by
only making queries to ?̃?.
Remark 3.9. In general, interesting decision games are not publicly-verifiable, otherwise, there
exists an adversary that breaks the game using only as many queries as it takes for the challenger
to verify the answer.
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3.2 Multi-Instance Security
In this section, we introduce multi-instance game and multi-instance security.
Definition 3.10 (Multi-Instance Security Game). For any security game 𝐺 = (𝐶) and any positive
integer 𝑔, we define the multi-instance game 𝐺⊗𝑔 = (𝐶⊗𝑔), where 𝐶⊗𝑔 is given as follows:
1. For 𝑖 ∈ [𝑔], do:
(a) Sample fresh randomness 𝑟𝑖 ←$ 𝑅;
(b) Compute 𝖼𝗁𝑖 ← 𝐶.𝖲𝖺𝗆𝗉𝐻(𝑟𝑖) and send it to the adversary;
(c) Give adversary access to oracle 𝐶.𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻(𝑟𝑖, ·) until the adversary submits a quantum
state (register) |𝖺𝗇𝗌𝑖⟩;
(d) Let {𝑃0, 𝑃1} be a projective measurement where 𝑃1 defines all 𝖺𝗇𝗌 that 𝐶.𝖵𝖾𝗋𝐻(𝑟𝑖, 𝖺𝗇𝗌) = 1
and 𝑃0 = 𝐼 − 𝑃1. Measure |𝖺𝗇𝗌𝑖⟩ in {𝑃0, 𝑃1} to get the quantum state |𝖺𝗇𝗌′𝑖⟩ and store
the result in 𝑏𝑖;
(e) Send |𝖺𝗇𝗌′𝑖⟩ back to the adversary.
2. Output 𝑏1 ∧ 𝑏2 ∧ ... ∧ 𝑏𝑔.
Definition 3.11. A (𝑔, 𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversary with advice for a multi-instance security game 𝐺⊗𝑔 = (𝐶⊗𝑔)
is defined as 𝒜 = (𝒜1,𝒜2), where the interactions between 𝒜2(|𝛼⟩) and 𝐶⊗𝑔 is defined as follows.
1. |𝛼⟩ ← 𝒜1(𝐻), which is an arbitrary (unbounded) function of 𝐻, and outputs an 𝑆-qubit
quantum state |𝛼⟩ for 𝒜2;
2. For each 𝑖 ∈ [𝑔],
(a) 𝒜2 is given a challenge 𝖼𝗁𝑖 and an oracle ?̃?𝑖 from 𝐶⊗𝑔;
(b) 𝒜2 makes at most 𝑇 queries to ?̃?𝑖 and prepares |𝖺𝗇𝗌𝑖⟩;
(c) 𝒜2 sends |𝖺𝗇𝗌𝑖⟩ to 𝐶⊗𝑔 and gets |𝖺𝗇𝗌′𝑖⟩ back;
3. Finally, 𝐶⊗𝑔 outputs a bit 𝑏.
In particular, if 𝑆 = 0, we also call it (𝑔, 𝑇 ) classical/quantum adversary (without advice), or a
(𝑔, 𝑇 ) algorithm in the ROM/QROM respectively.
For any 𝒜, which is a (𝑔, 𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversary with advice, we define
𝒜 ⇐⇒ 𝐶⊗𝑔(𝐻)
to be the binary variable indicating whether 𝒜 successfully makes the challenger output 1 in the game
defined above, or equivalently if 𝒜 wins the multi-instance security game.
Definition 3.12 (Multi-Instance Security). We say a multi-instance game 𝐺⊗𝑔 is 𝛿-secure in the
QROM (quantum random oracle model) if for any (𝑔, 𝑇 ) adversary 𝒜,
Pr
𝐻,𝒜,𝐶⊗𝑔
[𝒜 ⇐⇒ 𝐶⊗𝑔(𝐻)] ≤ 𝛿𝑔 = 𝛿(𝑔, 𝑇 )𝑔,
where 𝒜 in the probability denotes the randomness of the algorithm, 𝐶⊗𝑔 in the probability denotes
the randomness of the challenger.
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Remark 3.13 (Comparison with multi-instance problems). We expand our discussion in Sec-
tion 1.4.1 by noting that our multi-instance game is different from multi-instance problems (also
similar to direct product theorem) in two important aspects:
1. The adversary gets back |𝖺𝗇𝗌′𝑖⟩ after the challenger measures her decision. For a classical
adversary (i.e. if |𝖺𝗇𝗌′𝑖⟩ is classical), this makes no difference. For a quantum adversary,
this makes the game easier (𝛿 might go up). Looking ahead, this change is only necessary for
Theorem 4.3 but we state this for general games as it does not hurt the general bound in all
the cases we consider.
2. The adversary gets access to 𝖼𝗁𝑖+1 only after submitting his |𝖺𝗇𝗌𝑖⟩. This makes the game
harder, especially for quantum adversaries, as discussed in Section 1.4.1.
3.3 Helper Lemma for Multi-Instance Security
We now show a helpful lemma, which shows that to prove multi-instance security, it suffices to prove
conditional security for each round.
Lemma 3.14. Let 𝐺 be any security game. Let 𝐵𝑖 be the random variable for 𝑏𝑖 for the multi-
instance game 𝐺⊗𝑔 as defined in Definition 3.10, and let 𝑋 := (𝐵1, 𝐵2, ..., 𝐵𝑖−1, 𝑌 ) be the random
variable that denote the outcomes of all the measurements during the first (𝑖 − 1) rounds. For any
𝛿, if for any multi-instance adversary 𝒜 and for any 𝑥 that Pr[𝑋 = 𝑥] > 0, we have that
Pr[𝐵𝑖 = 1|𝑋 = 𝑥] ≤ 𝛿,
then 𝐺⊗𝑔 is 𝛿-secure.
Proof. We note that the success probability of 𝒜 is exactly
Pr [𝐵1 = 𝐵2 = · · · = 𝐵𝑔 = 1]
=
𝑔∏︁
𝑖=1
Pr [𝐵𝑖 = 1 |𝐵1 = · · · = 𝐵𝑖−1 = 1]
=
𝑔∏︁
𝑖=1
𝔼
𝑌
[Pr [𝐵𝑖 = 1 |𝐵1 = · · · = 𝐵𝑖−1 = 1, 𝑌 ]]
≤ 𝛿𝑔.
Here in the last inequality, we implicitly assume that the expectation is only taken over Pr[𝑌 |
𝐵1 = · · · = 𝐵𝑖−1 = 1] > 0, as otherwise the term will trivially evaluate to zero.
4 Reducing Games with Advice to Multi-Instance Games
In this section, we give four reductions from security against (𝑔, 𝑇 ) multi-instance adversaries to
security against (𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversaries with advice.
We first present the theorem that bootstraps security of multi-instance game to security against
quantum adversaries with classical advice or completely classical adversaries.
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Theorem 4.1. Given a security game 𝐺. Let 𝛿0 be the winning probability of an adversary that
outputs a random answer without advice or making any query. Assume that multi-instance game
𝐺⊗𝑔 is 𝛿(𝑔, 𝑇 )-secure in QROM (or ROM), 𝐺’s security against (𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversaries in AI-QROM
(or AI-ROM, respectively) is
𝛿′ ≤ 4 · 𝛿(𝑆 + log(1/𝛿0) + 1, 𝑇 ).
Remark. Looking ahead, we show in Lemma 5.2 that for OWF, its multi-instance security in the
QROM is 𝛿(𝑔, 𝑇 ) = 𝑂
(︁
𝑔𝑇+𝑇 2
min{𝑁,𝑀}
)︁
. The winning probability of random guess 𝛿0 is at least 1/𝑁 .
Plug these parameters into the corollary above, we have that OWF’s security in the AI-QROM is at
most
𝑂
(︂
(𝑆 + 𝑇 + log𝑁) · 𝑇
min{𝑁,𝑀}
)︂
= ?̃?
(︂
𝑆𝑇 + 𝑇 2
min{𝑁,𝑀}
)︂
.
While this theorem is very general, it yields no meaningful bound when 𝛿 ≥ 1/4, which is the
case for decision games as a random guessing adversary achieves success probability 1/2! We show
that this is not an issue, by showing that a more careful application of the reduction that is used for
proving the theorem above, actually yields the following bound for decision games against classical
advice, although with worse exponents on 𝜀′ = 𝛿′ − 1/2.
Theorem 4.2. Let 𝐺 be a decision game. Let 𝜀0 be a lower bound on the advantage for an adversary
with 𝑇0 queries and 𝑆0 bits of advice. Assume that multi-instance game 𝐺⊗𝑔 is (1/2+𝜀(𝑔, 𝑇 ))-secure
(or has best advantage 𝜀(𝑔, 𝑇 )) in QROM (or ROM). For any (𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversaries in AI-QROM (or
AI-ROM, respectively), the best advantage against 𝐺 is 𝜀′, which satisfies,
𝜀′ ≤ 4 · 𝜀
(︂
10 ln 2
𝜀′
· (𝑆 + 𝑆0 + log(1/𝜀0) + 2), 𝑇 + 𝑇0
)︂
.
Remark. Looking ahead, we show in Lemma 6.2 that for Yao’s box, its multi-instance best advantage
is 𝜀(𝑔, 𝑇 ) = 𝑂
(︂√︁
𝑔𝑇
𝑁
)︂
. When 𝑆0 = 1 and 𝑇0 = 0, 𝜀0 ≥ 12𝑁 (which is simply remembering 𝐻(1)).
Plug these parameters into the theorem above, we have that Yao’s box’s best advantage in the AI-
QROM 𝜀′ satisfies
𝜀′ ≤ 𝑂
(︃√︂
(𝑆 + 1 + log𝑁 + 2) · 𝑇
𝜀′𝑁
)︃
.
Therefore, we conclude that
𝜀′ ≤ 𝑂
(︂
(𝑆 + log𝑁) · 𝑇
𝑁
)︂1/3
= ?̃?
(︂
𝑆𝑇
𝑁
)︂1/3
.
These two theorems conclude the bounds for adversaries with classical advice. Next, we consider
bounds for quantum adversaries with advice, which is slightly worse than their classical counterparts.
We present a different reduction for quantum adversaries with advice, albeit the reduction only
works for publicly-verifiable games.
Theorem 4.3. Given a publicly-verifiable security game 𝐺, let 𝑇𝖵𝖾𝗋 be the upper bound on the
number of ?̃? queries for computing 𝖵𝖾𝗋?̃?(𝑐𝑕, ·). Assume that 𝛿0 = 1/𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒(𝑁,𝑀) is the winning
probability by random guess, and assume that multi-instance game 𝐺⊗𝑔 is 𝛿(𝑔, 𝑇 )-secure in the
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QROM. For any (𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversaries in the QAI-QROM, the best advantage against 𝐺 is 𝛿′, which
satisfies
𝛿′ ≤ 8 · 𝛿
(︁
?̃?(𝑆)/𝛿′, ?̃?(𝑇 + 𝑇𝖵𝖾𝗋)/𝛿′
)︁
,
where ?̃? absorbs 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒(log𝑁, log𝑀, log𝑆) factors.
Remark. Recall that for OWF, its multi-instance security is 𝛿(𝑔, 𝑇 ) = 𝑂
(︁
𝑔𝑇+𝑇 2
min{𝑁,𝑀}
)︁
and 𝑇𝖵𝖾𝗋 = 1;
for random guess, the winning probability is 𝛿0 ≥ 1/𝑁 . Plug these parameters into the corollary
above, we have that OWF’s security 𝛿′ in the QAI-QROM satisfies
𝛿′ ≤ ?̃?
(︂
𝑆𝑇 + 𝑇 2
𝛿′2 ·min{𝑁,𝑀}
)︂
.
In conclusion,
𝛿′ ≤ ?̃?
(︂
𝑆𝑇 + 𝑇 2
min{𝑁,𝑀}
)︂1/3
.
As noted before that publicly-verifiable games and decision games are essentially disjoint, we
finally present the fourth reduction for decision games.
Theorem 4.4. Given a decision security game 𝐺. Assume that 𝜀0 = 1/𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒(𝑁,𝑀) is a non-
negligible lower bound on the advantage for an adversary with 𝑇0 queries and 𝑆0 qubits of advice,
and assume that multi-instance game 𝐺⊗𝑔 is 𝜀(𝑔, 𝑇 )-secure in the QROM. For any (𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversaries
in QAI-QROM, the best advantage against 𝐺 is 𝜀′, which satisfies
𝜀′ ≤ 8 · 𝜀
(︁
?̃?(𝑆 + 𝑆0)
3/𝜀′9, ?̃?((𝑇 + 𝑇0)(𝑆 + 𝑆0)2)/𝜀′8
)︁
,
where ?̃? absorbs 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒(log𝑁, log𝑀, log𝑆) factors.
Remark. Recall that for Yao’s box, its multi-instance advantage is 𝜀(𝑔, 𝑇 ) = 𝑂
(︂√︁
𝑔𝑇
𝑁
)︂
; when
𝑆0 = 1 and 𝑇0 = 0, 𝜀0 ≥ 12𝑁 (which is simply remembering 𝐻(1)). Plug these parameters into the
corollary above, we have that Yao’s box’s best advantage 𝜀′ in the QAI-QROM satisfies
𝜀′ ≤ ?̃?
(︃√︂
𝑆5𝑇
𝜀′17𝑁
)︃
,
therefore, we conclude that
𝜀′ ≤ ?̃?
(︂
𝑆5𝑇
𝑁
)︂1/19
.
4.1 Reduction for Classical Advice
Fact 4.5. Given events 𝐸1, 𝐸2, ..., 𝐸𝑁 , any real number 𝐵 ≥ 0, 𝜀, let 𝐼 be a uniformly random
integer in [𝑁 ]. If Pr[𝐸𝐼 ] ≥ 𝐵 + 𝜀, there exists a subset 𝑆 ⊆ [𝑁 ] of size |𝑆| ≥ 𝜀𝑁/2, such that for
any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆, Pr[𝐸𝑖] ≥ 𝐵 + 𝜀/2.
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Proof. Without loss of generality, assume 𝜀 > 0. Let 𝑆* be the subset of [𝑁 ] that contains all
𝑖 ∈ [𝑁 ] whose Pr[𝐸𝑖] ≥ 𝐵 + 𝜀/2. Assume for contradiction, |𝑆*| < 𝜀𝑁/2. We have,
𝐵 + 𝜀 ≤ Pr[𝐸𝐼 ]
≤ 1 · Pr[𝐼 ∈ 𝑆*] + Pr[𝐸𝐼 |𝐼 ̸∈ 𝑆*] · Pr[𝐼 ̸∈ 𝑆*]
< 1 · 𝜀/2 + (𝐵 + 𝜀/2) · 1
= 𝐵 + 𝜀,
which is a contradiction.
Proposition 4.6. Given a security game 𝐺. Given an (𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversary with classical advice 𝒜 for
a security game 𝐺 with winning probability 𝛿, then for all real 𝐵 ≥ 0, let 𝛿 = 𝐵 + 𝜀, there exists an
(𝑔, 𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversary with classical advice 𝒜′ for the multi-instance game 𝐺⊗𝑔 with winning probability
𝛿′ ≥ 𝜀/2 · (𝐵 + 𝜀/2)𝑔 for any 𝑔 > 0.
Furthermore, this reduction is classical, meaning that if 𝒜 is a classical algorithm with advice,
so is 𝒜′.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume 𝐵 ≤ 𝛿 or 𝜀 ≥ 0. Consider the following adversary with
advice 𝒜′:
1. Compute 𝛼← 𝒜1(𝐻);
2. For 𝑖 ∈ [𝑔], on receiving challenge 𝖼𝗁𝑖 and given oracle access to ?̃?𝑖, computes 𝒜?̃?𝑖2 (𝛼, 𝖼𝗁𝑖),
sends its output, and ignores the answer sent back by the challenger.
Consider the event 𝐸𝐻 to be the event when 𝒜 wins the game conditioned on the random oracle
is fixed as 𝐻. Using Fact 4.5, we can find a subset 𝐻𝗀𝗈𝗈𝖽 of all possible functions such that whenever
the function 𝐻 is in 𝐻𝗀𝗈𝗈𝖽, Pr𝑟,𝒜[𝒜 ⇐⇒ 𝐶(𝐻) = 1] ≥ 𝐵 + 𝜀/2. Since 𝐻𝗀𝗈𝗈𝖽 takes up at least 𝜀/2
fraction of all possible functions, we have the theorem by observing that 𝒜′ given above have the
success probability lower bounded by 𝜀/2 · (𝐵 + 𝜀/2)𝑔.
Proposition 4.7. Given a security game 𝐺 and a (𝑔, 𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversary with (classical or quantum)
advice 𝒜 for the multi-instance game 𝐺⊗𝑔 with winning probability 𝛿, there exists an (𝑔, 𝑇 ) adversary
(without advice) 𝒜′ for the same game with winning probability at least 2−𝑆 · 𝛿.
Furthermore, the reduction is classical.
Proof. 𝒜′ works simply by invoking the second-stage adversary with a maximally mixed state 𝐼2𝑆
as its advice. Note that a maximally mixed state is a mixed state in any basis, in particular,
assume that the correct advice is |𝛼⟩, we can write 𝐼2𝑆 as a maximally mixed state in basis states
𝑣1, 𝑣2, ..., 𝑣2𝑆 where 𝑣1 = |𝛼⟩. Using this observation, we conclude that 𝒜′ has winning probability
at least 2−𝑆 · 𝛿.
The reduction is classical, as picking a maximally mixed state 𝐼2𝑆 is equivalent to choosing a
𝑆-bit bit-string uniformly at random.
Combining the two propositions above yields the following corollary.
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Corollary 4.8. Let 𝐺 be a security game. Given an (𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversary with classical advice 𝒜 for
the security game 𝐺 with success probability 𝛿, then for all real 𝐵 ≥ 0, let 𝛿 = 𝐵 + 𝜀, there exists
an (𝑔, 𝑇 ) adversary (without advice) 𝒜′ for the multi-instance game 𝐺⊗𝑔 with winning probability
𝛿′ ≥ 2−𝑆 · 𝜀/2 · (𝐵 + 𝜀/2)𝑔 for any 𝑔 > 0.
Furthermore, the reduction is classical.
Theorem 4.1. Given a security game 𝐺. Let 𝛿0 be the winning probability of an adversary that
outputs a random answer without advice or making any query. Assume that multi-instance game
𝐺⊗𝑔 is 𝛿(𝑔, 𝑇 )-secure in QROM (or ROM), 𝐺’s security against (𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversaries in AI-QROM
(or AI-ROM, respectively) is
𝛿′ ≤ 4 · 𝛿(𝑆 + log(1/𝛿0) + 1, 𝑇 ).
Proof. Let 𝒜 be the (𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversary with classical advice 𝒜 for 𝐺 with the best winning probability
𝛿′, then using Corollary 4.8 with 𝐵 = 0, there exists an (𝑔, 𝑇 ) adversary (without advice) 𝒜′ for
the multi-instance game 𝐺⊗𝑔 with winning probability at least 2−𝑆 · 𝛿′/2 · (𝛿′/2)𝑔 for any 𝑔 > 0. By
multi-instance security, we know that
𝛿(𝑔, 𝑇 )𝑔 ≥ 2−𝑆 · 𝛿′/2 · (𝛿′/2)𝑔 ≥ 2−𝑆 · 𝛿0/2 · (𝛿′/2)𝑔.
Take 𝑔 = 𝑆 + log(1/𝛿0) + 1, we have
𝛿(𝑔, 𝑇 )𝑔 ≥ 2−𝑔 · (𝛿′/2)𝑔,
and thus we have the theorem.
4.2 Reduction for Decision Games with Classical Advice
Fact 4.9. For any real 𝐶 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 1, we have that 𝐶𝐶+𝑥 ≤ 1− 𝑥𝐶+1 .
Proof. By monotonicity and convexity of 𝐶𝐶+𝑥 on 𝑥.
Theorem 4.2. Let 𝐺 be a decision game. Let 𝜀0 be a lower bound on the advantage for an adversary
with 𝑇0 queries and 𝑆0 bits of advice. Assume that multi-instance game 𝐺⊗𝑔 is (1/2+𝜀(𝑔, 𝑇 ))-secure
(or has best advantage 𝜀(𝑔, 𝑇 )) in QROM (or ROM). For any (𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversaries in AI-QROM (or
AI-ROM, respectively), the best advantage against 𝐺 is 𝜀′, which satisfies,
𝜀′ ≤ 4 · 𝜀
(︂
10 ln 2
𝜀′
· (𝑆 + 𝑆0 + log(1/𝜀0) + 2), 𝑇 + 𝑇0
)︂
.
Proof. Let 𝒜 be the (𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversary with classical advice 𝒜 for 𝐺 with the best advantage 𝜀′. By
security of multi-instance game and Corollary 4.8 with 𝐵 = 1/2, we know that there exists an (𝑔, 𝑇 )
adversary (without advice) 𝒜′ for the multi-instance game 𝐺⊗𝑔 with winning probability at least
2−𝑆 · 𝜀′/2 · (1/2+ 𝜀′/2)𝑔 for any 𝑔 > 0. Moreover, if 𝑆 ≥ 𝑆0 and 𝑇 ≥ 𝑇0, we have 𝜀′ ≥ 𝜀0. Therefore,
(1/2 + 𝜀(𝑆, 𝑇 ))𝑔 ≥ 2−𝑆 · (𝜀′/2) · (1/2 + 𝜀′/2)𝑔 ≥ 2−𝑆 · (𝜀0/2) · (1/2 + 𝜀′/2)𝑔.
Therefore, in general,
(1/2 + 𝜀(𝑔, 𝑇 + 𝑇0))
𝑔 ≥ 2−𝑆−𝑆0 · (𝜀0/4) · (1/2 + 𝜀′/2)𝑔.
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Take 𝑔 = 10 ln 2𝜀′ ·(𝑆+𝑆0+log(1/𝜀0)+2), using Fact 4.9, and the fact that, we have that (1−1/𝑥)𝑥 ≤
1/𝑒 for any real 𝑥 ≥ 1, we have(︂
1/2 + 𝜀′/4
1/2 + 𝜀′/2
)︂𝑔
≤
(︂
1− 𝜀
′/4
1/2 + 𝜀′/4 + 1
)︂𝑔
=
(︂
1− 1
4(1/2 + 1)/𝜀′ + 1
)︂𝑔
≤
(︂
1− 1
5(1/2 + 1)/𝜀′
)︂𝑔
≤ (︀1− 𝜀′/10)︀𝑔
≤ 2−(𝑆+𝑆0+log(1/𝜀0)+2)
= 2−𝑆−𝑆0 · 𝜀0/4.
Combining the two formulae above, we obtain that
(1/2 + 𝜀(𝑔, 𝑇 + 𝑇0))
𝑔 ≥ (1/2 + 𝜀′/4)𝑔,
where 𝑔 = 10 ln 2𝜀′ · (𝑆 + 𝑆0 + log(1/𝜀0) + 2). Thus we have the theorem.
4.3 Reduction for Publicly-Verifiable Games
Lemma 4.10 (Gentle measurement lemma [Aar05, Lemma 2.2]). Suppose a 2-outcome measure-
ment of a mixed state 𝜌 yields outcome 0 with probability 1 − 𝜀. Then after the measurement, we
can recover a state 𝜌 such that ‖𝜌− 𝜌‖tr ≤
√
𝜀. This is true even if the measurement is a POVM
(that is, involves arbitrarily many ancilla qubits).
Lemma 4.11 (Quantum union bound [AR19, Corollary 11]). Let 𝜌 be a mixed state and let
𝑆1, ..., 𝑆𝑚 be any quantum operations. Suppose that for all 𝑖, we have
‖𝑆𝑖(𝜌)− 𝜌‖tr ≤ 𝜀𝑖.
Then
‖𝑆𝑚(𝑆𝑚−1(...𝑆1(𝜌)...))− 𝜌‖tr ≤ 𝜀1 + ...+ 𝜀𝑚.
Lemma 4.12 ([BV97, Lemma 3.6]). Let 𝒟(𝜓) denote the probability distribution that results form
a measurement of |𝜓⟩ in the computational basis. If ‖|𝜑⟩ − |𝜓⟩‖tr ≤ 𝜀, then ‖𝒟(𝜑)−𝒟(𝜓)‖1 ≤ 4𝜀.
Proposition 4.13. There exists a universal constant 𝑐 > 0. Given a publicly-verifiable security
game 𝐺, let 𝑇𝖵𝖾𝗋 be the upper bound on the number of ?̃? queries for computing ̃︁𝖵𝖾𝗋?̃?(𝖼𝗁, ·). Given an
(𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversary with advice 𝒜 for 𝐺 with winning probability 𝛿, there exists an (𝑔, 𝑆′, 𝑇 ′) adversary
with advice 𝒜′ for the multi-instance game 𝐺⊗𝑔 with winning probability at least (𝛿/4)𝑔+1 for any
𝑔 > 0, where ⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
𝑆′ = 𝑘𝑆,
𝑇 ′ = 2𝑘(𝑇 + 𝑇𝖵𝖾𝗋),
𝑘 = 𝑐 · log(𝑔 + 1)/𝛿.
Proof. Consider the following adversary 𝒜′:
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1. At the pre-processing phase, compute |𝛼𝑗⟩ ← 𝒜1(𝐻) for all 𝑗 ∈ [𝑘].
2. At the online phase, on receiving challenge 𝖼𝗁𝑖 and given oracle access to ?̃?(·) := 𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻(𝖼𝗁𝑖, ·),
do:
(a) Run |𝖺𝗇𝗌𝑗⟩ ← 𝒜?̃?2 (|𝛼𝑗⟩ , 𝖼𝗁𝑖) for all 𝑗 ∈ [𝑘];
(b) Compute in superposition |𝑣𝑗⟩ ← ̃︁𝖵𝖾𝗋?̃?(𝖼𝗁𝑖, |𝖺𝗇𝗌𝑗⟩) for all 𝑗 ∈ [𝑘].
(c) In superposition, find the first 𝑗 such that 𝑣𝑗 = 1, and store 𝖺𝗇𝗌𝑗 into an empty register
𝖺𝗇𝗌.
(d) Send |𝖺𝗇𝗌⟩ to challenger, and receives |𝖺𝗇𝗌′⟩ back;
(e) Un-compute (c), (b), (a).
First, it is easy to see that for 𝒜′, its advice is of length 𝑆′ = 𝑘𝑆 and it requires to make at
most 𝑇 ′ = 2𝑘(𝑇 + 𝑇𝖵𝖾𝗋) oracle queries (𝑇 + 𝑇𝖵𝖾𝗋 queries to compute each 𝑣𝑗 and 𝑇 + 𝑇𝖵𝖾𝗋 queries to
un-compute the previous round).
Using Fact 4.5, we can find a subset 𝐻𝗀𝗈𝗈𝖽 that is at least 𝛿/2 fraction of all functions, such
that any function 𝐻 in 𝐻𝗀𝗈𝗈𝖽, Pr𝑟,𝒜[𝒜 ⇐⇒ 𝐶(𝐻) = 1] ≥ 𝛿/2.
Fix any function in 𝐻𝗀𝗈𝗈𝖽. Using Fact 4.5 again, we can find a subset 𝑅𝗀𝗈𝗈𝖽 that is of size at
least 𝛿|𝑅|/4 (which consequently is of at least 𝛿/4 fraction), such that for any randomness 𝑟 in
𝑅𝗀𝗈𝗈𝖽, Pr𝒜[𝒜 ⇐⇒ 𝐶(𝐻) = 1] ≥ 𝛿/4.
Assume 𝖼𝗁1 is generated using the randomness in 𝑅𝗀𝗈𝗈𝖽, then we know that the challenger will
reject the first answer with probability at most (1 − 𝛿/4)𝑘 ≤ 1
100𝑔4
if 𝑐 is a large enough constant.
Let 𝜌 be |𝛼1⟩ , ..., |𝛼𝑘⟩. By Lemma 4.10, after one round, the advice state we recovered from un-
computing 𝜌1 satisfies ‖𝜌1 − 𝜌‖tr ≤ 1/
√︀
100𝑔4 = 1/10𝑔2.
If all challenges are generated using randomness in 𝑅𝗀𝗈𝗈𝖽, by Lemma 4.11, the overall advice
state starting in each round 𝜌𝑗 satisfies ‖𝜌𝑗 − 𝜌‖tr ≤ 𝑔 · 110𝑔2 . Therefore, in each round, since
every operation besides the measurement is unitary, by Lemma 4.12, the challenger accepts with
probability at least 1 − 12𝑔 . By union bound, the challenger accepts with probability at least 1/2,
finishing the proof that the winning probability is at least 𝛿/2 · (𝛿/4)𝑔 · 1/2.
Combining this with Proposition 4.7 (to guess a quantum advice by a maximally mixed state),
we obtain the following.
Corollary 4.14. There exists a universal constant 𝑐 > 0. Given a publicly-verifiable security game
𝐺, let 𝑇𝖵𝖾𝗋 be the upper bound on the number of ?̃? queries for computing 𝖵𝖾𝗋?̃?(𝖼𝗁, ·). Given an
(𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversary with advice 𝒜 for 𝐺 with winning probability 𝛿, there exists an (𝑔, 𝑇 ′) adversary
𝒜′ for the multi-instance game 𝐺⊗𝑔 with winning probability at least 2−𝑘𝑆 · (𝛿/4)𝑔+1 for any 𝑔 > 0,
where 𝑇 ′ = 2𝑘(𝑇 + 𝑇𝖵𝖾𝗋) and 𝑘 = 𝑐 · log(𝑔 + 1)/𝛿.
Fact 4.15. Given any real 𝐶 ≥ 0, 𝐷 ≥ 2, if 𝑔0 = 𝐶+𝐷+14 and 𝑔 = 2𝑔0 log 𝑔0, 𝑔 ≥ 𝐶 log(𝑔+1)+𝐷.
Proof. Since 𝐶 ≥ 0, 𝐷 ≥ 2, we have 𝑔0 ≥ 16 and log 𝑔0 ≥ 4.
𝑔 − (𝐶 log(𝑔 + 1) +𝐷) ≥ 𝑔 − (𝐶 log(2𝑔) +𝐷)
≥ 2𝑔0 log 𝑔0 − (𝐶 log(4𝑔0 log 𝑔0) +𝐷)
≥ 2(𝐶 +𝐷 + 14) log 𝑔0 − (𝐶 log(4𝑔0 log 𝑔0) +𝐷)
≥ 𝐶(2 log 𝑔0 − (2 + log 𝑔0 + log log 𝑔0)) +𝐷(2 log 𝑔0 − 1).
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We complete the proof by noting that coefficients of 𝐶 and 𝐷 are both non-negative when log 𝑔0 ≥
4.
Theorem 4.3. Given a publicly-verifiable security game 𝐺, let 𝑇𝖵𝖾𝗋 be the upper bound on the
number of ?̃? queries for computing 𝖵𝖾𝗋?̃?(𝑐𝑕, ·). Assume that 𝛿0 = 1/𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒(𝑁,𝑀) is the winning
probability by random guess, and assume that multi-instance game 𝐺⊗𝑔 is 𝛿(𝑔, 𝑇 )-secure in the
QROM. For any (𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversaries in the QAI-QROM, the best advantage against 𝐺 is 𝛿′, which
satisfies
𝛿′ ≤ 8 · 𝛿
(︁
?̃?(𝑆)/𝛿′, ?̃?(𝑇 + 𝑇𝖵𝖾𝗋)/𝛿′
)︁
,
where ?̃? absorbs 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒(log𝑁, log𝑀, log𝑆) factors.
Proof. Let 𝒜 be the (𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversary with advice for 𝐺 with the best advantage 𝛿′, then there exists
an (𝑔, 𝑇 ) adversary (without advice) 𝒜′ for the multi-instance game 𝐺⊗𝑔 with winning probability
at least 2−𝑘𝑆 · (𝛿′/4)𝑔+1 for any 𝑔 > 0, where 𝑇 ′ = 2𝑘(𝑇 + 𝑇𝖵𝖾𝗋) and 𝑘 = 𝑐 · log(𝑔 + 1)/𝛿′. Then we
have,
𝛿(𝑔, 𝑇 ′)𝑔 ≥ 2−𝑘𝑆 · (𝛿′/4)𝑔+1
≥ 2−𝑘𝑆 · (𝛿0/4) · (𝛿′/4)𝑔
Take 𝑔0 = 𝑐𝛿′ ·𝑆+log(1/𝛿0)+16 and 𝑔 = 2𝑔0 ·log 𝑔0. By Fact 4.15, let 𝐶 = 𝑐𝛿′𝑆 and 𝐷 = log(1/𝛿0)+2,
we have 𝑔 ≥ 𝐶 log(𝑔 + 1) +𝐷 = 𝑐 log(𝑔 + 1)𝑆/𝛿′ + log(1/𝛿0) + 2.
Therefore, we have
𝛿(𝑔, 𝑇 ′)𝑔 ≥ 2−𝑘𝑆 · (𝛿0/4) · (𝛿′/4)𝑔
= 2−𝑐·log(𝑔+1)𝑆/𝛿
′ · 2− log(1/𝛿0)−2 · (𝛿′/4)𝑔
≥ (𝛿′/8)𝑔.
Therefore, we conclude that
𝛿′ ≤ 8 · 𝛿(𝑔, 𝑇 ′).
where 𝑔 = ?̃?(𝑆)/𝛿′ and 𝑇 ′ = ?̃?(𝑇 + 𝑇𝖵𝖾𝗋)/𝛿′.
4.4 Reduction for Decision Games with Quantum Advice
Theorem 4.16 (Online shadow tomography [AR19, Theorem 9]). There exists an explicit procedure
that performs shadow tomography, namely on input 𝑛 copies of an arbitrary unknown 𝑑-dimensional
mixed state 𝜌, and any two-outcome measurements 𝐸1, ..., 𝐸𝑚, it estimates Pr[𝐸𝑖(𝜌) = 1] within an
additive error of ±𝜀 for every 𝑖 ∈ [𝑚] with overall success probability 1− 𝛽, if
𝑛 = Ω
(︃
log2𝑚 · log2 𝑑 · log 1𝛽
𝜀8
)︃
.
Furthermore, this procedure satisfies the following properties:
1. It is online, meaning that it can be given by a pair of quantum algorithms: an initializa-
tion algorithm |𝗌𝗍⟩ ← 𝖰𝖯𝖬𝖶.𝖨𝗇𝗂𝗍(𝑛, 𝜌⊗𝑛,𝑚, 𝜀, 𝛽), and an estimation algorithm (|𝗌𝗍⟩ , 𝑝𝑖) ←
𝖰𝖯𝖬𝖶.𝖤𝗌𝗍(|𝗌𝗍⟩ , 𝑖, 𝐸𝑖). |𝗌𝗍⟩ will be updated by the estimation algorithm 𝖰𝖯𝖬𝖶.𝖤𝗌𝗍.
29
2. If the measurement 𝐸𝑖 can be written as (1). prepare a state |𝖺𝗇𝗌⟩ which is initialized as 0, (2).
apply a unitary 𝑈𝑖 over the joint state 𝜌 and |𝖺𝗇𝗌⟩, (3). measure |𝖺𝗇𝗌⟩ in the computational
basis. Then 𝑈𝑖 (or its inverse) will be run at most 4𝑛 times6.
First, we will present the following useful fact which says that additive error estimation is robust
with respect to arbitrary distribution.
Fact 4.17. Given 2𝑁 events 𝐸1, ..., 𝐸𝑁 , and 𝐸′1, ..., 𝐸′𝑁 , and some real 𝜀, such that for any 𝑖 ∈ [𝑁 ],
|Pr[𝐸𝑖] − Pr[𝐸′𝑖]| ≤ 𝜀. Then for arbitrary distribution 𝜇 over [𝑁 ] that is independent of the 2𝑁
events, |Pr[𝐸𝜇]− Pr[𝐸′𝜇]| ≤ 𝜀.
Proof.
⃒⃒
Pr[𝐸𝜇]− Pr[𝐸′𝜇]
⃒⃒
=
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒⃒∑︁
𝑖∈[𝑁 ]
(Pr[𝐸𝜇 ∧ 𝜇 = 𝑖]− Pr[𝐸′𝜇 ∧ 𝜇 = 𝑖])
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒⃒
≤
∑︁
𝑖∈[𝑁 ]
⃒⃒
Pr[𝐸𝜇 ∧ 𝜇 = 𝑖]− Pr[𝐸′𝜇 ∧ 𝜇 = 𝑖]
⃒⃒
=
∑︁
𝑖∈[𝑁 ]
Pr[𝜇 = 𝑖] · ⃒⃒Pr[𝐸𝑖|𝜇 = 𝑖]− Pr[𝐸′𝑖|𝜇 = 𝑖]⃒⃒
=
∑︁
𝑖∈[𝑁 ]
Pr[𝜇 = 𝑖] · ⃒⃒Pr[𝐸𝑖]− Pr[𝐸′𝑖]⃒⃒
≤
∑︁
𝑖∈[𝑁 ]
Pr[𝜇 = 𝑖] · 𝜀
= 𝜀.
Proposition 4.18. There exists a universal constant 𝑐 > 0. Given a decision game 𝐺. Given an
(𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversary with advice 𝒜 for 𝐺 with winning probability 1/2 + 𝜀, there exists an (𝑔, 𝑆′, 𝑇 ′)
adversary with advice 𝒜′ for the multi-instance game 𝐺⊗𝑔 with winning probability at least 𝜀/4 ·
(1/2 + 𝜀/4)𝑔 for any 𝑔 > 0, where ⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
𝑆′ = 𝑘𝑆,
𝑇 ′ = 4𝑘𝑇,
𝑘 = 𝑐
𝜀8
· 𝑆2 log2 𝑔.
Proof. Consider the following adversary 𝒜′:
1. At the pre-processing phase, compute |𝛼𝑗⟩ ← 𝒜1(𝐻) for all 𝑗 ∈ [𝑘]. We denote 𝜌⊗ =
|𝛼1⟩ , ..., |𝛼𝑘⟩ as the advice.
2. At the online phase, compute 𝗌𝗍← 𝖰𝖯𝖬𝖶.𝖨𝗇𝗂𝗍(𝑘, 𝜌⊗, 𝑔, 𝜀/4, 1/2);
3. On receiving challenge 𝖼𝗁𝑖 and given oracle access to ?̃?(·) := 𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻(𝖼𝗁𝑖, ·), do:
6This can be verified by looking at [AR19, Figure 1].
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(a) Compute (|𝗌𝗍⟩ , 𝑝𝑖)← 𝖰𝖯𝖬𝖶.𝖤𝗌𝗍(|𝗌𝗍⟩ , 𝑖, 𝐸𝑖), where the measurement 𝐸𝑖 is written as the
unitary that computes 𝒜?̃?2 (𝜌, 𝖼𝗁𝑖);
(b) Flip a biased coin that yields 1 with probability 𝑝𝑖 and 0 with probability 1 − 𝑝𝑖, and
send the result to the challenger;
(c) Ignore challenger’s response.
Note that each variable in Theorem 4.16 is set to be: 𝑚 = 𝑔, 𝑑 = 2𝑆 , 𝛽 = 1/2, additive error is
set to be 𝜀/4, and 𝛽 = 1/2. Therefore the number of copies 𝑛 in this theorem, or in other words, 𝑘
in our proposition is 𝑐
𝜀8
𝑆2 log2 𝑔. The advice is of length 𝑆′ = 𝑘𝑆 and the number of queries is at
most 𝑇 ′ = 4𝑘𝑇 because for each 𝐸𝑖, the unitary (or its inverse) that computes 𝐸𝑖 will be applied
at most 4𝑘 times (by Theorem 4.16).
Using Fact 4.5, we can find a subset 𝐻𝗀𝗈𝗈𝖽 of all possible functions such that whenever the
function 𝐻 is in 𝐻𝗀𝗈𝗈𝖽, Pr𝑟,𝒜[𝒜 ⇐⇒ 𝐶(𝐻) = 1] ≥ 1/2 + 𝜀/2. Since 𝐻𝗀𝗈𝗈𝖽 takes up 𝜀/2 fraction of
all possible functions, and this shadow tomography algorithm succeeds with probability ≥ 1− 𝛽 =
1/2. We have the theorem by observing that 𝒜′ given above has the success probability lower
bounded by 𝜀/2 · 1/2 · (1/2+ 𝜀/2− 𝜀/4)𝑔 (by Fact 4.17 and the fact that each challenge is generated
independently).
Combining this theorem with Proposition 4.7 (to replace a quantum advice with a maximally
mixed state), we obtain the following.
Corollary 4.19. There exists a universal constant 𝑐 > 0. Given a decision security game 𝐺. Given
an (𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversary with advice 𝒜 for 𝐺 with winning probability 1/2 + 𝜀, there exists an (𝑔, 𝑇 ′)
adversary 𝒜′ for the multi-instance game 𝐺⊗𝑔 with winning probability at least 2−𝑘𝑆 ·𝜀/4·(1/2+𝜀/4)𝑔
for any 𝑔 > 0, where 𝑇 ′ = 4𝑘𝑇 and 𝑘 = 𝑐
𝜀8
· 𝑆2 log2 𝑔.
Fact 4.20. Given any real 𝐶 ≥ 0, 𝐷 ≥ 2, if 𝑔0 = 𝐶 +𝐷 and 𝑔 = 16𝑔0 log 𝑔0, 𝑔 ≥ 𝐶 log2 𝑔 +𝐷.
Proof. First, since 𝐶 ≥ 0, 𝐷 ≥ 2, we have 𝑔0 ≥ 2.
log 𝑔 = log(2𝑔0 log
2 𝑔0) = 1 + log 𝑔0 + 2 log log 𝑔0 ≤ 3.9 · log 𝑔0
The above inequality is true because for 𝑔0 ≥ 2, 2 log log 𝑔0 ≤ 1.9 · log 𝑔0 and 1 ≤ log 𝑔0. Then we
have,
𝑔 − (𝐶 log2 𝑔 +𝐷) ≥ 16 · 𝑔0 log2 𝑔0 − (𝐶 · (3.9)2 log2 𝑔0 +𝐷)
≥ 𝐶(16− 3.92) log2 𝑔0 +𝐷(16 log2 𝑔0 − 1)
We complete the proof by noting that coefficients of 𝐶 and 𝐷 are both non-negative when log 𝑔0 ≥
1.
Theorem 4.4. Given a decision security game 𝐺. Assume that 𝜀0 = 1/𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒(𝑁,𝑀) is a non-
negligible lower bound on the advantage for an adversary with 𝑇0 queries and 𝑆0 qubits of advice,
and assume that multi-instance game 𝐺⊗𝑔 is 𝜀(𝑔, 𝑇 )-secure in the QROM. For any (𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversaries
in QAI-QROM, the best advantage against 𝐺 is 𝜀′, which satisfies
𝜀′ ≤ 8 · 𝜀
(︁
?̃?(𝑆 + 𝑆0)
3/𝜀′9, ?̃?((𝑇 + 𝑇0)(𝑆 + 𝑆0)2)/𝜀′8
)︁
,
where ?̃? absorbs 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒(log𝑁, log𝑀, log𝑆) factors.
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Proof. Let 𝒜 be the (𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversary with advice for 𝐺 with the best advantage 𝜀′, then there exists
an (𝑔, 𝑇 ) adversary (without advice) 𝒜′ for the multi-instance game 𝐺⊗𝑔 with winning probability
at least 2−𝑘𝑆 · 𝜀′/4 · (1/2 + 𝜀′/4)𝑔 for any 𝑔 > 0, where 𝑇 ′ = 4𝑘𝑇 and 𝑘 = 𝑐
𝜀8
· 𝑆2 log2 𝑔.
By the security of multi-instance game, if 𝑇 ′ ≥ 𝑇0 and 𝑆 ≥ 𝑆0, we know that
(1/2 + 𝜀(𝑔, 𝑇 ′))𝑔 ≥ 2−𝑘𝑆 · 𝜀′/4 · (1/2 + 𝜀′/4)𝑔 ≥ 2−𝑘𝑆 · 𝜀0/4 · (1/2 + 𝜀′/4)𝑔.
Therefore, in general,
(1/2 + 𝜀(𝑔, 𝑇 ′))𝑔 ≥ 2−𝑘(𝑆+𝑆0) · 𝜀0/4 · (1/2 + 𝜀′/4)𝑔.
Let 𝐶 = 15 ln 2𝜀′ · 𝑐/𝜀′8 · 𝑆2(𝑆 + 𝑆0) and 𝐷 = 15 ln 2𝜀′ (log(1/𝜀0) + 2) ≥ 2. Let
𝑔0 =
15 ln 2
𝜀′
· (𝑐/𝜀′8 · 𝑆2(𝑆 + 𝑆0) + log(1/𝜀0) + 2) = 𝐶 +𝐷,
𝑔 = 16𝑔0 log
2 𝑔0 ≥ 𝐶 log2 𝑔 +𝐷 = 15 ln 2
𝜀′
(𝑘(𝑆 + 𝑆0) + log(1/𝜀0) + 2),
where the inequality for 𝑔 comes from Fact 4.20.
(︂
1/2 + 𝜀′/8
1/2 + 𝜀′/4
)︂𝑔
≤
(︂
1− 𝜀
′/8
1/2 + 𝜀′/8 + 1
)︂𝑔
=
(︂
1− 1
8(1/2 + 1)/𝜀′ + 1
)︂𝑔
≤
(︂
1− 𝜀
′
15
)︂𝑔
≤ 2−𝑘(𝑆+𝑆0) · 𝜀0/4,
where the first inequality comes from Fact 4.9 and the last inequality comes from 𝑔 ≥ 15 ln 2𝜀′ (𝑘(𝑆 +
𝑆0) + log(1/𝜀0) + 2). Overall, we have,
(1/2 + 𝜀(𝑔, 𝑇 ′))𝑔 ≥ 2−𝑘(𝑆+𝑆0) · 𝜀0/4 · (1/2 + 𝜀′/4)𝑔 ≥ (1/2 + 𝜀′/8)𝑔.
In conclusion, 𝜀′(𝑆, 𝑇 ) ≤ 8 · 𝜀(𝑔, 𝑇 ′) where 𝑔 = ?̃?(𝑆 + 𝑆0)3/𝜀′9 and 𝑇 ′ = 4𝑘𝑇 = ?̃?((𝑇 + 𝑇0)(𝑆 +
𝑆0)
2)/𝜀′8.
5 One-Way Function
In this section, we show the security of OWF in the AI-QROM and QAI-QROM. Let us start with
reformalizing the security of OWF in QROM in our language of security games.
Definition 5.1 (OWF Security Game). Let 𝐻 be a random oracle [𝑁 ]→ [𝑀 ]. The security game
𝐺𝖮𝖶𝖥 = (𝐶𝖮𝖶𝖥) is specified by three procedures (𝖲𝖺𝗆𝗉,𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒,𝖵𝖾𝗋), where:
1. 𝖲𝖺𝗆𝗉𝐻(𝑥) takes a random element 𝑥 ∈ [𝑁 ], and outputs 𝑦 = 𝐻(𝑥).
2. 𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻(𝑥, 𝑥′) ignores the challenge point 𝑥 and simply outputs 𝐻(𝑥′).
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3. 𝖵𝖾𝗋𝐻(𝑥, 𝑥′) outputs 1 if and only if 𝐻(𝑥) = 𝐻(𝑥′).
To fill in the rest of the details from Definition 3.3, the security game defined here is that given a
random oracle, the challenger samples a uniformly random element 𝑥 ∈ [𝑁 ] and computes 𝑦 = 𝐻(𝑥)
as the challenge. The adversary is allowed to make oracle queries to 𝐻 and it wins if and only if it
finds any pre-image of 𝑦. This is exactly the security of OWF in QROM. This is also exactly the
problem of inverting a random image.
In the rest of the section, we are going to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2. 𝐺⊗𝑔𝖮𝖶𝖥 is 𝛿(𝑔, 𝑇 ) = 𝑂
(︁
𝑔𝑇+𝑇 2
min{𝑁,𝑀}
)︁
-secure in the QROM.
Combining this lemma with Theorem 4.1 (or Theorem 4.3), we can show the security of 𝐺𝖮𝖶𝖥
in the AI-QROM (or QAI-QROM, respectively).
Theorem 5.3. 𝐺𝖮𝖶𝖥 is 𝛿(𝑆, 𝑇 ) = 𝑂
(︁
(𝑆+𝑇+log𝑁)𝑇
min{𝑁,𝑀}
)︁
= ?̃?
(︁
𝑆𝑇+𝑇 2
min{𝑁,𝑀}
)︁
-secure in the AI-QROM.
Proof. In Theorem 4.1, 𝛿0 is at least 1/𝑁 because there is at least one pre-image of 𝑦, so random
guess has winning probability at least 1/𝑁 . Plugging in 𝛿0 ≥ 1/𝑁 , and 𝐺⊗𝑔𝖮𝖶𝖥 is 𝑂
(︁
𝑔𝑇+𝑇 2
min{𝑁,𝑀}
)︁
-
secure from Lemma 5.2, we have 𝐺𝖮𝖶𝖥 is 𝛿(𝑆, 𝑇 )-secure where,
𝛿(𝑆, 𝑇 ) ≤ 4 ·𝑂
(︂
(𝑆 + log(1/𝛿0) + 1)𝑇 + 𝑇
2
min{𝑁,𝑀}
)︂
= 𝑂
(︂
(𝑆 + log𝑁) · 𝑇 + 𝑇 2
min{𝑁,𝑀}
)︂
.
Theorem 5.4. 𝐺𝖮𝖶𝖥 is 𝛿(𝑆, 𝑇 ) = ?̃?
(︂(︁
𝑆𝑇+𝑇 2
min{𝑁,𝑀}
)︁1/3)︂
-secure in the QAI-QROM, where ?̃? absorbs
𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒(log𝑁, log𝑀, log𝑆) factors.
Proof. It is a publicly-verifiable game. For 𝐺𝖮𝖶𝖥, we can verify that 𝑇𝖵𝖾𝗋 = 2 and 𝛿0 is again
at least 1/𝑁 . Since 𝐺⊗𝑔𝖮𝖶𝖥 is 𝛿
′(𝑆, 𝑇 ) = 𝑂
(︁
𝑔𝑇+𝑇 2
min{𝑁,𝑀}
)︁
-secure from Lemma 5.2, we have 𝐺𝖮𝖶𝖥 is
𝛿(𝑆, 𝑇 )-secure where,
𝛿(𝑆, 𝑇 ) ≤ 8 · 𝛿′
(︁
?̃?(𝑆)/𝛿, ?̃?(𝑇 + 𝑇𝖵𝖾𝗋)/𝛿
)︁
≤ 8 · ?̃?
(︀
𝑆𝑇 + 𝑇 2
)︀
𝛿2 ·min{𝑁,𝑀} .
Therefore, 𝛿(𝑆, 𝑇 ) = ?̃?
(︂(︁
𝑆𝑇+𝑇 2
min{𝑁,𝑀}
)︁1/3)︂
.
In the following two subsections, we will first show multi-instance security for a slightly different
game with 𝛿(𝑔, 𝑇 ) = 𝑂(𝑔𝑇+𝑇
2
𝑀 ). Then in the second subsection, we show that these two games
are almost indistinguishable even for a quantum adversary, and conclude that the multi-instance
security for 𝐺⊗𝑔𝖮𝖶𝖥 is 𝛿(𝑔, 𝑇 ) = 𝑂
(︁
𝑔𝑇+𝑇 2
min{𝑁,𝑀}
)︁
.
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5.1 Multi-Instance Security for Inverting Random Image
Consider the following OWF game variant, where the main difference is that instead of uniformly
sampling 𝑥 ∈ [𝑁 ] and telling the adversary 𝐻(𝑥), we are directly sampling a uniformly random
𝑦 ∈ [𝑀 ] and telling the adversary 𝑦.
Definition 5.5 (OWF𝑦 Security Game). Let 𝐻 be a random oracle [𝑁 ]→ [𝑀 ]. The security game
𝐺𝖮𝖶𝖥𝑦 = (𝐶𝖮𝖶𝖥𝑦) is specified by the challenger 𝐶𝖮𝖶𝖥𝑦 = (𝖲𝖺𝗆𝗉,𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒,𝖵𝖾𝗋), where:
1. 𝖲𝖺𝗆𝗉𝐻(𝑦) = 𝑦 takes a randomness 𝑦 ∈ [𝑀 ], and outputs 𝑦 as the challenge.
2. 𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻(𝑦, 𝑥′) = 𝐻(𝑥′).
3. 𝖵𝖾𝗋𝐻(𝑦, 𝑥′) outputs 1 if and only if 𝐻(𝑥′) = 𝑦.
In other words, given a random oracle, the challenger samples a random output 𝑦 as the chal-
lenge. The adversary is allowed to make oracle queries to 𝐻 and it wins if and only if it finds a
pre-image of 𝑦.
In OWF𝑦 problem, a challenge 𝑦 may not have a valid answer. For example, when 𝑁 ≪ 𝑀 , a
random element 𝑦 in [𝑀 ] is not the image of any inputs with high probability.
Lemma 5.6. 𝐺⊗𝑔𝖮𝖶𝖥𝑦 is 𝛿(𝑔, 𝑇 ) = 𝑂
(︁
𝑔𝑇+𝑇 2
𝑀
)︁
-secure in the QROM.
Proof. Let 𝒜 be any (𝑔, 𝑇 ) adversary. By definition of security, to prove the lemma, we would need
to establish an upper bound on Pr[𝒜 ⇐⇒ 𝐶⊗𝑔𝖮𝖶𝖥𝑦(𝐻)]. Without loss of generality, we can write 𝒜
as a sequence of unitary operators (𝑈𝑖,𝑗)𝑖∈[𝑔],𝑗∈[𝑇+1] operating on registers |𝑥⟩ , |𝑦⟩ , |𝖺𝗎𝗑⟩, initialized
to empty, where
∙ 𝑥 ∈ [𝑁 ], 𝑢 ∈ [𝑀 ] and 𝖺𝗎𝗑 is the auxiliary register whose size is unbounded.
∙ |𝑢⟩ serves as the challenge as input to 𝑈𝑖,1.
∙ For 1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 , 𝑈𝑖,𝑡 prepares a query to 𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻(𝑦, ·) = 𝐻(·) at |𝑥⟩ and receives the output at
|𝑢⟩.
∙ 𝑈𝑖,𝑇+1 prepares the final output for 𝑖-th game in register |𝑥⟩, clears the register |𝑢⟩, and receives
the measured answer also back in the register |𝑥⟩ and the next challenge in the register |𝑢⟩.
Consider the simulator that instead simulates the interaction of 𝒜 and the challenger with the
compressed oracle. Formally, the simulator initializes the state |𝜓′1,0⟩ := |0⟩𝒜⊗|∅⟩𝐻 . For each round
𝑖 ∈ [𝑔]:
1. Starting at |𝜓′𝑖,0⟩, sample the next challenge 𝑦𝑖 ←$ [𝑀 ], and let |𝑢⟩ ← 𝑦𝑖. Let the resulting
state conditioned on the challenge being 𝑦𝑖 be |𝜓𝑖,0⟩.
2. We define |𝜓𝑖,𝑡⟩ and |𝜓′𝑖,𝑡⟩:
|𝜓′𝑖,𝑡+1⟩ = 𝑈𝑖,𝑡+1 |𝜓𝑖,𝑡⟩ for all 𝑡 = 0, · · · , 𝑇 ;
|𝜓𝑖,𝑡⟩ = 𝑈𝐻 |𝜓′𝑖,𝑡⟩ for all 𝑡 = 1, · · · , 𝑇 ;
where 𝑈𝐻 is 𝖢𝖲𝗍𝖮 operating on registers |𝑥⟩ , |𝑢⟩ , |𝐻⟩.
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3. By our assumption on 𝑈𝑖,𝑇+1, in state |𝜓′𝑖,𝑇+1⟩, |𝑥⟩ holds the adversary’s answer and |𝑢⟩ = |0⟩.
Verify the answer by doing the following: apply 𝑈𝐻 on |𝑥⟩ , |𝑢⟩. Let us call the resulting state
as |𝜓𝑖,𝑇+1⟩, then
|𝜓𝑖,𝑇+1⟩ =
∑︁
𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,𝐷
𝛾𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,𝐷 |𝑥, 𝑢, 𝖺𝗎𝗑⟩𝒜 |𝐷⟩𝐻
4. Compute in superposition 𝑏𝑖 = [𝑢 = 𝑦𝑖] and measure 𝑏𝑖.
5. Uncompute 𝑈𝐻 , let the resulting state conditioned on measurement result being 𝑏𝑖 be |𝜑′𝑖+1,0⟩.
By Corollary 2.5, the probability that this algorithm obtains 𝑏1 = · · · = 𝑏𝑔 = 1 is exactly the
probability that Pr[𝒜 ⇐⇒ 𝐶⊗𝑔𝖮𝖶𝖥𝑦(𝐻)]. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 5.7. For all 𝑖 ∈ [𝑔], let 𝑌1, 𝑌2, ..., 𝑌𝑖−1 be the random variable of the first (𝑖 − 1)
challenges and 𝐵1, ..., 𝐵𝑖 be the random variable for the decision bits. For any (𝑔, 𝑇 ) algorithm in
the QROM, 𝑦1, 𝑦2, ..., 𝑦𝑖−1 and 𝑏1, 𝑏2, ..., 𝑏𝑖, we have,
Pr [𝐵𝑖 = 1 |𝑌1 = 𝑦1, ..., 𝑌𝑖−1 = 𝑦𝑖−1, 𝐵1 = 𝑏1, ..., 𝐵𝑖−1 = 𝑏𝑖−1] ≤ 𝑂
(︂
𝑖𝑇 + 𝑇 2
𝑀
)︂
,
given that Pr[𝑌1 = 𝑦1, ..., 𝑌𝑖−1 = 𝑦𝑖−1, 𝐵1 = 𝑏1, ..., 𝐵𝑖−1 = 𝑏𝑖−1] > 0.
Proof. We start by observing that these conditioning correspond to the pure state |𝜓′𝑖,0⟩ that we
have described above. The state is well defined as these classical outcomes occur with non-zero
probability as we have assumed. Since the total number of queries up to this point is at most
(𝑖− 1)(𝑇 + 2), by Lemma 2.6, there exists some complex numbers 𝛼* such that
|𝜓′𝑖,0⟩ =
∑︁
𝑧,𝐷:|𝐷|≤(𝑖−1)(𝑇+2)
𝛼𝑧,𝐷 |𝑧⟩ |𝐷⟩ .
For any 𝑦𝑖 ∈ [𝑀 ], define 𝑃𝑦𝑖 to be a projection of finding 𝑦𝑖 in the database:
𝑃𝑦𝑖 =
∑︁
𝐷:∃𝑥∈[𝑁 ],𝐷(𝑥)=𝑦𝑖
|𝐷⟩ ⟨𝐷| .
Let 𝑝(𝑡)𝑦𝑖 be the probability that after 𝑡 queries to 𝖢𝖲𝗍𝖮, measuring the database register gives a
database containing 𝑦𝑖, or formally,
𝑝(𝑡)𝑦𝑖 := |𝑃𝑦𝑖 |𝜓𝑖,𝑡⟩|2 .
Since |𝜓′𝑖,0⟩ only has non-zero amplitude over 𝐷 with size at most (𝑖− 1)(𝑇 + 2), for each 𝑧,𝐷
pair, |𝛼𝑧,𝐷|2 contributes to at most (𝑖−1)(𝑇 +2) different 𝑦𝑖’s. We observe that the same conclusion
also holds for |𝜓𝑖,0⟩, as the only difference between these two states is that 𝑢 is initialized to some
element in [𝑀 ], and 𝐻 register is unchanged. In other words,
𝑀∑︁
𝑦𝑖=1
𝑝(0)𝑦𝑖 ≤ (𝑖− 1)(𝑇 + 2). (2)
We then have the following lemma that bounds 𝑝(𝑡)𝑦𝑖 for all 𝑡 > 0, which is the same as [Zha19,
Theorem 1] and similar to [LZ19a, Lemma 8 and Lemma 9].
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Lemma 5.8. For all 𝑡 = 0, 1, · · · , 𝑇 and all 𝑦𝑖 ∈ [𝑀 ],
√︁
𝑝
(𝑡+1)
𝑦𝑖 ≤
√︁
𝑝
(𝑡)
𝑦𝑖 +
√︀
1/𝑀 .
Proof. Let us define 𝑞(𝑡)𝑦𝑖 =
⃒⃒⃒
𝑃𝑦𝑖 |𝜓′𝑖,𝑡⟩
⃒⃒⃒2
. First, similar to [LZ19a, Lemma 8], we have 𝑞(𝑡+1)𝑦𝑖 = 𝑝
(𝑡)
𝑦𝑖 ,
since √︁
𝑞
(𝑡+1)
𝑦𝑖 =
⃒⃒
𝑃𝑦𝑖 |𝜓′𝑖,𝑡+1⟩
⃒⃒
= |𝑃𝑦𝑖𝑈𝑖,𝑡+1 |𝜓𝑖,𝑡⟩|
(*)
= |𝑃𝑦𝑖 |𝜓𝑖,𝑡⟩| =
√︁
𝑝
(𝑡)
𝑦𝑖 .
The equality (*) follows from the fact that 𝑈𝑖,𝑡+1 only applies on 𝒜’s register but 𝑃𝑦𝑖 only applies
on the database register and therefore they commute.
Second, we have
√︁
𝑝
(𝑡+1)
𝑦𝑖 ≤
√︁
𝑞
(𝑡+1)
𝑦𝑖 +
√︀
1/𝑀 [LZ19a, Lemma 9]:√︁
𝑝
(𝑡+1)
𝑦𝑖 = |𝑃𝑦𝑖 |𝜓𝑖,𝑡+1⟩| =
⃒⃒
𝑃𝑦𝑖𝑈𝐻 |𝜓′𝑖,𝑡+1⟩
⃒⃒
=
⃒⃒
𝑃𝑦𝑖𝑈𝐻 (𝑃𝑦𝑖 + (𝐼 − 𝑃𝑦𝑖)) |𝜓′𝑖,𝑡+1⟩
⃒⃒
≤ ⃒⃒𝑃𝑦𝑖𝑈𝐻𝑃𝑦𝑖 |𝜓′𝑖,𝑡+1⟩⃒⃒+ ⃒⃒𝑃𝑦𝑖𝑈𝐻(𝐼 − 𝑃𝑦𝑖) |𝜓′𝑖,𝑡+1⟩⃒⃒ .
Intuitively, the first term corresponds to the case that before making the (𝑡 + 1)-th query, the
database already has 𝑦𝑖. The second term corresponds to the case that before making the (𝑡+1)-th
query, the database does not have 𝑦𝑖.
The first term
⃒⃒⃒
𝑃𝑦𝑖𝑈𝐻𝑃𝑦𝑖 |𝜓′𝑖,𝑡+1⟩
⃒⃒⃒
≤
⃒⃒⃒
𝑈𝐻𝑃𝑦𝑖 |𝜓′𝑖,𝑡+1⟩
⃒⃒⃒
=
⃒⃒⃒
𝑃𝑦𝑖 |𝜓′𝑖,𝑡+1⟩
⃒⃒⃒
=
√︁
𝑞
(𝑡+1)
𝑦𝑖 .
For the second term, let |𝜑⟩ := (𝐼 −𝑃𝑦𝑖) |𝜓′𝑖,𝑡+1⟩, by definition of 𝑃𝑦𝑖 , there exists some complex
numbers 𝛽* such that
|𝜑⟩ =
∑︁
𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,
𝐷:∀𝑥′,𝐷(𝑥′ )̸=𝑦𝑖
𝛽𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,𝐷|𝑥, 𝑢, 𝖺𝗎𝗑⟩ |𝐷⟩ .
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We can equivalently write the second term as
|𝑃𝑦𝑖𝑈𝐻 |𝜑⟩|
=
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒𝑃𝑦𝑖𝖢𝖲𝗍𝖮 ∑︁
𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,
𝐷:∀𝑥′,𝐷(𝑥′ )̸=𝑦𝑖
𝛽𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,𝐷|𝑥, 𝑢, 𝖺𝗎𝗑⟩ |𝐷⟩
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒
=
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒𝑃𝑦𝑖 ∑︁
𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,
𝐷:∀𝑥′,𝐷(𝑥′ )̸=𝑦𝑖
𝛽𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,𝐷 𝖲𝗍𝖽𝖣𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝑥 ∘ 𝖢𝖲𝗍𝖮′ ∘ 𝖲𝗍𝖽𝖣𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝑥 |𝑥, 𝑢, 𝖺𝗎𝗑⟩ |𝐷⟩
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒
=
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒𝑃𝑦𝑖 ∑︁
𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,
𝐷:∀𝑥′,𝐷(𝑥′ )̸=𝑦𝑖
∑︁
𝑦
𝛽𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,𝐷√
𝑀
𝖲𝗍𝖽𝖣𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝑥 |𝑥, 𝑢+ 𝑦, 𝖺𝗎𝗑⟩ |𝐷 ∪ (𝑥, 𝑦)⟩
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒
(*)
≤
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒𝑃𝑦𝑖 ∑︁
𝑦
∑︁
𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,
𝐷:∀𝑥′,𝐷(𝑥′) ̸=𝑦𝑖
𝛽𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,𝐷√
𝑀
|𝑥, 𝑢+ 𝑦, 𝖺𝗎𝗑⟩ |𝐷 ∪ (𝑥, 𝑦)⟩
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒
=
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒ ∑︁
𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,
𝐷:∀𝑥′,𝐷(𝑥′) ̸=𝑦𝑖
𝛽𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,𝐷√
𝑀
|𝑥, 𝑢+ 𝑦𝑖, 𝖺𝗎𝗑⟩ |𝐷 ∪ (𝑥, 𝑦𝑖)⟩
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒
=
1√
𝑀
| |𝜑⟩ | ≤ 1√
𝑀
.
The inequality (*) comes from the fact that 𝐷 ∪ (𝑥, 𝑦) already contains 𝑥, therefore 𝖲𝗍𝖽𝖣𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝑥
will either remove the entry for 𝑥 or not change the database at all.
Using an induction on the lemma, we have√︁
𝑝
(𝑇+1)
𝑦𝑖 ≤
√︁
𝑝
(0)
𝑦𝑖 + (𝑇 + 1)/
√
𝑀. (3)
Define 𝑝𝑦𝑖 as the probability that 𝐵𝑖 = 1 conditioned on the challenge is 𝑦𝑖. In other words, 𝑝𝑦𝑖
is the probability that the final state 𝑥, 𝑢 when measured gives 𝑢 = 𝐻(𝑥) = 𝑦𝑖. By Lemma 2.7, we
have
√︀
𝑝𝑦𝑖 ≤
√︁
𝑝
(𝑇+1)
𝑦𝑖 + 1/
√
𝑀 . Combining this with (2), (3), and Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
1
𝑀
𝑀∑︁
𝑦𝑖=1
𝑝𝑦𝑖 ≤
2
𝑀
𝑀∑︁
𝑦𝑖=1
(︁
𝑝(0)𝑦𝑖 + (𝑇 + 2)
2/𝑀
)︁
≤ 𝑂(𝑖𝑇 + 𝑇
2)
𝑀
.
We complete the proof by observing that the left hand side is exactly the probability in the state-
ment.
Combine Proposition 5.7 and Lemma 3.14, we have proven the lemma.
5.2 Multi-Instance Indistinguishability of Sampling Image
The analysis for multi-instance security of 𝐺⊗𝑔𝖮𝖶𝖥𝑦 is not enough for 𝐺
⊗𝑔
𝖮𝖶𝖥. This is because in the
standard one-way function game, 𝑦 is sampled in the way that it is correlated with the random
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oracle. Therefore, we can not use Lemma 2.7, since the challenge image 𝑦 is almost always in the
database. In this subsection, we will instead show that the advantage of indistinguishing whether 𝑦𝑖
is sampled uniformly at random or from 𝐻(𝑥𝑖) for a uniformly random 𝑥𝑖 is at most 𝑂((𝑖𝑇+𝑇 2)/𝑁).
First, we need the following lemma, which says for any quantum algorithm 𝒜 making at most
𝑞 queries to a random oracle before getting a challenge, and at most 𝑞′ queries after, it can not
distinguish if it gets a random image 𝐻(𝑥) or a random element 𝑦 in the range. Furthermore, the
statement is true even after conditioning on arbitrary intermediate measurements.
Lemma 5.9. Let 𝒟 be a quantum algorithm that makes at most 𝑞 + 𝑞′ queries to a random oracle.
Let 𝐘[𝑝] = 𝑌1, 𝑌2, ..., 𝑌𝑝 be the random variable of the outcomes of 𝑝 arbitrary intermediate measure-
ments, all of which occur before the 𝑞-th query. After 𝒟 making 𝑞 queries, it is given a challenge 𝑦,
which we crudely denote as 𝒟𝐻(𝑦). It then makes another 𝑞′ queries and simply outputs a bit. For
any list of outcomes 𝐲[𝑝] = 𝑦1, ..., 𝑦𝑝,⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒√︂ Pr𝐻,𝑦←$[𝑀 ] [︀𝒟𝐻(𝑦) = 1 |𝐘[𝑝] = 𝐲[𝑝]]︀
−
√︂
Pr
𝐻,𝑥←$[𝑁 ]
[︀𝒟𝐻(𝐻(𝑥)) = 1 |𝐘[𝑝] = 𝐲[𝑝]]︀
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒ ≤ 2(√𝑞 + 𝑞′)/√𝑁.
Proof. We will first present two slightly different oracles or experiments, and argue that each of
them perfectly simulates 𝒟𝐻(𝑦) and 𝒟𝐻(𝐻(𝑥)) respectively.
Case 1. The challenge is a uniformly random 𝑦. We implement the following changes to the
oracle:
1. We replace the random oracle with a phase oracle. By Lemma 2.2, this change perfectly
preserves the probability that 𝒟 outputs 1 as he only interacts with |𝐻⟩ using the phase
oracle.
2. We consider the modified oracle ?̃? : [𝑁 + 1] ↦→ [𝑀 ], where ?̃? := 𝐻||𝑕′ for some random
element 𝑕′ ∈ [𝑀 ], and we pick 𝑕′ = ?̃?(𝑁 + 1) as our challenge. As 𝒟 only gets phase oracle
access to 𝐻, and we will only use 𝑕′ as classical randomness, this change again perfectly
preserves 𝒟’s functionality.
3. We additionally prepare a random 𝑥 ∈ [𝑁 ] at a new register 𝑥 but we do not use it. This
change is clearly only conceptual.
Conditioned on 𝐘[𝑝] = 𝐲𝑝, after 𝒟 has made 𝑞 queries to the phase oracle and before generating
the challenge, by Lemma 2.3, we know that the overall state of 𝒟 and the oracle internal state can
be written as7 ∑︁
𝑧,𝐷:|𝐷|≤𝑞
𝛼𝑧,𝐷 |𝑧⟩𝒟 |0⟩𝑦 ⊗
1√
𝑁
∑︁
𝑥
|𝑥⟩ ⊗ 1
𝑀 (𝑁+1)/2
∑︁
𝐻,𝑕′
𝜔
⟨𝐷,𝐻⟩
𝑀 |𝐻,𝑕′⟩,
7Here we write |𝑥⟩ for simplicity, but to see correctness, you could really think of |𝑥, 𝑥⟩ so we have two
computational-basis “copies” of the same uniform superposition 1/
√
𝑁
∑︀
𝑥 |𝑥⟩. As we will never touch the second
copy, the first copy behaves exactly like a classical random string to the rest of the algorithm.
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where 𝑥 and 𝑕′ have not been used and thus is completely un-entangled with 𝒟. After generating
the challenge, the overall state becomes
|𝜑1⟩ := 1
𝑁1/2𝑀 (𝑁+1)/2
∑︁
𝑧,𝐷:|𝐷|≤𝑞
∑︁
𝑥
∑︁
𝐻,𝑕′
𝛼𝑧,𝐷 |𝑧⟩𝒟 |𝑕′⟩𝑦 ⊗ |𝑥⟩ ⊗ 𝜔⟨𝐷,𝐻⟩𝑀 |𝐻,𝑕′⟩.
Case 2. The challenge is the image for a uniformly random pre-image. We implement the following
changes to the oracle:
1. We again replace the random oracle with a phase oracle using Lemma 2.2.
2. We again augment 𝐻 to be ?̃? : [𝑁 + 1] ↦→ [𝑀 ] for a new random element 𝑕′ ∈ [𝑀 ], and
prepare a new random 𝑥 ∈ [𝑁 ]. For now, this is only a conceptual change (we only added two
new independent registers).
3. Define a new classical oracle 𝐻 ′𝑥 : [𝑁 ] ↦→ [𝑀 ] to be
𝐻 ′𝑥(𝑥
′) := 𝐻<𝑥||𝑕′||𝐻>𝑥 =
{︃
?̃?(𝑁 + 1) = 𝑕′, 𝑥′ = 𝑥;
?̃?(𝑥′) = 𝐻(𝑥′), 𝑥′ ̸= 𝑥.
Instead of giving 𝒟 phase oracle to 𝐻, we are giving 𝒟 phase oracle to 𝐻 ′𝑥, where 𝑥 is pulled
from the new register |𝑥⟩ that we just add. For any fixed 𝑥, this change is perfectly consistent
with the original oracle distribution; and as |𝑥⟩ is just a classical random string, the overall
change is also perfectly consistent.
4. Instead of sampling a new pre-image for generating the challenge, we instead use 𝑥 as the
pre-image, that is, we “compute” 𝐻 ′𝑥(𝑥) = 𝑕′ and send 𝑕′ as the challenge for 𝒟. It is easy to
see that 𝒟 cannot obtain any information on 𝑥 for the first 𝑞 queries, thus this change still
perfectly preserves 𝒟’s functionality.
Therefore, conditioned on 𝐘[𝑝] = 𝐲𝑝, before giving 𝒟 the challenge, the overall state of 𝒟 and the
oracle internal memory is∑︁
𝑧,𝐷:|𝐷|≤𝑞
𝛼𝑧,𝐷 |𝑧⟩𝒟 |0⟩𝑦 ⊗
1√
𝑁
∑︁
𝑥
|𝑥⟩ ⊗ 1
𝑀 (𝑁+1)/2
∑︁
𝐻,𝑕′
𝜔
⟨𝐷,𝐻′𝑥⟩
𝑀 |𝐻,𝑕′⟩.
When the challenge is given, the overall state becomes
|𝜑2⟩ := 1
𝑁1/2𝑀 (𝑁+1)/2
∑︁
𝑧,𝐷:|𝐷|≤𝑞
∑︁
𝑥
∑︁
𝐻,𝑕′
𝛼𝑧,𝐷 |𝑧⟩𝒟 |𝑕′⟩𝑦 ⊗ |𝑥⟩ ⊗ 𝜔⟨𝐷,𝐻
′
𝑥⟩
𝑀 |𝐻,𝑕′⟩.
By now, we have shown two perfect simulator for 𝒟(𝑦) and 𝒟(𝐻(𝑥)) respectively, but instead
of the two cases getting different challenges (𝑦 vs 𝐻(𝑥)), we have designed the simulator in the way
that the difference now is instead which oracle 𝒟 is interacting with (𝐻 vs 𝐻 ′𝑥). Immediately after
𝒟 is given the challenge, the overall states of the two simulators after conditioning are |𝜑1⟩ , |𝜑2⟩
respectively. Intuitively, the problem now reduces to distinguishing these two oracles.
Lemma 5.10. ||𝜑1⟩ − |𝜑2⟩|2 ≤ 2 ·
√︀
𝑞/𝑁 .
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Proof. We compare two vectors component-wise. Fixing 𝑧,𝐷,𝐻, 𝑕′, since 𝐻 and 𝐻 ′𝑥 only differ at
point 𝑥, if 𝑥 satisfies 𝐷(𝑥) = 0, then by how we defined the inner product,
𝜔
⟨𝐷,𝐻⟩
𝑀 = 𝜔
⟨𝐷,𝐻′𝑥⟩
𝑀 .
Therefore, we can write these two vectors as |𝜑1⟩ = |𝜑⟩ + |𝖾𝗋𝗋1⟩ and |𝜑2⟩ = |𝜑⟩ + |𝖾𝗋𝗋2⟩, where |𝜑⟩
only sums over 𝑥 such that 𝐷(𝑥) = 0. Their difference is bounded by the following,
||𝜑1⟩ − |𝜑2⟩|2 = ||𝖾𝗋𝗋1⟩ − |𝖾𝗋𝗋2⟩|2
≤
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒⃒ 1𝑁1/2𝑀 (𝑁+1)/2 ∑︁
𝑧,𝐷:|𝐷|≤𝑞
∑︁
𝐻,𝑕′
∑︁
𝑥:𝐷(𝑥)̸=0
𝛼𝑧,𝐷 𝜔
⟨𝐷,𝐻⟩
𝑀 |𝑧, 𝑕′⟩ |𝑥⟩ |𝐻,𝑕′⟩
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒⃒
2
+
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒⃒ 1𝑁1/2𝑀 (𝑁+1)/2 ∑︁
𝑧,𝐷:|𝐷|≤𝑞
∑︁
𝐻,𝑕′
∑︁
𝑥:𝐷(𝑥)̸=0
𝛼𝑧,𝐷 𝜔
⟨𝐷,𝐻′𝑥⟩
𝑀 |𝑧, 𝑕′⟩ |𝑥⟩ |𝐻,𝑕′⟩
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒⃒
2
≤ 2 ·
⎯⎸⎸⎷ 1
𝑀𝑁+1
∑︁
𝑧,𝐷:|𝐷|≤𝑞
∑︁
𝐻,𝑕′
|𝐷|
𝑁
· |𝛼𝑧,𝐷|2
≤ 2 ·
√︃
𝑞
𝑁
·
∑︁
𝑧,𝐷:|𝐷|≤𝑞
|𝛼𝑧,𝐷|2
= 2
√︀
𝑞/𝑁,
where the last equality is due to the fact that the 𝛼*’s are defined as Lemma 2.3.
Therefore, before making the next 𝑞′ queries, the overall state is |𝜑1⟩ if it is in Case 1 or |𝜑2⟩
if it is in Case 2. Let 𝑈𝐻 be the oracle query to 𝐻 and 𝑈𝐻′𝑥 be the oracle query to 𝐻
′
𝑥. We can
write the rest of 𝒟𝐻 as 𝑈𝑞′𝑈𝐻 · · ·𝑈1𝑈𝐻𝑈0. First, by the fact that unitary preserves 𝐿2-norm and
triangle inequality, we have,⃒⃒
𝑈𝑞′𝑈𝐻 · · ·𝑈1𝑈𝐻𝑈0 |𝜑1⟩ − 𝑈𝑞′𝑈𝐻′𝑥 · · ·𝑈1𝑈𝐻′𝑥𝑈0 |𝜑2⟩
⃒⃒
2
≤ ⃒⃒𝑈𝑞′𝑈𝐻 · · ·𝑈1𝑈𝐻𝑈0 |𝜑1⟩ − 𝑈𝑞′𝑈𝐻′𝑥 · · ·𝑈1𝑈𝐻′𝑥𝑈0 |𝜑1⟩⃒⃒2 + 2√︀𝑞/𝑁
≤
𝑞′−1∑︁
𝑗=0
||𝜓𝑗⟩ − |𝜓𝑗+1⟩|2 + 2
√︀
𝑞/𝑁,
where |𝜓𝑗⟩ is defined as applying 𝑈𝐻 on |𝜑1⟩ for the first 𝑗 oracle queries and then 𝑈𝐻′𝑥 for the rest
(𝑞′ − 𝑗) oracle queries.
Lemma 5.11. For all 𝑗 = 0, ..., 𝑞′ − 1, ||𝜓𝑗⟩ − |𝜓𝑗+1⟩|2 ≤ 2/
√
𝑁 .
Proof. Before making the (𝑗 + 1)-th oracle query, let 𝑧 = (𝑥′, 𝑢, 𝖺𝗎𝗑) where 𝑥′, 𝑢 corresponds to the
input to the phase oracle, by Lemma 2.3, the overall state can be written as
1
𝑀𝑁/2
∑︁
𝑧,𝐷:|𝐷|≤𝑞+𝑖
∑︁
𝐻
𝛽𝑧,𝐷 |𝑥′, 𝑢, 𝖺𝗎𝗑⟩𝒟 ⊗ 𝜔⟨𝐷,𝐻⟩𝑀 |𝐻,𝑕′⟩ ⊗
1√
𝑁
∑︁
𝑥
|𝑥⟩ .
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Note that we can make this reordering since 𝐻 ′𝑥 is never invoked, and |𝑥⟩ is never used and therefore
unentangled with other registers.
For the (𝑗 + 1)-th oracle query, either 𝑈𝐻 or 𝑈𝐻′𝑥 is applied. We find that two oracle queries
are different if and only if 𝑥 = 𝑥′. Therefore, the difference is bounded by two times the norm of
the component whose 𝑥 = 𝑥′. Since |𝑥⟩ is un-entangled with other registers, the norm is at most
1/
√
𝑁 . Therefore, ||𝜓𝑗⟩ − |𝜓𝑗+1⟩| ≤ 2/
√
𝑁 .
Since each ||𝜓𝑗⟩ − |𝜓𝑗+1⟩| ≤ 2/
√
𝑁 , we conclude that⃒⃒
𝑈𝑞′𝑈𝐻 · · ·𝑈1𝑈𝐻𝑈0 |𝜑1⟩ − 𝑈𝑞′𝑈𝐻′ · · ·𝑈1𝑈𝐻′𝑈0 |𝜑2⟩
⃒⃒
2
≤ 2(𝑞′ +√𝑞)/
√
𝑁.
By perfect simulation, we have√︂
Pr
𝑦←$[𝑀 ]
[︀𝒟|𝐻⟩(𝑦) = 1 |𝐘[𝑝] = 𝐲[𝑝]]︀ = ⃒⃒𝑃1𝑈𝑞′𝑈𝐻 · · ·𝑈1𝑈𝐻𝑈0 |𝜑1⟩⃒⃒2√︂
Pr
𝑥←$[𝑀 ]
[︀𝒟|𝐻⟩(𝐻(𝑥)) = 1 |𝐘[𝑝] = 𝐲[𝑝]]︀ = ⃒⃒𝑃1𝑈𝑞′𝑈𝐻′ · · ·𝑈1𝑈𝐻′𝑈0 |𝜑2⟩⃒⃒2.
Our lemma follows.
5.3 Multi-Instance Security of OWF
Now with Proposition 5.7 and Lemma 5.9, we are ready to prove the multi-instance security of
𝐺⊗𝑔𝖮𝖶𝖥 that we have claimed at the beginning.
Lemma 5.2. 𝐺⊗𝑔𝖮𝖶𝖥 is 𝛿(𝑔, 𝑇 ) = 𝑂
(︁
𝑔𝑇+𝑇 2
min{𝑁,𝑀}
)︁
-secure in the QROM.
Proof. Let 𝐵𝑖 be the random variable for 𝑏𝑖, indicating if 𝒜 passes the 𝑖-th round of the multi-
instance game. Let 𝑌𝑖 be the random variable for the 𝑖-th challenge. Define 𝐵′𝑖 be the random
variable that 𝒜 finds a pre-image of the 𝑖-th challenge if 𝑌𝑖 is instead distributed uniformly at
random from [𝑀 ].
From Lemma 5.9 and setting 𝑞 = (𝑖−1)(𝑇 +2) and 𝑞′ = 𝑇 +1, we have, for any challenge 𝐲[𝑖−1]
(with non-zero probability conditioned on 𝐁[𝑖−1] = 𝟏𝑖−1),⃒⃒⃒⃒√︁
Pr[𝐵𝑖 = 1 |𝐘[𝑖−1] = 𝐲[𝑖−1],𝐁[𝑖−1] = 𝟏𝑖−1]
−
√︁
Pr[𝐵′𝑖 = 1 |𝐘[𝑖−1] = 𝐲[𝑖−1],𝐁[𝑖−1] = 𝟏𝑖−1]
⃒⃒⃒⃒
≤ 𝑂
(︃√
𝑖𝑇 + 𝑇√
𝑁
)︃
.
Since 𝐵′𝑖 = 1 is the single stage 𝐺𝖮𝖶𝖥𝑦 game, by Proposition 5.7, we have,
Pr[𝐵′𝑖 = 1 |𝐘[𝑖−1] = 𝐲[𝑖−1],𝐁[𝑖−1]] = 𝑂
(︂
𝑖𝑇 + 𝑇 2
𝑀
)︂
.
Then, by Cauchy-Schwarz, we have,
Pr[𝐵𝑖 = 1 |𝐘[𝑖−1] = 𝐲[𝑖−1],𝐁[𝑖−1] = 𝟏𝑖−1]
≤ 2Pr[𝐵′𝑖 = 1 |𝐘[𝑖−1] = 𝐲[𝑖−1],𝐁[𝑖−1]] +𝑂
(︂
𝑖𝑇 + 𝑇 2
𝑁
)︂
≤ 𝑂
(︂
𝑖𝑇 + 𝑇 2
𝑀
+
𝑖𝑇 + 𝑇 2
𝑁
)︂
= 𝑂
(︂
𝑔𝑇 + 𝑇 2
min{𝑀,𝑁}
)︂
.
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Finally, we complete the proof by invoking Lemma 3.14.
5.4 Security of PRG with Advice
We note that Lemma 5.9 essentially implies a security bound for PRG with advice. Let us start by
reformalizing PRG security in our security game framework.
Definition 5.12 (PRG Security Game). Let 𝐻 be a random oracle [𝑁 ]→ [𝑀 ] where 𝑁 < 𝑀 . The
security game 𝐺𝖯𝖱𝖦 = (𝐶𝖯𝖱𝖦) is specified by three procedures (𝖲𝖺𝗆𝗉,𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒,𝖵𝖾𝗋), where:
1. 𝖲𝖺𝗆𝗉𝐻(𝑏, 𝑥, 𝑦) takes a random bit 𝑏 ∈ {0, 1}, an element 𝑥 ∈ [𝑁 ] and an 𝑦 ∈ [𝑀 ], and outputs
𝐻(𝑥) if 𝑏 = 0, and 𝑦 otherwise.
2. 𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻((𝑏, 𝑥, 𝑦), 𝑥′) = 𝐻(𝑥′) simply queries 𝐻 directly.
3. 𝖵𝖾𝗋𝐻((𝑏, 𝑥, 𝑦), 𝑏′) outputs 1 if and only if 𝑏 = 𝑏′.
To fill in the rest of the details from Definition 3.3, the security game defined here is that given a
random oracle, the adversary is asked to distinguish a random 𝑦 ∈ [𝑀 ] from a random image 𝐻(𝑥).
The adversary is allowed to make oracle queries to 𝐻 and it wins if and only if he distinguishes the
two distributions correctly. This is exactly the security of PRG in QROM.
Using Lemma 5.9, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 5.13. 𝐺⊗𝑔𝖯𝖱𝖦 is 𝛿(𝑔, 𝑇 ) =
1
2 +𝑂
(︂√︁
𝑔𝑇+𝑇 2
𝑁
)︂
-secure in the QROM.
Proof. Consider in round 𝑖, conditioned on random outcomes in the previous rounds (𝑏𝑗 , 𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗 , 𝑏′𝑗)𝑗<𝑖,
which we simply denote as event 𝐸. Let 𝑝𝑏,𝑏′ be the probability that challenge is 𝑏 and the algorithm
outputs 𝑏′. By Lemma 5.9 and Cauchy-Schwarz, for any 𝑏′ we have that
|𝑝0,𝑏′ − 𝑝1,𝑏′ | ≤ |√𝑝0,𝑏′ −√𝑝1,𝑏′ | · |√𝑝0,𝑏′ +√𝑝1,𝑏′ |
≤ 2
√︀
(𝑖− 1)(𝑇 + 1) + 𝑇√
𝑁
· 2
≤ 4
√
2 ·
√︂
𝑔(𝑇 + 1) + 𝑇 2
𝑁
.
Therefore, |Pr[𝑏 = 𝑏′|𝐸] − Pr[𝑏 ̸= 𝑏′|𝐸]| ≤ |𝑝0,0 − 𝑝1,0| + |𝑝0,1 − 𝑝1,1| ≤ 8
√
2 ·
√︁
𝑔(𝑇+1)+𝑇 2
𝑁 , and we
conclude that Pr[𝑏 = 𝑏′|𝐸] ≤ 12 + 4
√
2 ·
√︁
𝑔(𝑇+1)+𝑇 2
𝑁 .
Consider the algorithm that queries 𝐻(1), and outputs 0 if 𝐻(1) = 𝖼𝗁 and 1 otherwise, then it
will succeed with probability 1/2 + Ω(1/𝑁). Combining these with Theorem 4.2 (or Theorem 4.4),
we obtain a security bound for PRG in the AI-QROM (or QAI-QROM, respectively).
Theorem 5.14. 𝐺𝖯𝖱𝖦 is 12 + ?̃?
(︁
𝑆𝑇+𝑇 2
𝑁
)︁1/3
-secure in the AI-QROM, and 12 + ?̃?
(︁
𝑆5𝑇+𝑆4𝑇 2
𝑁
)︁1/19
-
secure in the QAI-QROM, where ?̃? absorbs 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒(log𝑁, log𝑀, log𝑆) factors.
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6 Yao’s Box
In this section, we show the security of Yao’s box problem in the AI-QROM and QAI-QROM. Let
us start with reformalizing Yao’s box problem using our language of security games.
Definition 6.1 (Yao’s box security game). Let 𝐻 be a random oracle [𝑁 ]→ [2]. The security game
𝐺𝖸𝖡 = (𝐶𝖸𝖡) is specified by three procedures (𝖲𝖺𝗆𝗉,𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒,𝖵𝖾𝗋), where:
1. 𝖲𝖺𝗆𝗉𝐻(𝑥) = 𝑥 takes some randomness 𝑥 ∈ [𝑁 ], and outputs 𝑥 as the challenge pre-image.
2. 𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻(𝑥, ·): for all input 𝑥′ ̸= 𝑥, the output is 𝐻(𝑥′); 𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻(𝑥, 𝑥) = 1.
3. 𝖵𝖾𝗋𝐻(𝑥, 𝑏) outputs 1 if and only if 𝐻(𝑥) = 𝑏.
To fill in the rest of the details from Definition 3.3, given a random oracle with binary range,
the challenger samples a random input 𝑥 as the challenge. The adversary is allowed to make oracle
queries to 𝐻 except on input 𝑥 and it wins if and only if it finds 𝐻(𝑥) without making any queries
on 𝑥 (or equivalently, even if he makes query to 𝑥, he will just get a constant 1).
We are going to prove the following lemma, the multi-instance security of 𝐺⊗𝑔𝖸𝖡.
Lemma 6.2. 𝐺⊗𝑔𝖸𝖡 is 𝛿(𝑔, 𝑇 ) = 1/2 +𝑂
(︁√︀
𝑔𝑇/𝑁
)︁
-secure in the QROM.
Combining this lemma together with Theorem 4.2 (or Theorem 4.4), we can show the security
of 𝐺𝖸𝖡 in the AI-QROM (or QAI-QROM, respectively).
Theorem 6.3. 𝐺𝖸𝖡 is 𝛿(𝑆, 𝑇 ) = 1/2 + ?̃?
(︁
(𝑆𝑇/𝑁)1/3
)︁
-secure in the AI-QROM.
Proof. Let a trivial algorithm with 0 queries and 1 bit of advice do the following: store 𝐻(1) as its
advice; answer 𝐻(1) if the challenge is 1 and answer a random bit otherwise. The advantage of this
algorithm is 1/2+ 1/(2𝑁) because with probability 1− 1/𝑁 , it succeeds with probability 1/2; with
probability 1/𝑁 , it succeeds with probability 1.
Therefore, in Theorem 4.2, we have 𝜀0 = 1/(2𝑁), 𝑆0 = 1, 𝑇0 = 0 and 𝐺
⊗𝑔
𝖸𝖡 is 1/2 + 𝜀(𝑔, 𝑇 ) =
1/2 + ?̃?(
√︀
𝑔𝑇/𝑁)-secure. We have 𝐺𝖸𝖡 is 1/2 + 𝜀′(𝑆, 𝑇 )-secure where,
𝜀′(𝑆, 𝑇 ) ≤ 4 · 𝜀
(︂
10 ln 2
𝜀′(𝑆, 𝑇 )
(𝑆 + 𝑆0 + log(1/𝜀0) + 2, 𝑇 + 𝑇0)
)︂
= ?̃?
(︃√︃
𝑆𝑇
𝜀′(𝑆, 𝑇 )𝑁
)︃
.
We conclude that 𝜀′(𝑆, 𝑇 ) = ?̃?
(︁
(𝑆𝑇/𝑁)1/3
)︁
.
Theorem 6.4. 𝐺𝖸𝖡 is 𝛿(𝑆, 𝑇 ) = 1/2 + ?̃?
(︁(︀
𝑆5𝑇/𝑁
)︀1/19)︁-secure in the QAI-QROM.
Proof. Let a trivial algorithm with 0 queries and 1 bit of advice do the following: store 𝐻(1) as its
advice; answer 𝐻(1) if the challenge is 1 and answer a random bit otherwise. The advantage of this
algorithm is 1/2+ 1/(2𝑁) because with probability 1− 1/𝑁 , it succeeds with probability 1/2; with
probability 1/𝑁 , it succeeds with probability 1.
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In Theorem 4.4, we have 𝑆0 = 1, 𝑇0 = 0, 𝜀0 = 1/(2𝑁) and 𝜀(𝑔, 𝑇 ) = ?̃?(
√︀
𝑔𝑇/𝑁). We have 𝐺𝖸𝖡
is 1/2 + 𝜀′(𝑆, 𝑇 )-secure where,
𝜀′(𝑆, 𝑇 ) ≤ 8 · 𝜀
(︁
?̃? (𝑆 + 𝑆0)
3 /𝜀′9, ?̃?
(︀
(𝑇 + 𝑇0)(𝑆 + 𝑆0)
2
)︀
/𝜀′8
)︁
= ?̃?
(︃√︃
𝑆5𝑇
𝜀′(𝑆, 𝑇 )17 ·𝑁
)︃
.
We conclude that 𝜀′(𝑆, 𝑇 ) = ?̃?
(︁(︀
𝑆5𝑇/𝑁
)︀1/19)︁.
Now the problem reduces to proving its multi-instance security.
Proof of Lemma 6.2. Let 𝒜 be any (𝑔, 𝑇 ) adversary in the QROM. We again simulate the random
oracle 𝐻 with a compressed standard oracle, which by Corollary 2.5 perfectly perserves the func-
tionality of 𝒜 ⇐⇒ 𝐶⊗𝑔𝖸𝖡. We will also implement the projective measurement by directly measuring
𝒜’s output, as the output in Yao’s box is binary.
Assume after passing the first 𝑖 − 1 challenges, conditioned on the challenges are 𝑥1, · · · , 𝑥𝑖−1
and the algorithm passes all the challenges, the overall state of the algorithm and compressed oracle
is |𝜑0⟩ =
∑︀
𝑧,𝐷 𝛼𝑧,𝐷|𝑧⟩|𝐷⟩. By Lemma 2.6, we know every possible 𝐷 with non-zero weight is of
size at most (𝑖− 1)(𝑇 + 1) < 𝑔(𝑇 + 1), which is the total number of queries to 𝖢𝖲𝗍𝖮.
Fixing an 𝑥𝑖 (which is chosen with probability 1/𝑁), let 𝑝
(𝑡)
𝑥𝑖 be the probability that after 𝑇
queries, measuring the database register, it gives a database containing 𝑥𝑖. In other words, define
𝑃𝑥𝑖 =
∑︁
𝑧
𝐷:𝐷(𝑥𝑖) ̸=⊥
|𝑧,𝐷⟩⟨𝑧,𝐷|.
Then 𝑝(0)𝑥𝑖 = |𝑃𝑥𝑖 |𝜑0⟩|2. Similar to (2), we have,
𝑁∑︁
𝑥𝑖=1
𝑝(0)𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑔(𝑇 + 1).
As defined by 𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻(𝑥𝑖, ·), each query made by 𝒜 will be sent to the challenger first and the
challenger will apply the oracle query only on inputs that are not 𝑥𝑖. Therefore, assume before the
first query the state is |𝜑0⟩ =
∑︀
𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,𝐷 𝛼𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,𝐷|𝑥, 𝑢, 𝖺𝗎𝗑⟩|𝐷⟩. After the first query, it becomes
|𝜑1⟩ := 𝑈𝐻
∑︁
𝑥 ̸=𝑥𝑖,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑
𝐷
𝛼𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,𝐷|𝑥, 𝑢, 𝖺𝗎𝗑⟩|𝐷⟩+
∑︁
𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑
𝐷
𝛼𝑥𝑖,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,𝐷|𝑥𝑖, 𝑢, 𝖺𝗎𝗑⟩|𝐷⟩.
where 𝑈𝐻 is defined as 𝖢𝖲𝗍𝖮 applied on 𝑥, 𝑢 and 𝐷 register. Recall that 𝑝
(0)
𝑥𝑖 = |𝑃𝑥𝑖 |𝜑0⟩|2 and
𝑝
(1)
𝑥𝑖 = |𝑃𝑥𝑖 |𝜑1⟩|2. We want to show the following lemma.
Lemma 6.5. Let 𝑝(0)𝑥𝑖 and 𝑝
(1)
𝑥𝑖 be the probability defined above. Then 𝑝
(0)
𝑥𝑖 = 𝑝
(1)
𝑥𝑖 .
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Proof. This can be shown by a direct calculation.
𝑝(1)𝑥𝑖 = |𝑃𝑥𝑖 |𝜑1⟩|2
=
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒⃒⃒ ∑︁
𝑥 ̸=𝑥𝑖,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑
𝐷
𝛼𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,𝐷 𝑃𝑥𝑖𝑈𝐻 |𝑥, 𝑢, 𝖺𝗎𝗑⟩|𝐷⟩+
∑︁
𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑
𝐷
𝛼𝑥𝑖,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,𝐷𝑃𝑥𝑖 |𝑥𝑖, 𝑢, 𝖺𝗎𝗑⟩|𝐷⟩
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒⃒⃒
2
=
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒⃒⃒ ∑︁
𝑥 ̸=𝑥𝑖,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑
𝐷
𝛼𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,𝐷 𝑃𝑥𝑖𝑈𝐻 |𝑥, 𝑢, 𝖺𝗎𝗑⟩|𝐷⟩
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒⃒⃒
2
+
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒⃒⃒∑︁
𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑
𝐷
𝛼𝑥𝑖,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,𝐷𝑃𝑥𝑖 |𝑥𝑖, 𝑢, 𝖺𝗎𝗑⟩|𝐷⟩
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒⃒⃒
2
(*)
=
∑︁
𝑥 ̸=𝑥𝑖,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,𝐷
𝐷(𝑥𝑖 )̸=⊥
|𝛼𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,𝐷|2 +
∑︁
𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,𝐷
𝐷(𝑥𝑖) ̸=⊥
|𝛼𝑥𝑖,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,𝐷|2
=
∑︁
𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,𝐷
𝐷(𝑥𝑖 )̸=⊥
|𝛼𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑,𝐷|2 = 𝑝(0)𝑥𝑖 .
The equation (*) comes from the fact that if 𝑈𝐻 applies on |𝑥, 𝑢,𝐷⟩ such that 𝑥 ̸= 𝑥𝑖, it does not
change 𝐷(𝑥𝑖); in other words, if 𝐷(𝑥𝑖) = ⊥, then after applying 𝑈𝐻 it is still ⊥; if 𝐷(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑣, then
after applying 𝑈𝐻 it is still 𝑣.
Let 𝑝(𝑡) := |𝑃𝑥𝑖 |𝜑𝑖⟩ |, where |𝜑𝑖⟩ is the overall state after 𝑖-th query. As we do not assume any
structure of |𝜑0⟩, and the algorithm’s local computation does not impact the projector value, we
can use this lemma 𝑡 times and conclude that 𝑝(𝑡)𝑥𝑖 = 𝑝
(0)
𝑥𝑖 for all 𝑡.
By Lemma 2.7, let the probability that 𝒜 wins the game in the 𝑖-th round is 𝑝𝑥𝑖 , after 𝑇
queries we have, √𝑝𝑥𝑖 ≤
√︁
𝑝
(𝑇 )
𝑥𝑖 +
√︀
1/𝑀 =
√︁
𝑝
(𝑇 )
𝑥𝑖 +
√︀
1/2 =
√︁
𝑝
(0)
𝑥𝑖 +
√︀
1/2. Therefore, the overall
probability is,
1
𝑁
𝑁∑︁
𝑥𝑖=1
𝑝𝑥𝑖 =
1
𝑁
𝑁∑︁
𝑥𝑖=1
(︂√︁
𝑝
(0)
𝑥𝑖 +
√︀
1/2
)︂2
=
1
2
+
𝑁∑︁
𝑥𝑖=1
𝑝(0)𝑥𝑖 /𝑁 +
√
2 ·
𝑁∑︁
𝑥𝑖=1
√︁
𝑝
(0)
𝑥𝑖 /𝑁
≤ 1
2
+ (𝑔(𝑇 + 1))/𝑁 +
√︀
2𝑔(𝑇 + 1)/𝑁
≤ 1
2
+ (1 +
√
2)
√︀
𝑔(𝑇 + 1)/𝑁.
The above inequalities come from
∑︀𝑁
𝑥𝑖=1
𝑝
(0)
𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑔(𝑇 + 1), Cauchy-Schwarz, and assuming 𝑔(𝑇 +
1)/𝑁 ≤ 1 (which implies 𝑔(𝑇 +1)/𝑁 ≤√︀𝑔(𝑇 + 1)/𝑁). On the other hand, if 𝑔(𝑇 +1)/𝑁 > 1, the
bound above trivially holds.
Let 𝐵𝑖 be the random variable for 𝑏𝑖, indicating if 𝒜 passes the 𝑖-th round of the multi-instance
game. Let 𝑋𝑖 be the random variable for the 𝑖-th challenge. The above statement says for any
𝐱[𝑖−1],
Pr
[︀
𝐵𝑖 = 1 |𝐁[𝑖−1] = 𝟏𝑖−1,𝐗[𝑖−1] = 𝐱[𝑖−1]
]︀ ≤ 1/2 + (1 +√2)√︀𝑔(𝑇 + 1)/𝑁
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It implies Pr[𝐵1 = 1, 𝐵2 = 1, · · · , 𝐵𝑔 = 1] ≤ (1/2+(1+
√
2)
√︀
𝑔(𝑇 + 1)/𝑁)𝑔. Therefore, for any
(𝑔, 𝑇 ) algorithm 𝒜 in the QROM, the succeeding probability is at most (1/2 +𝑂(√︀𝑔𝑇/𝑁)𝑔.
7 Salting Defeats Preprocessing
In this section, we show generic salting defeats quantum pre-processing with classical/quantum
advice. There exist schemes that are secure in the QROM but not in the AI-QROM. One example
is collision-resistant hash function. For a random oracle 𝐻 : [𝑁 ] → [𝑀 ] with large enough 𝑁 ,
finding a collision without any pre-processing is hard [AS04, LZ19a], which requires 𝑇 = Ω(𝑀1/3)
queries. However, in the AI-QROM, as long as 𝑆 ≥ 2 · log𝑁 , the adversary can find a pair of
collision in the pre-processing procedure and store it as the advice/leakage; in the online phase, it
simply answers the pair. Therefore, collision-resistance is broken in the AI-QROM.
Definition 7.1 (Public-Salt Security Game). Given a security game 𝐺 = (𝐶), where 𝐶 = (𝖲𝖺𝗆𝗉,
𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒,𝖵𝖾𝗋). Consider a “salted” oracle where we enlarge the input space: 𝐻𝑆 : [𝐾] × [𝑁 ] ↦→
[𝑀 ], for some parameter 𝐾. The salted security game 𝐺𝑆 = (𝐶𝑆) defined on 𝐻𝑆, where 𝐶𝑆 =
(𝖲𝖺𝗆𝗉𝑆 ,𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝑆 ,𝖵𝖾𝗋𝑆) is specified as below:
1. 𝖲𝖺𝗆𝗉𝐻𝑆𝑆 (𝑠, 𝑟): on input uniformly random salt 𝑠 ∈ [𝐾] and 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, runs 𝖼𝗁← 𝖲𝖺𝗆𝗉𝐻𝑆(𝑠,·)(𝑟),
returns 𝖼𝗁𝑆 := (𝑠, 𝖼𝗁).
2. 𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻𝑆𝑆 ((𝑠, 𝑟), (𝑠
′, 𝑥)): on input salt 𝑠 and challenger randomness 𝑟, query salt 𝑠′ and some
input 𝑥, if 𝑠 = 𝑠′, output 𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻𝑆(𝑠,·)(𝑟, 𝑥); otherwise, output 𝐻𝑆(𝑠′, 𝑥).
3. 𝖵𝖾𝗋𝐻𝑆𝑆 ((𝑠, 𝑟), 𝖺𝗇𝗌): output 𝖵𝖾𝗋
𝐻𝑆(𝑠,·)(𝑟, 𝖺𝗇𝗌).
Lemma 7.2. For any security game 𝐺 with security 𝛿′ = 𝛿′(𝑇 ) in the QROM. For any integer 𝑔
and salt space [𝐾], the multi-instance game 𝐺⊗𝑔𝑆 is 𝛿-secure, where
𝛿 = 𝛿(𝑔, 𝑇 ) = 2𝛿′ +
𝑔(𝑇 + 1)
𝐾
. (4)
𝐺⊗𝑔𝑆 is also 𝛿-secure, where
𝛿 = 𝛿(𝑔, 𝑇 ) = 𝛿′ + 3
√︂
𝑔(𝑇 + 1)
𝐾
. (5)
We usually want to use (5) for decision games as a trivial random guessing adversary already
wins with probability 1/2, and the first bound trivially holds.
Combining the first part of Lemma 7.2 with Theorem 4.1, we have the following theorem.
Roughly speaking, the theorem says if a security game 𝐺 is 𝛿(𝑇 )-secure in the QROM, then the
salted game 𝐺𝑆 with salt space [𝐾] is 2(𝛿(𝑇 ) + 𝑆𝑇/𝐾)-secure against (𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversary in the AI-
QROM. In other words, as long as 𝐾 ≫ 𝑆𝑇 , pre-processing does not help break the salted game
𝐺𝑆 .
Theorem 7.3. Let 𝐺 be a security game with security 𝛿′(𝑇 ) in the QROM. Let 𝐺𝑆 be the salted
security game with parameter 𝐾. Let 𝛿0 be the winning probability of an adversary that outputs a
random answer in the game 𝐺𝑆 without advice or making any query. Then 𝐺𝑆’s security 𝛿(𝑆, 𝑇 )
against (𝑆, 𝑇 )-adversaries in the AI-QROM is
𝛿(𝑆, 𝑇 ) ≤ 8 ·
(︂
(𝑆 + log(1/𝛿0) + 1)(𝑇 + 1)
𝐾
+ 𝛿′(𝑇 )
)︂
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Proof. If 𝐺 has security 𝛿′(𝑇 ), then 𝐺⊗𝑔𝑆 is 𝛿
′′(𝑔, 𝑇 ) = 2(𝛿′(𝑇 )+𝑔(𝑇+1)/𝐾)-secure. By Theorem 4.1,
𝐺𝑆 is 𝛿(𝑆, 𝑇 )-secure in the AI-QROM, where 𝛿(𝑆, 𝑇 ) ≤ 4 · 𝛿′′(𝑆 + log 1/𝜀0 + 1, 𝑇 ).
Combining the first part of Lemma 7.2 with Theorem 4.3, we have the following theorem about
salted public-verifiable security games in the QAI-QROM.
Theorem 7.4. Let 𝐺 be a publicly-verifiable security game with security 𝛿′(𝑇 ) in the QROM. Let
𝑇𝖵𝖾𝗋 = 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒(log𝑀, log𝑁) be the upper bound on the number of ?̃? queries for computing 𝖵𝖾𝗋?̃?(𝖼𝗁, ·),
i.e., the number of queries required to do the public verification. Let 𝐺𝑆 be the salted security game
with parameter 𝐾. Let 𝛿0 = 1/𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒(𝑁,𝑀) be a non-negligible lower bound on the winning probability
of an adversary that outputs a random answer in the 𝐺𝑆 without advice or making any query. Then
𝐺𝑆’s security 𝛿 = 𝛿(𝑆, 𝑇 ) against (𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversaries in the QAI-QROM satisfying
𝛿 ≤ ?̃?
(︂
𝑆𝑇
𝐾𝛿
+ 𝛿′
(︁
?̃?(𝑇 )/𝛿
)︁)︂
,
where ?̃? absorbs 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒(log𝑁, log𝑀, log𝑆) factors.
Combining the second part of Lemma 7.2 with Theorem 4.2, we have the following theorem
about salted decision security games in the AI-QROM. Roughly speaking, the theorem says if a
decision game 𝐺 is 1/2 + 𝜀(𝑇 )-secure in the QROM, then the salted game 𝐺𝑆 with salt space [𝐾]
is 1/2+𝑂(𝜀(𝑇 )+ (𝑆𝑇/𝐾)1/3)-secure against (𝑆, 𝑇 ) adversary in the AI-QROM. In other words, as
long as 𝐾 ≫ 𝑆𝑇 , pre-processing does not help break the salted game 𝐺𝑆 .
Theorem 7.5. Let 𝐺 be a decision game with security 1/2 + 𝜀′(𝑇 ). Let 𝐺𝑆 be the salted decision
game with parameter 𝐾. Let 𝜀0 be a lower bound on the advantage for an adversary for 𝐺𝑆 with 𝑇0
queries and 𝑆0 bits of advice. Then 𝐺𝑆’s security 𝛿(𝑆, 𝑇 ) = 1/2+𝜀(𝑆, 𝑇 ) against (𝑆, 𝑇 )-adversaries
in the AI-QROM satisfies that
𝜀(𝑆, 𝑇 ) = 𝑂
(︃
𝜀′(𝑇 + 𝑇0) +
(︂
(𝑆 + 𝑆0 + log(1/𝜀0))(𝑇 + 𝑇0)
𝐾
)︂1/3)︃
.
Combining the second part of Lemma 7.2 with Theorem 4.4, we have the following theorem
about salted decision security games in the QAI-QROM.
Theorem 7.6. Let 𝐺 be a decision game with security 1/2 + 𝜀′(𝑇 ). Let 𝐺𝑆 be the salted decision
game with parameter 𝐾. Let 𝜀0 = 1/𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒(𝑁,𝑀) be a non-negligible lower bound on the advantage for
an adversary for 𝐺𝑆 with 𝑇0 queries and 𝑆0 bits of advice. Then 𝐺𝑆’s security 𝛿(𝑆, 𝑇 ) = 1/2+𝜀(𝑆, 𝑇 )
against (𝑆, 𝑇 )-adversaries in the QAI-QROM satisfies that
𝜀 = ?̃?
(︃
𝜀′
(︃
?̃?((𝑇 + 𝑇0)(𝑆 + 𝑆0)
2)
𝜀8
)︃
+
√︂
(𝑆 + 𝑆0)5(𝑇 + 𝑇0)
𝐾𝜀17
)︃
,
where ?̃? absorbs 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒(log𝑁, log𝑀, log𝑆) factors.
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7.1 Multi-Instance Security of Salted Game
In this section, we prove Lemma 7.2. We first argue some general facts about the salting game, and
then show that (4) and (5) holds respectively, and therefore concluding the proof.
Let 𝒜 be any (𝑔, 𝑇 ) adversary in the QROM for 𝐺⊗𝑔𝑆 . We again start by considering the following
algorithm that perfectly simulates the original interaction:
1. Instead of directly sampling the oracle distribution 𝐻𝑆 : [𝐾]× [𝑁 ] ↦→ [𝑀 ], we instead consider
the equivalent sampling procedure where we instead sample a random function 𝐻𝑠 : [𝐾] ↦→
ℛ𝑁 , where ℛ𝑁 denotes the randomness for sampling the original oracle 𝐻 : [𝑁 ] ↦→ [𝑀 ]. Let
𝒮 : ℛ𝑁 ↦→ ([𝑁 ] ↦→ [𝑀 ]) be the original oracle sampler, that is 𝒮 on input some randomness,
samples (according to the distribution) the entire truth table of 𝐻 : [𝑁 ] ↦→ [𝑀 ]. 𝐻𝑆([𝐾], [𝑁 ])
has the exact same distribution as 𝒮(𝐻𝑠([𝐾]))([𝑁 ]) as long as the sampler 𝒮 is correct.
For random functions or random oracle model, ℛ𝑁 = [𝑀𝑁 ], and any arbitrary bijection
[𝑀𝑁 ]↔ [𝑀 ]𝑁 is a correct sampler.
2. By definition we have 𝖵𝖾𝗋𝐻𝑆𝑆 ((𝑠, 𝑟), 𝖺𝗇𝗌) = 𝖵𝖾𝗋
𝐻𝑆(𝑠,·)(𝑟, 𝖺𝗇𝗌), therefore, the verification algo-
rithm will only ever query𝐻𝑆(𝑠, ·) = 𝒮(𝐻𝑠(𝑠))(·). Using this observation, whenever we need to
run 𝖵𝖾𝗋𝐻𝑆𝑆 ((𝑠, 𝑟), 𝖺𝗇𝗌), we instead first obtain the (entire truth table of) oracle 𝐻
′ ← 𝒮(𝐻𝑠(𝑠)),
and run 𝑏← 𝖵𝖾𝗋𝐻′(𝑟, 𝖺𝗇𝗌) directly.
Note that after this change, each round will only ever issue (𝑇 + 1) queries to the oracle 𝐻𝑠.
3. We replace the oracle access to 𝐻𝑠 with the compressed standard oracle operator 𝖢𝖲𝗍𝖮, which
preserves the functionality by Corollary 2.5.
Conditioned on passing the first (𝑖 − 1) challenges, and the challenges being (𝑠1, 𝖼𝗁1), · · · ,
(𝑠𝑖−1, 𝖼𝗁𝑖−1) and the algorithm having passed all the challenges (we again only consider the 𝑠’s and
𝖼𝗁’s that have non-zero probability), we denote the overall state of the algorithm and compressed
oracle to be |𝜑0⟩ =
∑︀
𝑧,𝐷 𝛼𝑧,𝐷|𝑧⟩|𝐷⟩. By Lemma 2.6, since the total number of queries made by 𝒜
and 𝐶⊗𝑔 is at most (𝑖− 1)(𝑇 +1), we know every possible 𝐷 with non-zero weight is of size at most
𝑔(𝑇 + 1).
Fixing a salt 𝑠 and challenger randomness 𝑟. Let 𝑝𝑠,𝑟 be the probability that 𝒜 wins conditioned
on salt 𝑠 and randomness 𝑟. Let 𝑞𝑠 be the probability that measuring the database register gives a
database containing 𝑠. In other words, define
𝑄𝑠 =
∑︁
𝑧,𝐷:𝐷(𝑠)̸=⊥
|𝑧,𝐷⟩⟨𝑧,𝐷|
Then 𝑞𝑠 = |𝑄𝑠|𝜑0⟩|2. Similar to (2), we have,
∑︀
𝑠∈[𝐾] 𝑞𝑠 ≤ 𝑔(𝑇 + 1).
Let 𝑈𝑠,𝑟 be the unitary describing the rest of the computation for this round, that is including:
𝒜’s oracle queries (which also includes the oracle expansion in superposition using 𝒮) and local
computation, our added query and 𝒮 for computing 𝐻 ′ in change 2, and the final local computa-
tion 𝖵𝖾𝗋𝐻
′
(𝑟, 𝖺𝗇𝗌). Let 𝑃𝑠,𝑟 be the projective measurement that 𝖵𝖾𝗋 outputs 1. Using triangular
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inequality, we then have
√
𝑝𝑠,𝑟 = |𝑃𝑠,𝑟𝑈𝑠,𝑟 |𝜑⟩0|
≤ |𝑃𝑠,𝑟𝑈𝑠,𝑟𝑄𝑠 |𝜑⟩0|+ |𝑃𝑠,𝑟𝑈𝑠,𝑟(𝐼 −𝑄𝑠) |𝜑⟩0|
≤ |𝑄𝑠 |𝜑⟩0|+ |𝑃𝑠,𝑟𝑈𝑠,𝑟(𝐼 −𝑄𝑠) |𝜑⟩0|
=
√
𝑞𝑠 + |𝑃𝑠,𝑟𝑈𝑠,𝑟(𝐼 −𝑄𝑠) |𝜑⟩0| .
Proof of (4). Taking expectation over the randomness of 𝑠, 𝑟, the probability of 𝒜 succeeding in
round 𝑖 is
1
𝐾 ·𝑅
∑︁
𝑠,𝑟
𝑝𝑠,𝑟 ≤ 1
𝐾 ·𝑅
∑︁
𝑠,𝑟
(
√
𝑞𝑠 + |𝑃𝑠,𝑟𝑈𝑠,𝑟(𝐼 −𝑄𝑠) |𝜑⟩0|)2
≤ 2
𝐾 ·𝑅
∑︁
𝑠,𝑟
(︁
𝑞𝑠 + |𝑃𝑠,𝑟𝑈𝑠,𝑟(𝐼 −𝑄𝑠) |𝜑⟩0|2
)︁
≤ 2 · 𝑔(𝑇 + 1)
𝐾
+
2
𝐾 ·𝑅
∑︁
𝑠,𝑟
|𝑃𝑠,𝑟𝑈𝑠,𝑟(𝐼 −𝑄𝑠) |𝜑⟩0|2 .
(6)
Next, we are going to show the second term is at most 2 𝛿′(𝑇 ). We are going to construct
an algorithm ℬ making at most 𝑇 queries which takes 𝒜 as a subroutine and wins the game 𝐺
with probability at least 1𝐾·𝑅
∑︀
𝑠,𝑟 |𝑃𝑠,𝑟𝑈𝑠,𝑟(𝐼 −𝑄𝑠) |𝜑⟩0|2, which can not be greater than 𝛿′(𝑇 ) (the
security of 𝐺).
Consider the following algorithm ℬ breaking 𝐺 = (𝐶), ℬ is going to simulate the multi-instance
game for the first (𝑖− 1) rounds and simulate the 𝑖-th round by making queries to 𝐶. Therefore, if
𝒜 win the 𝑖-th round of 𝐺⊗𝑔, then ℬ wins 𝐺.
1. ℬ takes 𝒜 as a subroutine. Let 𝐻 be the oracle in the game 𝐺.
2. ℬ simulates the random oracle 𝐻𝑆 exactly the same as our simulator (in particular, using
𝖢𝖲𝗍𝖮 on 𝐻𝑠 and does not use 𝐻) and interacts with 𝒜 up to round (𝑖− 1).
3. ℬ checks that 𝒜 passes the first (𝑖− 1) rounds.
4. ℬ samples a salt 𝑠← [𝐾] and it checks (or measures) whether 𝐷(𝑠) = ⊥.
5. If any of the two checks fails, ℬ clears all registers and start back at the beginning.
If both checks pass, note that the overall state now conditioned on (𝑠𝑖, 𝑟𝑖, 𝑏𝑖)’s is exactly
1
ℓ𝑠
(𝐼 −𝑄𝑠) |𝜑0⟩ where ℓ𝑠 = |(𝐼 −𝑄𝑠) |𝜑0⟩ | ≤ 1 is the normalization factor.
6. ℬ simulates the 𝑖-th round using a modified oracle 𝐻*, where 𝐻* is consistent with 𝐻𝑆 , except
on salt 𝑠 where the queries are instead forwarded to 𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻 . In particular,
∙ The challenge sent to 𝒜 is instead 𝖲𝖺𝗆𝗉𝐻*𝑆 (𝑠, 𝑟) = 𝖲𝖺𝗆𝗉𝐻
*(𝑠,·)(𝑟) = 𝖲𝖺𝗆𝗉𝐻(𝑟) = 𝖼𝗁
where 𝖼𝗁 is the challenge received from 𝐶.
∙ When 𝒜 makes a quantum oracle query 𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻*𝑆 ((𝑠, 𝑟), (𝑠′, 𝑥)), if 𝑠 ̸= 𝑠′, ℬ can simulate
the query using 𝖢𝖲𝗍𝖮 on 𝐻𝑠; if 𝑠 = 𝑠′, ℬ makes an oracle query (𝑟, 𝑥) to 𝐶, since
𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻
*
𝑆 ((𝑠, 𝑟), (𝑠
′, 𝑥)) = 𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻(𝑟, 𝑥) if 𝑠 = 𝑠′.
Note that this simulation does not require knowledge of 𝑟 and only uses query access to
𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻 , as desired.
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7. Finally, ℬ output |𝖺𝗇𝗌⟩ from the overall state 1ℓ𝑠𝑈𝑠,𝑟(𝐼 −𝑄𝑠) |𝜑0⟩.
Since we condition on step 4 passing (𝐷(𝑠) = ⊥), 𝐻𝑆 and 𝐻* are perfectly indistinguishable for 𝒜.
Therefore the succeeding probability of ℬ is,
1
𝐾 ·𝑅
∑︁
𝑠,𝑟
⃒⃒⃒⃒
1
ℓ𝑠
𝑃𝑠,𝑟𝑈𝑠,𝑟(𝐼 −𝑄𝑠) |𝜑0⟩
⃒⃒⃒⃒2
≥ 1
𝐾 ·𝑅
∑︁
𝑠,𝑟
|𝑃𝑠,𝑟𝑈𝑠,𝑟(𝐼 −𝑄𝑠) |𝜑0⟩|2 .
By security of the unsalted game, left hand side is bounded by 𝛿′, therefore,
1
𝐾 ·𝑅
∑︁
𝑠,𝑟
|𝑃𝑠,𝑟𝑈𝑠,𝑟(𝐼 −𝑄𝑠) |𝜑0⟩|2 ≤ 𝛿′. (7)
Putting this together with (6), we conclude that the algorithm wins 𝑖-th round with probability
at most 2𝑔(𝑇 + 1)/𝐾 + 2𝛿′(𝑇 ). Therefore, invoking Lemma 3.14, for any (𝑔, 𝑇 ) algorithm in the
QROM, the succeeding probability is at most (2𝑔(𝑇 + 1)/𝐾 + 2𝛿′(𝑇 ))𝑔.
Proof of (5). Using (7), the probability of 𝒜 winning round 𝑖 conditioned on (𝑠𝑖, 𝑟𝑖, 𝑏𝑖)’s is,
1
𝐾 ·𝑅
∑︁
𝑠,𝑟
𝑝𝑠,𝑟 ≤ 1
𝐾 ·𝑅
∑︁
𝑠,𝑟
(
√
𝑞𝑠 + |𝑃𝑠,𝑟𝑈𝑠,𝑟(𝐼 −𝑄𝑠) |𝜑0⟩|)2
=
1
𝐾 ·𝑅
∑︁
𝑠,𝑟
(︁
𝑞𝑠 + |𝑃𝑠,𝑟𝑈𝑠,𝑟(𝐼 −𝑄𝑠) |𝜑⟩0|2 + 2
√
𝑞𝑠 |𝑃𝑠,𝑟𝑈𝑠,𝑟(𝐼 −𝑄𝑠) |𝜑0⟩|
)︁
≤ 𝑔(𝑇 + 1)
𝐾
+ 𝛿′(𝑇 ) +
2
𝐾 ·𝑅
∑︁
𝑠,𝑟
√
𝑞𝑠 · 1
≤ 𝑔(𝑇 + 1)
𝐾
+ 𝛿′(𝑇 ) + 2
√︂
𝑔(𝑇 + 1)
𝐾
≤ 𝛿′(𝑇 ) + 3
√︂
𝑔(𝑇 + 1)
𝐾
,
The last inequality holds assuming 𝑔(𝑇 +1)/𝐾 ≤ 1, since otherwise (5) also trivially holds. There-
fore, using Lemma 3.14, for any (𝑔, 𝑇 ) algorithm in the QROM, the succeeding probability is at
most
(︂
𝛿′(𝑇 ) + 3
√︁
𝑔(𝑇+1)
𝐾
)︂𝑔
.
7.2 Hardness of Salted Collision-Resistant Hash Functions
Definition 7.7 (Collision-Resistant Hash Security Game). Security game 𝐺𝖢𝖱𝖧 = (𝐶𝖢𝖱𝖧) is spec-
ified by three procedures (𝖲𝖺𝗆𝗉,𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒,𝖵𝖾𝗋), where:
1. 𝖲𝖺𝗆𝗉𝐻(⊥) = ⊥.
2. 𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻(⊥, ·) = 𝐻(·) provides query access to 𝐻.
3. 𝖵𝖾𝗋𝐻(⊥, (𝑥1, 𝑥2)) outputs 1 if and only if 𝑥1 ̸= 𝑥2 and 𝐻(𝑥1) = 𝐻(𝑥2).
It is easy to see that 𝑆 = 2 log𝑀 suffices to break this security game with optimal probability.
However, without advice, the problem is hard even against quantum computations.
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Proposition 7.8 ([Zha19, Corollary 2]). 𝐺𝖢𝖱𝖧 has security Θ(𝑇 3/𝑀) in QROM.
It is easy to verify that this game is publicly-verifiable, as 𝖵𝖾𝗋𝐻(⊥, (𝑥1, 𝑥2)) = 𝖵𝖾𝗋𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻 (⊥, (𝑥1, 𝑥2)).
Denote the salted collision-resistant hash game as 𝐺𝖢𝖱𝖧,𝑆 . Combining this lemma with Theorem 7.3,
and the fact that random guessing has winning probability 1/𝑀 , we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 7.9. 𝐺𝖢𝖱𝖧,𝑆 is 𝑂(𝑇 3/𝑀 + (𝑆 + log𝑀)𝑇/𝐾)-secure in the AI-QROM, and ?̃?(𝑇 3/𝑀 +
𝑆𝑇/𝐾)1/4-secure in the QAI-QROM, where ?̃? absorbs 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒(log𝑁, log𝑀, log𝐾, log𝑆) factors.
We now proceed to show the implication of this corollary in complexity theory for function
problems.
Definition 7.10 (Polynomial Weak Pigeonhole Principle). A binary relation 𝑃 (𝑥, 𝑦) is in 𝖯𝖶𝖯𝖯
if and only if 𝑃 is Karp-reducible to 𝖢𝖮𝖫𝖫𝖨𝖲𝖨𝖮𝖭(𝒞, (𝑥1, 𝑥2)), where 𝒞 is a circuit with 𝑛 inputs and
𝑚 < 𝑛 outputs, and (𝒞, (𝑥1, 𝑥2)) is in 𝖢𝖮𝖫𝖫𝖨𝖲𝖨𝖮𝖭 if and only if 𝒞(𝑥1) = 𝒞(𝑥2).
Definition 7.11 (Function Bounded-error Quantum Polynomial time with Polynomial-size Quan-
tum advice). A binary relation 𝑃 (𝑥, 𝑦) is in 𝖥𝖡𝖰𝖯/𝗊𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒 if and only if there exists a polynomial-time
uniform family of quantum circuits {𝐶𝑛}𝑛∈ℕ such that for any 𝑥, there exists some quantum state
𝜌 of dimension 2𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒(|𝑥|), such that Pr[𝑃 (𝑥,𝐶|𝑥|(𝜌, 𝑥))] ≥ 2/3.
Theorem 7.12. Relative to a random oracle 𝒪, 𝖯𝖶𝖯𝖯𝒪 ̸⊆ 𝖥𝖡𝖰𝖯𝒪/𝗊𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒.
Proof. For any integer 𝑛, let 𝒪𝑛 : [2𝑛] × [2𝑛+1] ↦→ [2𝑛] be a random oracle. Consider the relation
𝑃𝒪(𝑘, (𝑥1, 𝑥2)) that corresponds to finding collision in 𝒪(𝑘, ·) (which is a circuit consisting of one
oracle gate) for any 𝑘 ∈ [2𝑛] is a problem in 𝖯𝖶𝖯𝖯𝒪 as 2𝑛+1 > 2𝑛, however, by the corollary above,
any quantum polynomial-time algorithm with polynomial-size advice can succeed with probability
exp(−Ω(𝑛)) over a random 𝑘, in particular, this implies that there exists some hard instance 𝑘 such
that the algorithm cannot succeed with non-negligible probability, and therefore proving that this
problem is not in 𝖥𝖡𝖰𝖯𝒪/𝗊𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗒.
7.3 Tightness of Salted Game Lower Bound
In this subsection, we establish the tightness of Theorem 7.3. In particular, we show that the bound
is asymptotically tight up to poly-logarithmic factors for the following simple game.
Definition 7.13 (Prediction Security Game). Let 𝐻 be a random oracle [1] → [𝑀 ], i.e. 𝑁 = 1.
The security game 𝐺𝖸𝖡𝟢 = (𝐶𝖸𝖡𝟢) is specified by three procedures (𝖲𝖺𝗆𝗉,𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒,𝖵𝖾𝗋), where:
1. 𝖲𝖺𝗆𝗉𝐻(⊥) = ⊥.
2. 𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗒𝐻(⊥, ·) = ⊥.
3. 𝖵𝖾𝗋𝐻(⊥, 𝑦) outputs 1 if and only if 𝐻(1) = 𝑦.
For this game, the adversary is asked to predict 𝐻(1), and therefore its security 𝛿′(𝑇 ) = 1/𝑀 .
Intuitively, the salted prediction game, denoted as 𝐺𝖸𝖡𝟢,𝑆 is simply Yao’s box over a large alphabet
[𝑀 ]. Combining this with Theorem 7.3, we immediately obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 7.14. 𝐺𝖸𝖡𝟢,𝑆 is 𝛿(𝑆, 𝑇 ) = 𝑂(1/𝑀 + (𝑆 + log𝑀)𝑇/𝐾)-secure in the AI-QROM.
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Proposition 7.15. For any 𝑆, 𝑇 such that 𝑆(𝑇 + 1) ≤ 𝐾 log𝑀 , there exists an (𝑆, 𝑇 )-adversary
in the AI-QROM that breaks 𝐺𝖸𝖡𝟢 with winning probability at least Ω(1/𝑀 +𝑆(𝑇 +1)/(𝐾 log𝑀)).
Proof. For the purpose of this proof, we will instead view 𝐻𝑆 : [𝐾] ↦→ ℤ/𝑀ℤ as [𝐾]× [1] ≃ [𝐾] and
[𝑀 ] ≃ ℤ/𝑀ℤ. In the pre-processing stage, the algorithm stores the following 𝑆/ log𝑀 elements in
ℤ/𝑀ℤ: for the 𝑗-th element 𝗌𝗎𝗆𝑗 ,
𝗌𝗎𝗆𝑗 =
𝑇+1∑︁
𝑘=1
𝐻(𝑗(𝑇 + 1) + 𝑘), ∀𝑗 = 0, 1, · · · , 𝑆/ log𝑀 − 1.
In the online state, given a salt 𝑠 ∈ [𝐾], if 𝑠 ̸∈ {1, · · · , 𝑆(𝑇 +1)/ log𝑀}, the algorithm randomly
guesses a 𝑦. Otherwise, let 𝑗 be the unique integer such that 𝑗(𝑇 + 1) < 𝑠 ≤ (𝑗 + 1)(𝑇 + 1). The
algorithm queries 𝐻(𝑠′) for all 𝑠′ ∈ {𝑗(𝑇 + 1) + 1, · · · , (𝑗 + 1)(𝑇 + 1)}, 𝑠′ ̸= 𝑠, and subtract them
from 𝗌𝗎𝗆𝑗 and output the result, which succeeds with probability 1.
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A Extended Preliminaries for Compressed Oracle
Lemma 2.3. Let 𝒜 be a quantum algorithm making at most 𝑇 queries to a phase oracle. The overall
state of 𝒜 and the phase oracle can be written as ∑︀𝑧,𝐷:|𝐷|≤𝑇 𝛼𝑧,𝐷 |𝑧⟩ ⊗ 1𝑀𝑁/2 ∑︀𝐻 𝜔⟨𝐷,𝐻⟩𝑀 |𝐻⟩ =∑︀
𝑧,𝐷:|𝐷|≤𝑇 𝛼𝑧,𝐷 |𝑧⟩ ⊗ |𝜑𝐷⟩.
Moreover, it is true even if the state is conditioned on arbitrary outcomes (with non-zero proba-
bility) of 𝒜’s intermediate measurements.
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Proof. We begin by assuming that there are no intermediate measurements. Note that if 𝒜 makes
some local quantum computation 𝑈 ⊗ 𝐼 on his on register |𝑧⟩, it does not affect the statement, as
(𝑈 ⊗ 𝐼)
∑︁
𝑧,𝐷:|𝐷|≤𝑇
𝛼𝑧,𝐷 |𝑧⟩ |𝜑𝐷⟩ =
∑︁
𝐷:|𝐷|≤𝑇
(︃
𝑈
∑︁
𝑧
𝛼𝑧,𝐷 |𝑧⟩
)︃
|𝜑𝐷⟩ .
We prove the lemma by induction. The base case is before 𝒜 makes any query. The overall
state by definition is
∑︀
𝑧 𝛼𝑧 |𝑧⟩ ⊗ 1𝑀𝑁/2
∑︀
𝐻 |𝐻⟩. If we view the register |𝐻⟩ under the Fourier basis
|𝜑𝐷⟩, there is only non-zero amplitude on 𝐷0 which is an all-zero vector.
If 𝒜 makes an oracle query to phase oracle, using the “phase kickback” trick,
𝖯𝗁𝖮
∑︁
𝑧=(𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑)
𝐷:|𝐷|≤𝑇
𝛼𝑧,𝐷 |𝑥, 𝑢, 𝖺𝗎𝗑⟩ 1
𝑀𝑁/2
∑︁
𝐻
𝜔
⟨𝐷,𝐻⟩
𝑀 |𝐻⟩
=
∑︁
𝑧=(𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑)
𝐷:|𝐷|≤𝑇
𝛼𝑧,𝐷 |𝑥, 𝑢, 𝖺𝗎𝗑⟩ 1
𝑀𝑁/2
∑︁
𝐻
𝜔
⟨𝐷,𝐻⟩+𝑢𝐻(𝑥)
𝑀 |𝐻⟩
=
∑︁
𝑧=(𝑥,𝑢,𝖺𝗎𝗑)
𝐷:|𝐷|≤𝑇
𝛼𝑧,𝐷 |𝑥, 𝑢, 𝖺𝗎𝗑⟩ |𝜑𝐷⊕(𝑥,𝑢)⟩ ,
where 𝐷 ⊕ (𝑥, 𝑢) is defined as a new vector that is almost identical to 𝐷 but the 𝑥-th entry is
updated to 𝐷(𝑥) + 𝑢. Therefore, it is easy to see that |𝐷 ⊕ (𝑥, 𝑢)| ≤ |𝐷| + 1 for all 𝐷, which
implies that the resulting state has only non-zero amplitude on |𝑧⟩ |𝐷′⟩ whose |𝐷′| ≤ 𝑇 + 1. Using
induction, we reach our conclusion for the case where there are no intermediate measurements.
Now consider the case where 𝒜 makes intermediate measurements. Without loss of generality,
we can delay all the measurements to the last step. Before making these measurement, we know
the overall state can be written as∑︁
𝑧,𝑏1,··· ,𝑏𝑘,𝐷:|𝐷|≤𝑇
𝛼𝑧,𝑏1··· ,𝑏𝑘,𝐷 |𝑧⟩ |𝑏1, · · · , 𝑏𝑘⟩ ⊗ |𝜑𝐷⟩ ,
where each |𝑏𝑖⟩ is going to be measured by 𝒜. Therefore, it is easy to see that conditioned on
any outcomes of the measurements (of non-zero probability), the resulting state has only non-zero
amplitude on |𝑧⟩ |𝐷⟩ whose |𝐷| ≤ 𝑇 .
Lemma 2.6. If 𝒜 makes at most 𝑇 queries to a compressed standard oracle, assuming the overall
state of 𝒜 and the compressed standard oracle is ∑︀𝑧,𝐷 𝛼𝑧,𝐷 |𝑧⟩𝒜|𝐷⟩𝐻 , then it has support on all 𝐷
such that |𝐷| ≤ 𝑇 . In other words, the overall state can be written as,∑︁
𝑧,𝐷:|𝐷|≤𝑇
𝛼𝑧,𝐷 |𝑧⟩𝒜 ⊗ |𝐷⟩𝐻 .
Moreover, it is true even if the state is conditioned on arbitrary outcomes (with non-zero probability)
of 𝒜’s intermediate measurements.
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Proof. First, 𝒜 applies a local unitary/measurement over its register. Since the operation does not
operate on 𝐷, it cannot change the probability distribution of the outcomes on measuring 𝐷. As a
consequence, this operation cannot increase max𝛼𝑧,𝐷>0 |𝐷|.
Second, 𝒜 makes an oracle query on state |𝑥⟩ |𝑢⟩. We claim that 𝖢𝖲𝗍𝖮 |𝑥⟩ |𝑢⟩ |𝐷⟩ is a state with
support on database 𝐷′ such that |𝐷′| ≤ |𝐷|+1, which is implicitly stated in the proof for Lemma
4, Hybrid 4 in [Zha19], and can also be directly derived from the definition of 𝖢𝖲𝗍𝖮 and 𝖲𝗍𝖽𝖣𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉.
We reach our conclusion by using an induction if there are no intermediate measurements.
Finally, 𝒜 makes intermediate measurements. Without loss of generality, all these measurements
are delayed to the last step. Before making these measurement, by the above discussion, the overall
state can be written as ∑︁
𝑧,𝑏1,··· ,𝑏𝑘,𝐷:|𝐷|≤𝑇
𝛼𝑧,𝑏1··· ,𝑏𝑘,𝐷 |𝑧⟩ |𝑏1, · · · , 𝑏𝑘⟩ ⊗ |𝐷⟩
where each |𝑏𝑖⟩ is going to be measured by 𝒜. Therefore, it is easy to see that conditioned on
any outcomes of the measurements (of non-zero probability), the resulting state has only non-zero
amplitude on |𝑧⟩ |𝐷⟩ whose |𝐷| ≤ 𝑇 .
Lemma 2.7 ([Zha19, Lemma 5]). Let 𝐻 be a random oracle from [𝑁 ]→ [𝑀 ]. Consider a quantum
algorithm 𝒜 making queries to the standard oracle and outputting tuples (𝑥1, · · · , 𝑥𝑘, 𝑦1, · · · , 𝑦𝑘, 𝑧).
Supposed the random function 𝐻 is measured after 𝒜 produces its output. Let 𝑅 be an arbitrary
set of such tuples. Suppose with probability 𝑝, 𝒜 outputs a tuple such that (1) the tuple is in 𝑅 and
(2) 𝐻(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑦𝑖 for all 𝑖. Now consider running 𝒜 with the compressed standard oracle CStO, and
supposed the database 𝐷 is measured after 𝒜 produces its output. Let 𝑝′ be the probability that (1)
the tuple is in 𝑅 and (2) 𝐷(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑦𝑖 (in particular, 𝐷(𝑥𝑖) ̸= ⊥) for all 𝑖. Then √𝑝 ≤
√
𝑝′+
√︀
𝑘/𝑀 .
Moreover, it is true even if it is conditioned on arbitrary outcomes (with non-zero probability)
of 𝒜’s intermediate measurements.
Proof. Without conditioning on intermediate measurements, this is the exact statement of [Zha19,
Lemma 5]. Observe that their proof works as long as the final state of the algorithm and the oracle
can be written as,∑︁
𝐱,𝐲,𝑧,𝐷
∀𝑖,𝐷(𝑥𝑖)=⊥
∑︁
𝐼⊆[𝑘]
∑︁
𝐫𝐼∈{1,...,𝑀−1}|𝐼|
𝛼𝐱,𝐲,𝑧,𝐷,𝐫𝐼
1√
𝑀 |𝐼|
∑︁
𝐲′𝐼∈(ℤ/𝑀ℤ)|𝐼|
𝜔
⟨𝐲′𝐼 ,𝐫𝐼⟩
𝑀
⃒⃒
𝐱,𝐲, 𝑧,𝐷 ∪ (𝐱𝐼 ,𝐲′𝐼)
⟩︀
, (8)
where 𝐱 ∈ [𝑁 ]𝑘,𝐲 ∈ (ℤ/𝑀ℤ)𝑘. That is, if 𝐷(𝑥) ̸= ⊥, then the superposition of 𝐷(𝑥) decomposed in
the Fourier basis does not contain a uniform superposition (corresponding to 𝐫𝐼 ∈ {1, ...,𝑀 − 1}|𝐼|
in the formula, or in other words, no 0 entry).
Zhandry showed the final state satisfies the condition above. It is indeed easy to prove. Recall
that 𝖢𝖲𝗍𝖮 = 𝖲𝗍𝖽𝖣𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉 ∘ 𝖢𝖲𝗍𝖮′ ∘ 𝖲𝗍𝖽𝖣𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉. As the second 𝖲𝗍𝖽𝖣𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉 will map any uniform∑︀
𝑦 |𝑦⟩ to |⊥⟩, the decomposition in the Fourier basis does not contain uniform superposition.
Now consider the case of having intermediate measurements. We claim that the state has the
above form, conditioned on arbitrary outcomes (with non-zero probability) of 𝒜’s intermediate mea-
surements. Without loss of generality, we defer all measurements until the end of the computation.
Before making these measurements, we know the overall state can be written as∑︁
𝐱,𝐲,𝑧,𝜔,𝐷
∀𝑖,𝐷(𝑥𝑖)=⊥
∑︁
𝐼⊆[𝑘]
∑︁
𝐫𝐼∈{1,...,𝑀−1}|𝐼|
𝛼𝐱,𝐲,𝑧,𝜔,𝐷,𝐫𝐼
1√
𝑀 |𝐼|
∑︁
𝐲′𝐼∈(ℤ/𝑀ℤ)|𝐼|
𝜔
⟨𝐲′𝐼 ,𝐫𝐼⟩
𝑀
⃒⃒
𝐱,𝐲, 𝑧, 𝜔,𝐷 ∪ (𝐱𝐼 ,𝐲′𝐼)
⟩︀
,
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where 𝜔 ∈ Ω is the register to be measured. It is easy to see that after conditioning on 𝜔 ∈ 𝐸
where 𝐸 ⊆ Ω being an arbitrary event, the final state can still be written as (8), as conditioning
simply zeroes out some 𝛼’s for every 𝜔 ̸∈ 𝐸 and re-normalizes. The rest of the proof simply follows
Zhandry’s proof for [Zha19, Lemma 5].
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